

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ROMANIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE

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ILIE CEAUSESCU

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CHAPTER 1

THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE ENTIRE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR THE HOMELAND'S DEFENSE FROM TIMES OF YORE TO THE MIDDLE AGES

Millenary Historical Roots of the Doctrine of the Entire People's War of the Romanians

The Romanian people come from the Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic area, one of the oldest cultural regions known in Europe. The Romanian people "through its forefathers," asserted the great Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga, "*has fourfold military roots:* this is our pride and thus is our power."[1]

As attested by sources of all kinds, our legitimate ancestors were the Geto-Dacians. They had had a permanent presence in the Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic area.[2]

The Geto-Dacians were kin of the Thracians. The power, numbers and importance of the Thracian world were pointed out by Herodotus, "the father of history," who said about them: "The kin of the Thracians, the largest one after that of the Indians would be undefeatable and by far stronger than any kin on earth, if they had only one leader and lived in concord."[3]

In the geographic, economic, historical, and cultural conditions typical of the then north Balkan and north Danubian lands, the Thracian society

developed into an independent organic entity. So, starting with the ninth and eighth centuries B.C., one could already speak about the Geto-Dacians in the Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic area: Getae (Γεται) and Dacians (Λαχοι) as peoples with an independent political, economic, and cultural organization, unitary both ethnically and linguistically, whose historical destiny would be different from that of the south Balkan area where they emerged.[4] The Geto-Dacians were first attested by written sources almost 2,500 years ago. Herodotus describes them as the "bravest and the most righteous of the Thracians," and numerous ancient documents have given us information that this people was living in a large territory extending from the Tisza River to the Balkans, and north of the Black Sea to the mouth of the Bug River.

Archeological investigations, especially those made in the last few decades by the Romanian, Bulgarian, Soviet, Hungarian, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, and other researchers proves that, starting with the seventh century B.C., Geto-Dacian society passed to the Iron Age. It developed then, naturally, toward an advanced form of political organization for that time; they were good farmers, shepherds, handicraftsmen, merchants and miners. These peaceful occupations and the level of culture they built put their imprint, from the very beginning, on the entire activity of the Geto-Dacians in the field of military theory and practice, which had a strong defensive character. Frequest foreign invasions by empires that, through history, surrounded the ancient lands of the Romanian people always mobilized its forces and energies. Located "in the way of all wrongs"—eloquently described by Grigore Ureche—with one hand on the plough and the other on the weapon, the Romanian people had always been in a close symbiosis with the land where it lived and toiled.

It is a fundamental truth that the peculiar trait of the Romanian people's millenary struggle against any invaders, whatever their strength and equipment, was a popular resistance, an entire people's struggle.[5] The then contemporary sources clearly attest that, when the country was in danger, all the people (able to bear arms or inflict casualties on the enemy—men, women, young, and old) rose to fight as one. Wisely employing the terrain, its reliable ally for ever, they could inflict shattering blows on the aggressor, no matter the season, by day or night, finally chasing the enemy out.

Grounded in such fighting experience, during a long historical process, the content and fundamental elements of a local military technique crystallized:

with war by an entire people, this military system relied on the organization, preparation, and employment of all human and material resources, the judicious use of the home territory, the creation of the technical and material means needed, the strong development of morale and of virtues. Original fighting forms and means to lessen the enemy's superiority included, "scorched earth" strategy and tactics, the continuous harassment of the aggressors, incessant assaults, resistance by successive alignments in various terrains (mountains, hills, woods, water courses), surprise attacks and ambushes or drawing the enemy to places established in advance allowed shattering blows to be struck.

All through its history, the Romanians' struggle for the accomplishment of its major desiderata were just, and the wars it wages were always defensive wars. "As a matter of fact, the history of our people, of our army," stressed Romania's President Ceaușescu, "has strongly evinced that the Romanian people [and] its army never aimed at aggressive goals."[6]

The First Written Documents Attesting to the Defensive Wars Wages by the Geto-Dacians (Sixth-First-Century A.D.)

Archaeological investigations have proved that the inhabitants of the Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic area had to cope with successive invasions, which permanently preoccupied them in searching out the most adequate and efficient methods of fighting various tribes and populations. Written documents, as well as the archeological finds, prove that, ever since the third millenium B.C., the autochthonous population could not be driven from the area, irrespective of the strength of the successive invasions. moreover, having a solid and flourishing material and spiritual culture, the autochtonous population could successfully cope with the quite frequent danger of foreign expansion and even assimilate them into the local culture.[7] This process made possible the emergence of the great and strong Thracian community in the vast area from the Carpathians to the Aegean and even in Asia Minor, and from central Europe to the north Pontic steppes.

Relying on their own forces, our forefathers always found the most adequate and efficient forms and methods to defeat aggressors. In the entire Geto-Dacian area, the existence of some bodies politic has been identified; these built strong military organizations whose fundamental goal was homeland defense, not the conquest of foreign territories. The

very reason for this ancestral military doctrine was its defensive character, aiming exclusively at the defense of the land. The entire population in the territory threatened by aggressors took part in such defense. A firm determination to face and defeat the enemy and soldierly virtues were the resources of the Geto-Dacians. The defensive character of their military doctrine is also illustrated by the existence of a strong and large net of fortifications, among which the strongholds (*davae*) played an important role.[8] The solidity and, in particular, the great size of these fortifications gave convincing proof of the entire peopulation's participation in the defensive effort in the territory subject to aggression, each stronghold being a resistance center.

In the eighth to seventh centuries B.C., the Geto-Dacians' defensive struggle was marked by their rising to arms to cope with the great danger of expansion by the Scythians, whose raids from the north Pontic steppes had become highly dangerous and, starting in the first half of the first millenium B.C., the whole Geto-Dacian society would pass through a process of continually and irreversibly developing its political organization, as a result of both internal development and the frequent and hard confrontations with invading armies much superior in point of effectives and equipment. From the kinship-tribal organization in the nineth to eighth centuries B.C. to the bodies politic in the fifth to first centuries B.C. and the centralized Dacian state in the time of Burebista and Decebalus, there was a historical process of gradual accumulation of the first elements of the doctrine of people's war among the Romanians.[9]

From those beginnings, there stood out the fundamental political-strategic objective of the military doctrine of our forefathers—namely the defense of the integrity of the native land, organically integrated into the Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic area. The attainment of this objective needed huge human and material resources because our forefathers' ancient lands and their riches aroused the greed of some strong and numerous aggressors. Under unfavorable conditions in the balance of forces, our forefathers learned to successfully use an original method of waging defensive wars, i.e., the entire people's struggle. The first big military confrontation marking the beginning of the historical process of crystallizing such a doctrine was the defensive war waged by the Geto-Dacians against Darius the Great's invading Persian armies.

In the 514 B.C. advance toward the mouth of the Danube, in order to subdue recalcitrant Scythian tribes, the huge Persian army under King Darius marched through the Getae's lands between the Danube, the Black Sea, and the Balkans.[10] Unlike other Thracian tribes, which submitted to Darius without fighting, resistance by the Getae, "who considered themselves immortal," amazed all the ancient world. So, the Geto-Dacians entered written history through everlasting feats of arms performed in a battle against a much superior enemy. It was in the thick of some fierce battles that the first forms and procedures of the entire people's struggle became traditional: permanent harassment of the enemy, the denying, by destruction, of goods to the enemy, taling the enemy by surprise, and laying traps and ambushes.[11]

The main trait of the first military actions of the Geto-Dacians was the mass character of the resistance, as later sources would attest when referring to the fights waged in these territories. The Geto-Dacians put up successive resistance against both the advance of the Persian army and the union of tribes in south Dobrudja and north of the region between the Danube and the Black Sea (both of them archaeologically attested).[12] The first rising to arms of the Geto-Dacian people against the greatest power of that time was an example of its unflinching determination to defend its liberty and ancestral land, an eloquent proof of its capacity in employing ingenious and efficacious fighting forms and methods, in skillfully using the advantages offered by the terrain, in maing its own conception of the homeland's defense against any aggressors through the correct employment of all human, material, and spiritual resources.

Although complete records of the Geto-Dacians' military ideas have not survived, the information offered by ancient writings about the character of the wars they waged, the military structures and practical ways of action reveal the presence of such conceptions at the level of the Dacian political and military leadership. The same principles, grounded in the entire people's resistance no matter what the conditions, until the final chasing away of the enemy, and the deadly blows dealt to the enemy that invaded the Geto-Dacian lands would accompany, in the following centuries, the efforts of the Geto-Dacian people to defend its independence and state life.

A direct outcome of the evolution of the Geto-Dacian society by the mid-fourth century B.C. was strong political organizations. They rose to

fight firmly against the Macedonian expansion and established close relations with the south Danubian Thracians and the Illyrians, a prerequisite to a larger alliance of the Geto-Dacians with the other peoples in the Balkans.[13] In 335 B.C., the first confrontation between the Getae and the Macedonians took place when Alexander the Great, aiming at establishing the northern frontiers of his kingdom on the Danube, led an expedition to the left bank of that river.[14] In these fights, the doctrine of the entire people's struggle proved its superiority, contributing to the winning of the brilliant victories by the Geto-Dacians and the complete annihilation of the Macedonian velites.

The Geto-Dacian effecvies committed to battle (4,000 horsemen and 10,000 footmen) show the military capacity of the formations that opposed the conqueror of the ancient world.[15] For all this, the defenders avoided a direct confrontation with the Macedonian phalanges and adopted an ingenious maneuver, which was for posterity—beyond the immediate results of the conflict—a good example of the capacity of resistance to aggression in their own territory.[16] The big confrontation at the Danube directly contributed to ending Macedonian plans for penetrating Geto-Dacian territory, demonstrating that the military art of our forefathers was able to employ ingenious fighting methods adapted to changes in the battlefield. Geto-Dacian tactics, characterized by laying traps and ambushes, harassment of the enemy, sheltering the nonfighting population and their wealth at safe places established in advance highlighted some of the essential traits of the autochthonous inhabitants' military art, which was to become traditional with the Romanians.[17]

The rapid political-military evolution in the Balkan Peninsula, after the death of Alexander the Great, would have strong repercussions upon the Geto-Dacians in the territory between the Danube and the Carpathians.

By the end of the fourth and beginning of the third centuries B.C., Geto-Dacian territory was seriously affected in the south because of the installment of Macedonian rule over the territories between the Danube, Balkans, and the Black Sea. But, north of the Danube, in the Carpatho-Danubian area, the strong Geto-Dacian body politic continued its existence: a state formation that stubbornly opposed Macedonian expansion. By about 300 B.C., the powerful political formation of the Geto-Dacians was headed by Dromichaites, whose strong personality focused the attention of his ctonemporaries by brilliant victories scored against Lysimachus,

the Macedonian king of Thrace and one of the former generals of Alexander the Great.[19] Continuing an expansionist policy, aimed at consolidating his rule over the Danube line, Lysimachus had mounted offensive actions against the Getae-Dacian state formations. The Dacian-Macedonian conflict, developed in the two phases of 300/299 and 292 B.C., confirmed once again the spirit of sacrifice of the Geto-Dacian people, its legendary heroism, and resistance power.[20]

Remarkable are the appreciations of the ancient writings about the soldierly virtues of the Geto-Dacians, their cleverness and diplomatic skillfulness in treating the defeated enemy, and in nullifying the Macedonian velites. It is thus known that in the first campaign, "Lysimachus had to face men very deft in warfare and who outnumbered him by far. He himself was in great danger and escaped by running for his life."[21] His son "Agathocles was made a prisoner by the Getae."[22] The peace that followed was highly profitable for the Getae, who knew to turn to good account the victory o the battlefield. In exchange for the release of Agathocles, the Dromichaites-led Getae established their control over the territory occupied by Lysimachus and over the "lands beyond the Istros [Danube]," and perhaps some Macedonian bridgeheads north of the river.

In the second stage of the conflict, the Geto-Dacians (headed by Dromichaites) employed other elements of military art, such as drawing the enemy to places fixed in advance, the strategy and action of the "flexible retreat" and "scorched earth," reshuffling forces in an organized way in the interior of the country, the permanent harassment of the enemy, drawing it to unknown and hostile territories for surprise attacks, etc.[23] At that time of ordeal, as Diodorus Siculus narrates, "Dromichaites took them by surprise and defeated Lysimachus and all his troops, accounting for one hundred thousand men."[24] The defeated Macedonian army had to surrender, and Lysimachus and his generals were taken to the residence of Dromichaites, the stronghold of Helis. Although the assembly of the armed men demanded severe punishment for the captive king, Dromichaites preferred to conclude a profitable and lasting peace, a very humanitarian political solution. "Dromichaites was agianst the king's severe punishment," and he explained that this man should be saved because "he was to be grateful vis-à-vis the people [the Getae] who granted his life. And the fortified places which had been occupied by them

[the Macedonians] will be returned to the Getae without any danger."[25] Aiming at political consolidation by assuring good relations with the Geto-Dacians' neighbors, Dromichaites "urged them not to wage warfare against people like him and in *places in which no foreign army can escape under the open sky.*"[26]

In the following centuries, the Geto-Dacian people had to cope with new and different invading waves that tried to seize by force some parts of ancient Dacia. The strong Geto-Dacian communities all over their native territory were led by good, deft kings, and skillful army commanders who would cope successfully with the onslaughts by the Scythians, the warlike Celts (temporary conquerors of part of Dacia's lands and of Transylvania), or the Bestarnae who occupied, for a short while, areas in northern Moldavia.[27]

The Entire People's Participation in the Military Effort to Consolidate the Independent Centralized Dacian State headed by Burebista

By the end of the second century B.C. and the beginning of the first century B.C., the aspirations for unity by the communities intensified ever more as an expression of the consciousness of living in the same territory, and of speaking the same language became general throughout the entire Geto-Dacian area, a prerequisite for the making of the Dacian centralized state in the first century B.C. At the same time, it needed the union of the military organization from each community into a single army under one authority to liberate Geto-Dacian lands still under foreign sway and for the maintenance of the independence and unity of the ancient hearth.

All ancient historical resources and archeological findings eulogize the great king Burebista and the first independent centralized Dacian state organized and ruled by him. Thus Strabo, the geographer and historian of antiquity, wrote in his *Geography:* "Setting aside the remote past of the Getae, the happenings of our times are the following: coming at the head of his people, who were tired of frequent wars, the Geto Burebista raised them so much by exercises, abstention from wine and obedience to orders, that after a few years he came to build up a strong state and the Getae subjected most of the neighboring populations. Morover

he came to be feared by the Romans themselves."[28] The high standard of development attained by the Dacian state ruled by Burebista was a direct expression of its material and spiritual life.

The existence of a centralized political authority in Dacia had remarkable consequences for the development of material production, envinced among other things by thriving handicrafts and commercial and civil building activities. The exploitation of gold, silver, iron, copper, and salt deposits was intensified; cities and long-lasting roads were built and cultural edifices were erected. A prosperous agriculture also developed in Dacia. Concurrent with the development of material life and closely linked to it, spiritual life fully blossomed on Dacia's territory. The Geto-Dacian people contributed to enriching the universal spiritual thesaurus; evidence from various ancient sources and material tracts brought to light by archeology highlight the fact that the Geto-Dacians were skilled builders and possessed remarkable knowledge in medicine, astronomy, philosophy, architecture, music, etc.[29]

The economic and spiritual development of the Geto-Dacian society during Burebista's reign favored the strengthening of the country's defense capacity through the organization of a large and strong army. Strabo noted that Burebista could "commit to the fight some 200,000 men," a figure not exaggerated if one takes into account the vast area of the Dacian state, the numerous human settlements, and the ever-increasing demographic possibilities.[30] The level attained by this society, the existence of a large army, disciplined and well-trained, gave a strong stimulus to the military doctrone of this great king and army commander and deepened its popular character, which aimed for the defense of the Dacian people's liberty and integrity and state independence.

Fortifications were to play an important role. The great army commander was preoccupied with building fortified settlements and strongholds, adding to this the wise employment of the advantages offered by the variegated territory where the defense system was really strong and solid, difficult for penetration by invaders. At the same time, Burebista paid great attention to the proper training of his army, equipping it with weapons on a par with contemporary standards, and appointing skillful commanders. The army was trained to use extensively maneuver, to harass and strongly attack the enemy rapidly and by surprise, mounting successively frontal or encircling operations or both of them concomitantly.

Burebista was also a great strategist of those times, which explains, besides all other elements of his military system, the victories he won and how he withstood Roman expansion. He conceived and skillfully led external operations all around his territory, even to the western and northwestern coasts of the Black Sea, where the conquest of the rich Greek cities located here greatly increased the military and economic capacity of his state.[31] Thus was attained the main goal of the entire policy and diplomacy of Burebista's military and political doctrine, namely the liberation of all the Geto-Dacian territories from the foreign yoke and the political unification of the entire Dacian world under a sole authority.[32] The Dacian state in Burebista's time (the permanent habitation area of the Geto-Dacians) covered a vast territory: approximately an area delimited by the mid-Danube and Morava rivers westward, the Carpathians northward, the lower basin of the Bug River, the Black Sea eastward, and the Balkans southward.

For Burebista, it was clear that the power represented by the independent centralized Dacian state he ruled over was bound to stir up the hostility of the Roman empire; that is why he skillfully blended his military actions with political and diplomatic ones, using all resources to strengthen the state's independence and tranquility. In this respect, when the Dacian state was at the acme of its power and prosperity, Burebista tried to influence the internal policy of the Roman Empire. Thus, Burebista interfered in the conflict between Caesar and Pompey, supporting Pompey and engaging in negotiations with Suebian Ariovistus, chieftain of a Germanic tribal union. The diplomatic negotiations with Pompey are confirmed by a decree issued by the city of Dionysopolis in honor of Acornion, Burebista's ambassador to Pompey. The document reveals, among others "[Acornion] being sent by King Burebista as ambassador to Cn[aeus] Pompeius. . . he not only fulfilled his mission, but he also negotiated the best for his country."[33]

Contemporaries saw in Burebista the greatest military and political personality of Thrace: the inscription from Dionysopolis described him as "the first and greatest of all kings of Thrace and ruler of all lands on either side of the Danube. . . ."[34] The U.S. historian, Paul MacKendrick, assessed that the state ruled by Burebista was "one of the most remarkable autochthonous states created in the ancient world."[35]

The struggle for a centralized Dacian state and the defense of its territorial integrity represented one of the most important stages in the crystallization and assertion of the traditional military doctrine of the entire people's war. For the first time, the political-strategic target of our forebearers' military doctrine was accomplished, namely the liberation of all their native lands and their defense against any invaders. In the thick of these wars, the doctrine of the entire people's struggle demonstrated its superiority, all human and material resources were used, and the soldierly qualities and virtues of the Geto-Dacians were demonstrated.

As early as the first century B.C., the threatening power of Rome was to be seen on the Danube; the Roman Empire had seized much of the Balkan Peninsula and organized the most importrant Roman military bases in Macedonia. With this grave danger hanging over Dacia, Burebista with his exceptional strategic and political genius tried to cope with it through the mobilization of all the human and material resources of the centralized and independent Dacian state under his rule. The same guiding trends would characterize the policy of Burebista's successors.[36]

The dynamic policy of Dacia's kings envisaged, without exception, through vigorous offensive actions south of the Danube to keep as far away as possible the Roman military expansion on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to regain the territories between the Danube and the Balkans, old Geto-Dacian areas seized by the Romans at the end of the first century B.C.

The Raising to Superior Level of the Defense Struggle of the Dacian State Headed by Decebalus in the Face of the Roman Empire's Expansion

The Roman Empire's successive territorial annexations in the first century B.C. menaced Dacia from three sides by turning territories between the Danube and the Black Sea into a Roman province, as well as through making Pannonia in the west and Moesia in the south into provinces too. The confrontation between the defensive policy of the Dacian state and the Roman expansionism turned into fiery wars. "Between the Dacian state and the great neighboring Roman Empire," Romania's President Ceauşescu pointed out, "long-standing close relations had developed in a great variety of fields. However, as a result of the expansionistic policy

pursued by the emperors of Rome, conflicts arose between the two states and wars broke out."[37]

To liberate the overrun territories, remove the Roman danger, and consolidate its defense, the Dacian state answered with energetic military actions. So, in the winter of 69-70 A.D., the Dacians launched a strong offensive south of the Danube,[38] also profiting from the grave crisis of the Roman Empire's civil wars. This wide-scale strategic operation clearly showed that the Dacian state aimed at striking a deadly blow at the Romans between the Danube and the Balkans. These goals were tenaciously held to and determined the launching of the second big offensive, in the winter of 85-86 A.D.

The Dacian army cross south over the Danube and penetrated in depth into the province of Moesia. The raid took the enemy by surprise and ended with a brilliant victory against the Romans, with the governor of this district, Oppius Sabinus, being killed.[39] Annoyed by the situation, Emperor Domitian went to Moesia with a large army, succeeded in reestablishing the situation, and took a series of measures for the military and administrative reorganization of this province.[40] In their turn, the Dacians, to successfully cope with an imminent Roman counteroffensive, also took measures for reorganizing the political leadership. King Duras (also called in historical sources Diurpaneus), feeling himself too old to successfully lead the state as the danger of Roman expansion grew, resigned the throne by early 87 A.D. in favor of his nephew, Decebalus, who had shown great doldierly qualities in the military campaign in the previous year. For two decades, he would display exceptional qualities as a strategist and politician. In his work, *Roman History*, Dio Cassius wrote about him: "He was skillful in war plans and clever in their application, knowing [how] to choose the moment to attack the enemy and to withdraw in time. He was clever in setting traps, a good fighter, and he was ingenious enough to take advantage of a victory and also to come safely out of defeat. That is why for a long time he was a feared enemy for the Romans."[41]

To the offensive launched in the year 87 by General Cornelius Fuscus, led army he would oppose a tactics now traditional with the Geto-Dacians: exploiting the impetuosity of the Roman commander, he let him advance far from his bases and, offering false peace proposals, caught him in a trap laid in a very narrow place (very likely Tapae, the pass of today's "Iron

Gate" of Transylvania).[42] The Roman army was crushed, its imprudent commander himself lost his life, and the Roman banners, war machines, and a great deal of weapons were captured by the Dacians.[43]

The first big confrontation between the Dacians and the Romans conducted on Dacia's territory was a genuine synthesis of the traditional elements of the doctrine of the entire people's struggle: maneuvers on interior lines, scorched earth strategy and tactics, permanent harassment, drawing them to a place of decisive confrontation, surprise attacks, encirclement and annihilation of the bulk of the enemy troops, and tracking down the rest and chasing them from national territory.

The rapid deterioration of the empire's political and military situation on the other frontiers, and the stubborn resistance that the Romans met in Dacia without any chance of a military victory, made the emperor conclude peace with Dacia, which had in fact already been proposed through diplomatic channels time and again by the Dacian king.[44] The peace concluded in 88 A.D., even if Dacia formally became "a client of Rome," represented trhough its provisions a Dacian diplomatic success. The important sums of money, the skilled workers and the war machines granted by the emperor would be used by Decebalus to strengthen his defensive capacity against new Roman offensives that the Dacian king anticipated and expected.

A good manager of his country's resources, skilled in guiding the Dacian people's creative capacity, Decebalus succeeded in organizing in short time a strong army equipped with the most advanced technology of that time, well trained, and grounded on a strong defensive system made up of almost impregnable strongholds, efficiently using the advantages of the mountainous terrain. The strongholds were intended, by their position, to check the enemy access to the main political, economic, and religious center, Dacia's capital city, Sarmizegethusa Regia.[45]

After his becoming emperor, Trajan (98-117) had obvious aims of conquest, and firmly determined to radically change the political-military relations between Rome and the Dacian state.[46] The relatively peaceful relations between Dacia and the Roman Empire in the wake of the peace of 88 A.D. would be replaced with a clash of arms. Decebalus immediately took firm defensive measures to strengthen the country's capacity to resist: first, he consolidated the network of strongholds, built successive obstacles in the passes, and strengthened the organization of the army that

was to bear the brunt of the struggle, mobilizing the entire Dacian people to fight against the invaders. Following his voyage to Dacia on the eve of the outbreak of the conflict, Dio Chrysostomos wrote about the Dacians' preparations and the true reason for these preparations: "I reached there where some [deft] people who had not the time to listen to speeches, but they were agitated and anxious like racehorses at the post. . . . Everywhere one could see swords, lances, armors, everywhere horses, arms and armed people. . . . I wished to see the people fighting for power and domination, others for liberty and homeland. . . ."[47] The conquest and annexation of the Carpathian redoubt would have brought the empire's important strategic and economic advantages (Dacia's soil and subsoil riches having been well known in the ancient world), as well as the possibility of watching and eventually breaking up, by diplomatic and military actions, any large anti-Roman coalition.

On 25 March 101, Emperor Trajan headed from Rome toward the Danube at the head of a big army of about 150,000 men organized into two columns. He crossed the large river near Lederata locality (today Ramna, Yugoslavia) and at Drobeta (today Drobeta-Turnu Severin); the two armies met at Tibiscum (present-day Jupa, Caraș-Severin County) near the Iron Gate.[48] Having to cope with a huge Roman army, the largest concentration of forces ever met before, Decebalus employed the entire people's strength and strategy and tactics suitable to it. All able-bodied people took part in the fight against the invading forces. Mounting resistance on successive alignments and harassing the enemy, Decebalus avoided a decisive battle in the open field against his superior enemy and aimed at gradually weakening the Roman potential for combat. The Roman advance was difficult, as the single excerpt preserved from Trajan's comments on this war, subsequently quoted by Priscianus shows: "From Berzobis we moved towards Aizis" (the present-day localities of Berzovia and Fîrling in the Banat).[49] It was a relatively small advance but it met big difficulties because of the Dacians' stubborn resistance. The first sizable resistance organized by Decebalus was at Tapae where the victory was not settled. The Roman army continued its advance through the Haţeg Depression, toward the Orăştie Mountains and Dacia's capital, but it had to fight hard against the Dacian army and population who permanently harassed the invaders and attacked them by surprise on the flanks or in the rear.

The offensive launched by Trajan to the heart of the Dacian kingdom in the spring of 101 met a defensive plan worthy of the most illustrious strategists of antiquity.[50] Decebalus visualed a wide-scale strategic maneuver; thus, part of the Dacian forces, together with their allies, were to cross the Danube at great distance from Dacia's frontiers through the Dobrudjan "corridor," then to traverse the Balkans in order to intercept Trajan's communications with the empire and catch the Roman army between two forces. The issue should have been one of the most terrible disasters ever suffered by the Romans. To be successful, some stops should have been taken: full secrecy of operation, dissimulation of intentions, close coordination of forces of different provinces fighting in a huge space, rapid and surprise attacks, punctuality in execution when the frozen waters of the Danube were a veritable bridge, etc. Decebalus' retarding tactics succeeded in keeping the Romans from winning a decisive success before the coming winter.

The wide-scale strategic maneuver so brilliantly conceived by Decebalus unfolded, in the main, according to the plan even though the Danube had not frozen hard—the ice was supposed to aid the troops' crossing the river rapidly and without losses—thus, the crossing met many difficulties. The main column made up of the Dacians and Burii allies developed the offensive toward south Dobrudja while the Sarmatian allies and other Dacian forces crossed the Danube and advanced ot the pass of Șipca. While the allied forces were defeated near this important pass of the Balkans, the main group of Dacians and Sarmatian allies met the bulk of the Roman army moved posthaste into these regions under the command of Trajan himself on the Adamclisi Plateau, in southern Dobrudja. Here took place, in the spring of 102, the decisive battle of the first Dacian-Roman war, the bloodiest of all the Dacian-Roman battles. The losses were great for both sides, the Romans finally winning victory because of their numerical superiority and better technology.

After winning the victory, a stronghold and a great memorial were built right on the battlefield. On the front of the memorial, bearing the name of the victor, Trajan, ther were carved in stone the following words: "In honor and memory of the brave men who, fighting for the republic, were killed here," evidences of the gory clash in which the victor had been but a step from defeat.

Given the new conditions engendered by a general offensive of the Roman army, Decebalus had to sue for peace. The peace was concluded in 102. The Dacian king could not stand the terms of the peace, and, therefore in 105, he unexpectedly started attacks against the Romans. Decebalus ". . . commenced openly to fight [for] all neighboring populations by telling them that if they left him [to fight] alone they would have their days of danger, that they could preserve their liberty more safely and easily fighting alongside him, before the misfortune fell upon him, than to turn a blind eye upon the destruction of the Dacian people. The time [would] come when they, in their turn, lacking allies, [would] suffer much. . . ."[51] But, abandoned by most of his allies, in a most unfavorable balance of forces, Decebalus was compelled to an active defense. Di Cassius wrote that "Trajan crossed the Istros on this bridge [built by Apollodor at Drobeta—a.n.] and waged warfare cautiously rather than enthusiastically and defeated the Dacians after long and hard endeavors."[52] The Roman army continued its offensive, and converging in the Orăștiei Mountains, the Dacian strongholds were taken by storm, one after another, with great effort "mountain by mountain," as Dio Cassius wrote, "nearing the residence of the Dacian king."[53] At Sarmizegethusa, the Romans met the stubborn resistance of the defenders, who gave proof of their desire to save, even at the cost of their lives, the sacred stronghold, symbol of the very being and unity of the Dacian state. At last the Dacians' capital was conquered. Decebalus, symbol of boldness and the spirit of sacrifice in the defense of liberty and independence of his homeland and people, succeeded in making his way to other regions of Dacia in hopes of organizing other resistance areas. Finally surrounded and summoned to surrender, and although the promise was made to spare his life, he killed himself lest he should become a prisoner of the Romans, as one of the last scenes on Trajan's Column shows.[54]

Thus ended the decisive stage of the military confrontations between the Roman Empire and the Dacian state, a stage that lasted intermittently for about two decades. The long wars between the Dacians and the Romans occasioned an exhausting struggle, in which the greatest power of antiquity would be victorious. The liberty-loving Dacian people, defended with legendary stubborness its right to a free and independent life. "During those fierce armed confrontations," Romania's president pointed out "the Dacians demonstrated their firm will to preserve their independence

and territorial integrity and oppose the strongest military force ever known in ancient times. . . . The heroic struggles of the Dacians won the praise of the historians of the ancient world."[55]

One of the gravest consequences of the Romans' victory over the Dacian people was the conquest of part of Dacia and the setting up of a severe regime of military occupation. During the occupation in Dacia, a great number of troops and officers were deployed, between 50,000 to 55,000 men.[56] As in other subdued regions, the Roman army kept a tight rein on the subdued population and, at the same time, stopped the vigorous attacks by the Dacians in free areas, who had coalesced with other populations, and were discontented with the rule imposed in the interior of the Carpathian arc. In part of Dacia, during the occupation, Legion XIII Gemina was stationed at Apulum and 167 men of the V Macedonia were at Potaissa; an important number of auxiliary forces, infantry and cavalry, were also stationed in Dacia to watch and control the Dacian people and prevent the inevitable penetrations by free Dacians. At the same time, the Romans built fortifications of all kinds thoughout Dacia.

Like other occupation forces, the Roman troops deployed throughout Dacia inflicted material and moral losses on the Dacian people. Vexations of all kinds and cruel suppression of any attempt by the Dacians to fight for liberty made for a strained, explosive situation.[57] The subject Dacians could not be content, any moment, with their situation; and, for almost 170 years, they joined closely with free Dacians to wage an incessant resistance until they drove out the Romans. The adamant struggle by the Dacian people to regain their full independence, to liberate the occupied territories, and reconstitute Dacia within her natural borders represented the main content of the doctrine of the entire people's struggle by the Romanians' forefathers in this period.

A valiant and stubborn people, the Dacians did not resign themselves to being subdued and exploited in their own country. The flame of liberation was kept up, first of all by the Dacians living in the north and in the east. The poor strata of the Dacian people made up the social basis of the liberation struggle; the great majority of these people nurtured a fierce hate for the foreign occupiers. They employed traditional forms of organization and procedures sanctioned by the entire past fighing of the autochthonous forefathers of the Romanian people.[58] Trajan's measures taken after the end of the war only mirrored the Dacians' stubborn resistance to

the invaders. An excerpt from Lactanius underlined clearly that Trajan had imposed on the Dacians a heavy census "as a punishment for their long stubborn resistance."[59]

The main feature of the period following the conquest of part of Dacia was the Dacians' success in preserving their ethnic being, as well as a set of linguistic and spiritual peculiarities, and old traditions, enriched by the long-term contact with the Roman civilization. The living continuity of the Dacian people in Dacian territory and its evolutin in the new conditions marked by an impact of Roman civilization stronger than in the previous period are unquestionably attested by numerous archeological, linguistic, numismatic, and ethnographic proofs that totally refute the biased, non-scientific assertions serving only hostile political interests of foreign authors about the alleged extermination of the autochthonous population during the Roman conquest.

The presence of the native Dacian people and, alongside it, the Roman colonizing element were prerequisites for a vast and complex historical process of symbiosis of the two civilizations. Thus, the Romanian ethnogenesis covered the two centuries prior to the Roman conquest and the 170 years of the Dacians' living together with the Romans in two basic fields: material and spiritual, named by Nicolae Iorga, great connoisseur of world history, as the "synthesis at the Lower Danube." This meant the Romans' taking elements of Dacian civilization and the Dacians' rapid assimilation of Roman civilization elements, the Latin language in particular.

This ample process, with its profound and fundamental consequences for the Dacian-Roman symbiosis, is characterized as a synthesis by Romania's president: "In the hard battles and in the living together for centuries of the Dacians and Romans, a new people was moulded which preserved and developed the best features of its ancestors."[60] It is in this way that the Romanian people was born with more than two millenia in the same hearth.

Born and molded in the same territory where its direct forefathers, the Geto-Dacians, composed epics about the defense of their land, the Romanian people entered the new stage of its evolution, the third through the ninth centuries, with a rich and diversified patrimony of combat methods against any invader, of doctrine principles bequeathed by its forefathers. According to these, when enemies were superior in number and technology,

the fight for independence, unity, and a free state life could not be victorious but through the entire people's rising to fight for the homeland's defense.

The Resistance Struggle of the Romanian People Within the Political-Military Framework of the Romanian Knezates and Voivodeships Against the Invasions of the Migratory Barbarian Populations

Direct heirs of the loftiest virtues of the Dacians and Romans, the Romanian people would prove, in the centuries to come after the retreat of the Roman administration, its vitality and resistance power in face of all migratory waves. Thus, it preserved its ethnic being, language, and civilization. This fact also proved the durability and solidarity of the symbiosis between the Dacian and Roman civilizations, the Dacians' complete assimilation of Latin, which were processes defining the shaping of the Romanian people. The vicissitudes of the tormented times of migrations could not break up or annihilate the blending of the two great civilizations of antiquity, Dacian and Roman. Material proofs attest to the incessant social development in the entire Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic areas; it would naturally develop, in new conditions, in the way of the Romanian people's individuality. The new stage of the Romanian people's evolution was influenced by internal and external factors that engendered a specific situation that would put its imprint upon the individualizing process of the Romanians in the European Roman world and upon their independent political and state organization.

Despite the migrations, when successive invasions of populations, bearers of inferior culture and civilization, passed over the ancient Dacian-Romanian territory, the Romanian people succeeded in facing them, thus preserving Romanian historical features and forms of social, political, and military organization.

In the early Middle Ages, a peculiar trait of the Romanian people's development was its demographic expansion to habitable natural places in the mountain depressions, in sub-Carpathian valleys, near the centuries-old forests and woods coming down to the Bărăgan fields, in the meadows of the large Moldavian and Wallachian rivers, of the Danube in particular, and on the sand banks of the Danube delta. These microterritories offered

fine conditions for the development of the Romanian farming-pastoral economy and for the organization of defense in the face of invading armies by use of natural barriers in a difficult terrain for the foreigners. It was here that the Romanian people's organization into state forms took place, a process grounded on the territorial agrarian community, the free village community. Here, all the inhabitants mastered the land and they toiled it in common.[61] They were headed by judges that they themselves elected, the council of "good and old men," of the "judges [who] defended it [the land] in common too."[62]

Faced with enemies from among these *juzi* (judges), also called after the Slav assimilation *cnezi de sate* (village *knezes*), the unions of communities ("popular Romanians" as a great Romanian historian called them) elected military commanders, *duce* (*dux*) or *voievod* (*voivode*), the organizers of defense who also took on administrative and juridical functions. Under their command the entire population rose to fight, all the able-bodied men making up the *oastea* ("host;" "army") of the knezdate or voivodeship, a native army whose bravery stemmed from the Romanian peasant's love for his land. As early as after the 275 Roman withdrawal from Dacia, ancient writers told of a "peasant army, the cavalry of the common peasants [*ignari agricolae*]."[63] It was a reality that both the migrating populations and the invading armies of the aggressive states of the ninth to the thirteenth centuries (the Byzantine Empire, the Tatar-Mongol empire and its successor, the Golden Horde, and from the eleven century, the Hungarian Kingdom) had to be confronted. "History finds the Romanian here, before everybody, not as a shepherd, but as a soldier —then, as we shall see, he has been the permanent defender of these lands, he is the spring and the reason of the Romanians' military virtues, so steady and lofty."[64]

Historically it is indubitable that, faced with the permanent danger posed by invaders, the Romanian people toiled and fought tirelessly to preserve its ethnicity, liberty, and the fruits of its peaceful work. Trying to write a history of the Romanians, the great democratic-revolutionary thinker Nicolae Bălcescu started to deal with their military institutions: "I preferred to deal with military institutions before any others, for these institutions are the most wonderful ones forged by our forefathers because they had been responsible for the country's glory and power."[65] The Romanians fully grasped—Bălcescu wrote—that their "military system should

be grounded on a good organization and a numerous national reserve; it was for this that they organized from the very beginning the army, militia and the multitudes since every Romanian was born with the duty to be a soldier and defend the country in case of need, and when the enemy would encroach upon the Romanian land all the country should be in arms."[66] And *ţara* (the country) has ever been identified in the Romanian consciousness with the entire Romanian-inhabited areas: the "country of the Romanians" was characterized through a harmonious blending of all forms of features, beautiful and rich, offering fine conditions for all kinds of work. But this "country," inhabited by diligent, right, and gentle people, was geographically situated—as Romanian chronicler Grigore Ureche wrote—"in the way of all wrongs," at the crossroads of all invading routes. Nicolae Iorga wrote highly suggestively in this sense: "When the North wanted to go southwards, when the West wanted to go eastwardds they met here."[67]

Under these inauspicious conditions, the Romanian people did not manage from the very beginning, after the Roman withdrawal, to organize into strong states, to transform the entire "country of the Romanians" into a sole political state body. They had been compelled to adopt the above-mentioned specific forms of political and military organizations like unions of communities or "popular Romanians," knezates and voivodeships generically called *ţări* (countries) from the Latin word *terra.* These are met in the old foreign documents under the name of *Vlahii, Valahii, terra blachorum,* etc. as components of the sole Romanian "country." Thus, the ethnic, cultural and lingusitic, economic, social, and geographic unity of the Romanian area preserved and developed from generation to generation. "On a basis of common interests—not speaking about Moldavia and Wallachia which economically made a sole country—the first union of the Romanians existed when, in the scholars' minds, this idea had not yet appeared, grounded on the perfect unity of economic life relying upon the perfect unity of general life and Transylvania, too, entered into this life through the Romanian intercirculation; a sole body, a sole solid system of veins crossed by the same live blood."[68]

Following Aurelianus' wthdrawal, and through the entire Middle Ages, the "Romanian people lived besieged"[69] and because of that, although a peaceful people by its occupations, "it was compelled . . . to pay a great heed to military organization."[70] Thus, in the context of speeding up the

reunion of the state entities existing prior to the eighth century A.D., superior organizations forms like unions of communities, or the big knezates or voivodeships were formed initially for military purposes, especially in zones situated farther from the main invasion routes. This avoided being in the way of the main targets: Constantinople, Rome, and western towns across the Pannonian Plain. But, with the increase of the demographic and economic potential, military included, and of the development of social restructuring through the leaders' rising from the producer masses (farmers, shepherds, handicraftsmen, peasants)—at the same time being fighters—these unions could extend territorially and have a greater capacity for resistance in the face of the invaders.

Unlike the settlements and the refuge strongholds of the communities —archeologically attested everywhere in the Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic area—the residences of the Romanian dukes (great *knezes* and *voivodes*) developed rapidly, becoming centers with a way of life typical of early Romanian feudalism. Suggestively mirrored by the settlements' location round the *voivodes'* residences, in distinct depression zones or the hydrographic basins of the big rivers, the voivodeships managed to encompass up to sixty villages and covered areas between 2,000 and 6,000 square kilometers.[71] Archeological findings show the existence of seven to eight such zone groups east of the Carpathians (Moldavia) in the eighth to the eleventh centuries, two in the territory between the Danube and the Black Sea (the Dobrudja), twelve to fourteen south of the Meridional Carpathians (Wallachia nad Oltenia), one in the Banat, and eight to nine in the intra-Carpathian zone. As for the Romanian lands west of the Apuseni (Transylvania), Byzantine, and Oriental chronicles, documents of the papal or Hungarian officers or of the Balkan states too speak of the existence of numerous *vlahii* in the Balkan mountain region, in the Rhodope and Pindic areas, and on the coast of the Adriatic Sea.[72]

According to the information supplied by Hungarian *gestas*[73] the Magyars, after the conquest of the country of Ung or Ungvar inhabited by Romanians and Slovaks, would enter history under the name of *unguri* ("Hungarians"),[74] said the armies of the Romanian voivodeships were made up of light cavalry, rapid and flexible, and a numerous peasant infantry. The strongholds, both the earth and the stone ones with high walls and protected by earth walls, moats and palisades, lodged garrisons with the mission of defending and working on, with the help of the

population in the neighboring villages, repairing, maintaining, and consolidating the fortifications.[75] In frontier zones, the populations of the villages had the main mission (having been exempted, in return, from any obligation in products and services to the entire community, represented by the voivode's authority) of securing the border, engaging the first actions against the enemy vanguards, undertaking missions of reconnaissance, and signalling the advane of the enemy troops by setting fire on the heights.

Informed promptly of the enemy movements, *voivodes* Gelu, Glad, and Menumorut succeeded, behind the resistance organized by the communities' population on the border, in mobilizing the entire army of the voivodeship and meeting (896) the Magyar aggressor shortly after the latter had invaded the Romanian territory. Within this framework, the big defeat of the Magyar tribes by the *valahi* north of Maramureș before their advance into Pannonia, when their leader Almos "was killed in the country beyond the forests," proved how efficacious the military strategy was, with the romanian *voivodes'* tactical capacity in organizing and leading some large-scale, decisive fighting actions.[76]

In the conditions of the general "call-up" of all the "country's" inhabitants, the strength committed to fight against the invaders was really great. Under the supreme command of the *voivodes* who organized a standing military body to defend their persons and residences and to rapidly organize the defense, all the big *knezes de vale* ("of the valleys") were obliged to gather; to the latter, the village *knezes* were subordinated along with all able-bodied men of the communities.

The peasants on foot were armed with their working tools transformed into weapons: pitchforks, axes, scythes, clubs, and mauls of hard wood, completed by pikes and, rarely swords and slings. The cavalry was equipped with spears, swords, mauls, axes etc. Mentioned by the Hungarian *gestas* and confirmed by archeological findings, the bow was the weapon equipping all fighters to strike the enemy at a distance.[77] The strongholds' garrisons were supplied with catapults and ballistas. For protection, there were wooden shields covered with animal skins or metal plates; only the rich had mail shirts and helmets. The majority of the fighters were dressed in the *suman* (a kind of long, coarse stuff peasant coat) tow lined inside, and traditionalps having in its crown a raft line.

As a main trait not only of that epoch, but of its entire history, Romanian military thinking distinguished itself by its profoundness, adaptability, and power of assimilation of the new, both in point of technology and the application of tactical procedures, and by continually learning from their fights with different enemies. For instance, the false retreat was used mainly following the fights with the Pechnegs, Cumans, and Tatars. New weapons and tactics would find their natural place in the armies' equipment and the traditional military art, with the Romanians' strengthening the shock capacity, mobility, and the resistance of their troops, as well as perpetuating and developing the traditional scorched earth tactics. Taking the combat experience of their forebearers, the *voivodes* of the eighth to the thirteenth centuries avoided battle in the open field when the enemy was superior in numbers and technology and employed a wide range of tactical and strategic means to physically and morally exhaust the enemy. The continuous harassment of the enemy forces and the establishment of an unpropitious place and time for the enemy thus prepared its defeat from its first steps on Romanian land until the unexpected attack in narrow or swampy places. Of a mass, popular character, the defensive war did not cease until the enemy remnants were driven from the voivodeship's borders.

Faced during those centuries with attempts at penetrating the Romanian areas by Bulgarians, Magyar tribes, Pechnegs, Cumans, Tatars, with the Mongolian or Hungarian (after the emergence of the Hungarian kingdom in the eleventh century) expansionist policies, the process of political unification of large areas intensified. By the turn of the ninth century, the Magyar tribes were encountering strong resistance from the troops led by the *voivodes* Gelu, Glad, and Menumorut. The Hungarian monarchy would meet, in the first years of the second millenium, a strong enemy in the person of Giulea, the great *voivode* of a unified Transylvania, or in Ahtum, the *voivode* of the Banat. This was the reason that the fights would be long in duration (by the early fourteenth century), with the acknowledgement of Transylvania as a distinct political and ethnic entity, as a voivodeship separate from the Hungarian kingdom, linked to the kings in Buda by virtue of the feudal vassalage relations through the *voivode's* oath made to the crown. This truth was expressed by the Hungarian historian Sándor Szilágy: "Transylvania and Hungary never confounded one another and they always formed two distinct countries."[78]

Never was Transylvania a province of Hungary, but a vassal territory of the crown over which "the Hungarian kings ruled through the voivodes of Transylvania."[79] It was a political reality grounded on ethnic reality, on ethnic-cultural and economic unity, on the unitary social development, and the unity of interests of the Romanian areas. "The Transylvanian compass needle," wrote this same historian, "was fixed towards the Orient because of the population belonging in its great majority to the Oriental church [Orthodox—a.n.] whilst Hungary was oriented towards the West ever since the time of her first king."[80]

The ethnic-cultural continuity of the autochthonous population and its traditional forms of organization, military included, were underlined by Hungarian historian András Huszti who concluded: "The Geto-Dacians' descendants are still living today and they are dwelling where their parents dwelt and are speaking the language their parents spoke in olden times."[81] Quite illustrative of the reality of the thirteenth century, about the attitudes of the Romanian Transylvanians towards the aggressive policy of the Hungarian crown, is also the information in the documents of the papal office and the *Cîntecul de jale* (*Carmen miserabile*) of Canon Rogerius about the events in 1241-1242. After their initial resistance to the Mongol invasion, the *schismaticii* (schismatics)—i.e., the Orthodox Romanians—rose in rebellion, attacked, and set on fire the castles of the Hungarian noblemen, obliging them to flee to Hungary.

After the Tatars quit Transylvania and pased through the territory between the Tisza and the Danube, the Transylvanians (whose Romanian origin Rogerius mentioned when he wrote about a "village called *Frata* in the people's language") rebuilt the communities' strongholds and reinstalled the old Romanian chieftains. "There were about 100 knezes, peace was ruling, there were boroughs and justice was rendered to everybody as it was right to be."[82] When the Hungarian crown established its suzerainty (1242) they kept their entity and political rights, directly taking part—proportional to their number and social condition—in ruling the country alongside the Szekler and Saxon colonists recently settled as "guests" (*hospites*), with fiscal and military obligations to the Hungarian kings on Romanian territory. So, the general assembly at Alba Iulia in 1291 was attended by "Universis nobilibus, Saxonibus, Syculis et *Olahis* in partibus Transilvanis."[83]

The unification of the Romanian voivodates between the Carpathians and the Danube and the emergence on Europe's map of a new feudal Romanian state "Wallachia" (The Romanian Country of Wallachia) took place in the same epoch (the thirteenth century) gradually as a result of the voivode-led struggle on both banks of the Olt river. The unification was the result of Hungarian acknowledgement of all the "lands" or voivodeships between the Carpathians and the Danube and implicitly, their armies' unification into a single army of the country—"the greater army." The victory against an Anjou Hungarian army had been ensured by the employment of the "scorched earth" and traditional tactics in the way of the invader—the exhaustion of his forces, the drawing on a secondary route of access, and the decisive attack in a narrow mountainous defile, a huge trap wherefrom only some wounded saved their lives.[85] This victory demonstrated that the "method of the entire people's war is the single solution for securing the homeland's independent," which definitively imposed itself as a peculiar trait of the autochthonous military thinking and practice.[85]

After victory, the process of unification advanced toward the Danube, at the mouths of the Prut and Siret rivers, through the outbreak (in 1343) of a long war with the Golden Horde, which was ended by Wallachian princes at the end of the sixth decade by the unification of the territories in north Dobrudja, of "the Tatar lands," and the extension of the borders to near Cetatea Albă.[86] The anti-Tatar reconqueste would be taken over by the Romanian *voivodes* east of the Carpathians until the complete rout of the Tatars. The fight for winning the full independence and the unification of the Romanian territories between the Dniester, the Carpathians, and the Black Sea unfolded on two fronts. Starting in 1342-1343, resistance was organized with the help of the Romanians living in Maramureş (Transylvana's northeastern part) and their *voivode*, Bogdan from Cuhea, and against the expansionist tendencies of Hungary under the Anjou dynasty as well.[87] The year of "foundation" of Romanian Moldavia is considered 1359, when Hungarian suzerainty was removed and Bogdan I ascended the throne. The process of unification would end within her maximum mediaeval frontiers under the rule of Petru I Muşat (1375-1391). In a similar context, also fighting on two fronts, against the Tatars and the Byzantines, the process of unification of the Romanian territories between the Danube and the Black Sea would be completed.

Until the end of the fourteenth century, through their firm struggle against foreign aggressions, the Romanians created several centralized feudal states, the main mission of which was to become, in the centuries to come, the assertin of the full independence and the accomplishment of the union, in the hearth of old Dacia, of the sole Romanian state of all the Romanians.

Henceforth, wrote Nicolae Bălcescu, "national union was the dear dream of our greater men who embodied the people's individuality and thinking to show them to the entire world. It was for it [union] that they lived, toiled, suffered and died."[88] It is a natural corollary of the Romanian people's national consciousness and of its love for liberty. Highly telling are the words uttered by Menumorut addressed to Arpád (896-907), the chieftain of the invading Magyars: "Tell Arpád, Duke of Hungary, your Lord: we are obliged to him like a friend to a friend, with everything he needs because he is in need of many things. But the territory that he asked from our goodwill we shall never cede to him as long as we are still alive. . . . Neither our of love, nor out of fear shall we cede him any bits of our land."[89] Menumorut, as a supreme proof of his ethnic and political continuity, stated that he "inherited this land from his great-grandfather," who ruled over it ever since Dacia's leaving by the Romans.

Dacia's memory of the ancient political unity, preserved in the Romanian consciousness, would stand as a stimulus to the struggle for the "Dacian idea's" victory in the Middle Ages, for the Romanian countries' union into a sole state of all Romanians. "In Dacia," wrote the great humanist, Nicolaus Olahus (the Romanian), primate and chancellor of Hungary in 1536, "there are the provinces: the Great Wallachia also called Transalpine, Maramuresh, the Land of Someș, the Land of Criș, Nyr and the Land of Timiș."[90] The union desideratum, together with that of full independence, stimulated the political, diplomatic, and military thinking of the medieval Romanian epoch.

CHAPTER 2

THE ASSERTION OF THE ROMANIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE ON THE ENTIRE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE ANCESTRAL LAND IN THE MIDDLE AGES

The Romanian Military Thinking and Practice During the Struggle for Consolidation and Defense of the Independence of the Romanian Feudal States: Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania

In the evolution of the Romanian military doctrine on the entir people's war, the Middle Ages enjoy a distinct and highly important plac in the annals of the Romanian military patrimony, having been called wit good reason the epoch of heroic military glory of the Romanian countries

In those centuries of glory (the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries) Romanian military thinking and practice developed as never before. I was determined by the entire evolution of the society in the Carpatho Danubian-Pontic area in the economic, political, and cultural fields by th ideals of unity, liberty, and independence of the Romanian feudal state against the danger posed by the aggression of the Hungarian kingdom. I was also determined by their decisive contribution to the defense an rescue of the Western European civilization during the Ottoman Empire' expansion toward central and northern Europe. In achieving these ideal

of the national and European civilizations, Romanian military doctrine was an efficient instrument in the entire people's rising to arms, in the mobilization and employment of all the material and spiritual resources against some strong and numerous enemies, well-armed and versed in territorial invasions.

For centuries on end, Romanian society was caught in the fire and iron circle of some aggressive neighbors: the Ottoman Empire at the southern frontier; medieval Hungary and, after its dissolution in 1526-1541, the Habsburg Empire at the western frontier; feudal Poland and the Golden Horde then the Russian Empire at the northern and eastern frontiers. Under those grave historical circumstances, the safeguarding of national independence and territorial integrity of the Romanian feudal countries lay, politically and ethnically, in the accomplishment of state unity, under a single leadership and, militarily, in the application of the doctrine of the entire people's war.

The first goal embodied in the "Dacian idea" of all the Romanian countries' union into a single independent state; this union, although short-lived (1599-1600), was achieved under the scepter of Michael the Brave (1593-1601), the ruling prince of Wallachia and then of all the Romanians. It was the glorious epoch in which the Romanians, while defending their state and ethnic being, their ideals and aspirations, implicitly defended the Western European civilization by building up at the Danube a solid wall in the way of the Ottoman expansion toward central and northern Europe. As an acknowledgement of their effort and of the fact that any anti-Ottoman European crusade relied on the Romanian troops, in the middle of Borgiano's *Mapamond*, the cartographers placed the "Dacian bloc" of the Romanian countries as the main enemy of the Ottoman Empire, under the symbolic name of the ethnic, political, and military unity "Magna Valachia" (Greater Romania).

In Romanian military thinking and practice, the doctrine of the entire people's war proved itself the sole viable option of struggle against any aggressors and under any circumstances. The decisive role devolved upon the broad popular masses made up of peasants, in their great majority, the main producers of material assets, the mass basis of the Romanian armies. Besides them, an important role also devolved upon the pleiad of *voivodes* and great army commanders from the Romanian countries, in particular Basarab I, Bogdan I, Mircea the Great, Iancu of Hunedoara, Vlad the

Impaler, Stephen the Great, and Michael the Brave who gave a fresh brilliance to the doctrine of the Romanian people's war. They cultivated and capitalized on the glorious military traditions of their Geto-Dacian forefathers in their fights against the Persians, Macedonians and Romans, the traditions of the autochthonous armies against migratory waves. But their historic merit lies in the elaboration and employment of some doctrine concepts concerning the mobilization of all human, material and spiritual resources for the homeland's defense, of some principles of military art, of strategy and tactics for the organization and leading an armed fight against an enemy superior in numbers and technology. They opened a new chapter in the national military patrimony and made an original contribution to the enrichment of the European and world military theory and practice. Interpretation of the epoch's sources and analysis of the military events attest to the existence of well-defined conceptions in the military field capable of originally and efficiently solving all the problems engendered by the ceaseless defensive efforts. Leading the fight under specific conditions, the Romanian army commanders, as Nicolae Bălcescu concluded, "have some thorough principles of military art which does not mean but to defeat a greater power with a smaller one."[1] Using combat methods and means adequate to the human potential and the one's own level of equipment and technology, relying on good knowledge of the terrain and its employment when the own territory became a genuine theater of military operations, the Romanian *voivodes* asserted themselves at the head of their troops, preponderantly peasant, and scored victories against invading Hungarian, Polish, and Ottoman armies, superior in effectives. These incontestable feats of arms bring to the conclusion that "our military history is not inferior to that of the older Western armies, neither through the resounding victories scored, or the ingeniousness of the proceeding used," which are "full of originality and teaching."[2]

The entire evolution of the Romanian military thinking and art has been characterized by its continuity, the perpetuation of the fighting traditions of the armed people inherited from Geto-Dacian forefathers because, as heirs of their entire military patrimony, "the oldest military establishment of the Romanians relied on everybody's duty to fight."[3] It was mirrored in the same methods of mobilizing the entire people's efforts for the homeland's defense, in the same unflinching will to live in liberty as a moral factor of the great victories, in the same skillfullness to

use the advantage of the terrain as an ally against the aggressor and in the same spirit of sacrifice.[4]

Romanian military thinking and art have crystallized in the course of time in the very character of the entire people's war because, as Romania's president pointed out, "For centuries the Romanian army acted exclusively for the defense of the national being, of national independence."[5] This was the main strategic aim that determined the patriotic character of the Romanian's rising to arms. To achieve this goal, Romanian military thinking had the mission to find, in case of emergency, practical ways and means able to secure, by an appeal to arms, the free, unimpeded development of the society and running the state institutions to ensure the Romanian people its political and national individuality. As a supreme proof, stands the fact that the Romanians kept up their state in being, an autonomous development under circumstances in which the Bulgarian tsardoms, Serbia, Albania, the Byzantine Empire, and the Hungarian Kingdom (after 1526) disappeared from the map of medieval Europe, having been broken up by the Ottoman Empire and transformed into Turkish *pashaliks.* After this, the Habsburg Empire nurtured pretensions to world domination, but it was forced to defend the very cradle of its power, Vienna, twice besieged by the Ottomans (1529, 1683). After they had repelled successively Tatar, Polish, Hungarian, and Ottoman aggressions, the Romanian states would accept in the fifteenth century (Wallachia and Moldavia) and the sixteenth century (1541, Transylvania) Ottoman sovereignty in return for the latter's guaranteeing, through "capitulations" having the juridical sense of treaties, the Romanian countries' full autonomy and territorial integrity. Defeating the Porte's invading armies, which never succeeded in conquering their "country," the "Wallachians," wrote the Venetian, Filippo Buonaccorsi Callimachus in 1490, "after they had repelled the armies and its attempts [of the Ottoman Porte] agreed through treaties not as vanquished but as vanquishers."[6] All the Romanian *voivodes* in that epoch could be credited with the words uttered by Stephen the Great, the prince of Moldavia (1457-1504), that they owe their rule "neither to the Polish king, nor the Magyar on, [and are] not subject to the Turks as well."[7]

Romanian military thinking has been always guided by the political idea of the Romanian states' joint armed fight as a guarantee of victory in repelling aggression against any Romanian borders. So, against the Tatars,

Wallachians, Moldavians, and Transylvanians fought united in the fourteenth century. Faced with Ottoman aggression, the united fighting front of the Romanian countries was built, wheneve needed, under the swords of Mircea the Great, the ruling prince who freed and united Dobrudja with Wallachia over 1388-1390, of Iancu of Hunedoara, Stephen the Great, and Michael the Brave. These princes, like some of the leaders of the popular masses' revolutionary struggle—in Transylvania in particular—against the Habsburg oppression, considered the fighting unity not a mere alliance, but a first step to remaking Dacia's unity, to the accomplishment of the unitary Romanian state.

For the guarantee of complete liberty and millenary Romanian aspiration, wrote Nicolae Bălcescu, "Mircea the Old and Stephen the Great fought all their long lives and incurred the awful onslaught of the Turks: it was for that that Michael the Brave fell dead in the fields near Turda; it was for that that Şerban Cantacuzino drank poison; it was for that that Horea suffered a terrible death by being broken on the wheel."[8] Their brilliant victories for liberty and independence were so many stages of the struggle for union.

Besides political, social, and national traits, Romanian military thinking and art in the Middle Ages was characterized by the emergence of the first theoretical preoccupations with the generalization of the Romanian people's rich combat experience. In the previous period, there had not been an elaboration of approaching and solving the complex doctrine, strategic, and tactical problems; but Romanian army commanders had succeeded in solving difficult situations as they occurred, most often successfully, thanks to the teachings regarding the defensive fightings transmitted from generation to generation and continually added to.

The first attempt at a theoretical generalization of the rich experience gathered by the Romanian armies in the defensive wars was a most significant work *Învăţăturile lui Neagoe Basarab către fiul său Teodosie* (Neagoe Basarab's Teachings for His Son Teodosie). It was a work of value for that period that reflected the advanced military thinking of the great Romanian *voivode*, a man of great culture, with a political and military vision that impressed both his contemporaries and successors as well. His concept stemmed from Romanian realities. His *Teachings* were meant to help his successors manage the state affairs and serve the interests of the people and of the country. The work by *voivode* Neagoe Basarab

represents the first original synthesis that turns to good account all that military thinking had accumulated up to those times. The author extensively dealt with the problems of the country's defense by the entire people, underlining the idea that the *voivodes* should pursue a policy so as to have the entire people on their side to avert danger when needed. One of the main ideas of the book results from the *voivode's* concern to protect the country against military conflicts and to avoid war as a means for solving controversies. "Do not love wars and clashes and do not enter into conflicts. Even if one of your friends incites you to dissension, do not listen to him."[9]

All divergent problems that might occur between our country and other countries, in the opion of the great *voivode* thinker, should be exclusively settled by way of negotiations that should be come to with caution and care. In his conception, war was accepted only after all the diplomatic attempts were made and failed to maintain peace. In this sense, Neagoe Basarab wrote: "If you see that by benevolence you cannot appease the mood of those who will be your enemy, do not be cowardly, but valiantly oppose them. Becuase they were the first who sowed hostility."[10] Wise Basarat makes a clear difference between defensive wars that should be waged to its end at any cost by the entire people, namely by "the boyars, the old men and your advisers and all the country" and wars of conquest led by the aggressive states.[11] The *voivode* urges his men to wage defensive war with firmness, courage, and gallantry, nto to stain the Romanians' honor and dignity. "That is why," he wrote, "an honorable death is preferable to a blemished name." In case the country was in danger, Besarab told his son, "You yourself, together with your men, go straight to your enemy, without fear, however numerous they might be. Never be afraid of your enemy, even if they are many because the valiant soldier is never afraid of a multitude of enemies."[12] The above quotations clearly reveal an idea specific to the people's war waged by the Romanians—that of using all forms and methods to defeat the enemy at any cost, be it superior in many respects.

Starting from the realities of this country, Neagoe Basarab's book strongly emphasizes the outstanding importance of the action of preparing the entire population for defense against the invaders, for resistance. The great *voivode* considered, with good reason, that the best area for organizing the popular resistance was within the boundaries of the

country. In this connection he wrote: "If the enemies come against you and you see that they are more powerful than you, and your counsellors will advise you to fight against them in haste, or will frighten you to leave your country, do not believe them. Why? Because they are not friends to you."[13]

Many interesting ideas in this book refer to the way of waging a people's war of defense against powerful invaders. The author writes that a *voivode* should take measures to withdraw the population in front of the enemy: "And the children of the boyars and of the peasants, all of them, must be taken far away, and do not let those children of the boyars or of the peasants in front of the enemy when they will start war against you, and you with your armies be beyond them thus letting the enemy strike and capture the children of your boyars and peasants. Because when the boyars and peasants will see their children have been captured, they will leave you and track their children."[14] In his outlook, the army naturally had a mass character, and, in order to ensure success in the battle, it was highly important to take care of the families of the fighters, to shelter and protect them from perils.

The book also dwells on another idea of great theoretical value: when the course of the battle was unfavorable, firm and urgent steps had to be taken to withdraw and thus preserve the forces for the next decisive fight. In that context, however, the *voivode* urged his successor: "Do not go beyond the borders of your country . . . but remain here and stay concealed in those places where the faithful people are living . . . because your enemy, who came against you, will not remain for long, but they will go back and leave here another prince, but that one will have few people on his side."[15] This clearly points to the idea that the people's resistance had to be organized throughout the country, including the zones temporarily occupied by the enemy. Besarab's book also offers precious ideas regarding the way the armed people must be organized and led in case of war. Advising his son how to behave in case of danger, the *voivode* wrote: "Therefore, organize your army and encourage your people and put everybody in their place and according to the rules."[16]

The ideas presented so far are but a few of the valuable work of military theory written in the first half of the sixteenth century. There are in the book many precepts, concepts, and methods synthetizing the experience gathered from the people's resistance fight, from the wars

waged by the Romanian people, ever since the time of the Dacians, for the defense of the homeland. This work strongly highlights the idea of the continuity since our ancestors' time of the fighting methods and forms, the strategic objective, and the popular character of the struggle.

All these doctrinal, strategic, and tactical teachings stemmed from the experience of the fights waged by Basarab I in the mountains "in narrow passes," the exhausting war led by Vlad the Impaler, and the active defense mounted by Mircea the Great, whose offensive actions pierced in depth the Ottoman defensive system. They also dealt with fighting on inner directions (lines), the strategic maneuvers whereby Stephen the Great successfully baffled the advance of the Tatar and Ottoman armies in 1476, or through the defensive fights led by the same Vlad the Impaler who, by strategically securing the frontier, could strike at the Ottomans while they were crossing the Danube.[17] This experience would be enriched in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, in the time of Michael the Brave in particular, under conditions of an enhanced Romanian defensive effort in the anti-Ottoman wars of coalition, when the Romanian *voivodes* engaged battles "by stages" (the defense of the Danube in May-July 1595 and the battle of Călugăreni of August 13-23, 1595) aimed at deterring the enemy offensive until the promised allied help would come.

Starting with the sixteenth century, as a consequence of the military technological revolution, artillery would be much more important, preparations by artillery being used to discourage the enemy before the attack or to exhaust his flanks upon advancing, thus ensuring the success of the frontal counterattack or of the actions of outflanking and turning the front executed by cavalry. Ottoman chroniclers and Western historians offer us highly succinct information about the battle of Călugăreni. Having to face an enemy much superior in numbers (its effectives were sixteen times greater), Michael the Brave deployed the foot on both flanks, in the middle the cavarly, and in front the bombard artillery, having a harassing detachment of 500 fighters, a reserve, behind the dispositions, made up of 6,000 men with two cannon and numerous arquebusiers hidden in the bushes bordering the access ways to the bridge across the river Neajlov. In the face of the enemy's overwhelming forces, the Romanians reshuffled their troops, retreated methodically in the shape of any angle pointed toward the enemy, along the reserves' alignment, and

the counterattack was executed in the center with all available forces; concurrently, the right flank of the enemy was encircled by a cavalry detachment that took the Ottomans in the rear.

The battle was difficult, long, and full of dramatic moments. The Ottomans were sure of a great victory, but the Romanians' bravery and intelligence thwarted their plans. Michael's victory took a heavy toll; it was a historic victory that amazed his contemporaries. The historic Romanian military victory of almost 400 years ago continues to impress us even today.[18]

Both tactically and strategically, the Romanian army commanders always argued for a flexible defense based on drawing the enemy deep into the territory, continual striking at the march columns in advance and drawing them to prearranged places where they were to be decisively struck. The counterattack, i.e., the counteroffensive, followed (and carried to the frontier); that was to consolidate the victory because, fighting on their own territory, the Romanian cavalry could easily carry out the strategic tracking on parallel ways of access, outrunning the discouraged enemy troops, waiting and striking them again at unavoidable passing points (e.g., at the fords of the Danube and the Dniester or in the mountain passes). Successes scored in such actions also show the existence of permanent combat control in both its forms: reconnaissance and security. The leaders of the Romanian armies were infomred in due time by the reconnaissance groups about the enemy's movements, a desideratum envisaged in the campaign plan as one of the essential conditions for effecting surprise. To attain surprise, Iancu of Hunedoara in the battle at Sibiu (22 March 1442) against the Ottoman invaders, and Vlad the Impaler, in his campaign to disengage from the Danube line in the winter of 1461-1462 and in the famous night attack on the camp of Sultan Mehmed II of 16-17 June 1462, turned to an interesting strategum—they attacked the enemy with cavalry groups dressed in the enemy's uniforms. Stephen the Great, in the battle at Scheia resorted to a stratagem similar to that used at the beginning of the third century B.C. by the Getic King Dromichaites against the Macedonians: he sent some faithful men to the enemy camp who, pretending to be traitors, succeeded in catching the leader of the invading army in a trap.

In mentioning only some of the traits of the Romanian strategy and tactics in those centuries, a conclusion should be drawn, namely that the

Romanian countries' armies had military thinking and art in full harmony with the ideals and objectives of the struggle for the defense of the Romanian people's ethnic being, of its liberty and dignity. Everything conceived and achieved in that tormented, but glorious, epoch of Romanian history strengthened even more the pillars of the ancient military traditions of the Romanian people whose coordinates were: the right character of the wars waged by the Romanians, their option for armed battle determined by the need to defend their ancestral independence and land; an advanced military art and lofty soldierly values; the assistance given to other peoples in the fight for liberation and the contribution to the defense of civilization in Central and West Europe.[19]

Considered on a European scale, Romanian military strategy and tactics reveal ever more their original character, their own scientific and methodologic advances, especially if one takes into account that, in the medieval West, a general regression could be found in combat conceptions and fighting methodologies as compared to Classical times. In this respect, some specialists consider that "between the battle at Cannae and the end of the feudal cavalry nothing can be distinguished but a long period of decay."[20]

In his turn, Fuller considers that in the Middle Ages "In the Occident military organization disappeared"[21] and the famous British historian, Liddell Hart concluded that "in the West, in the Middle Ages the spirit of the feudal chivalry was hostile to the military art."[22] Similar too is the appreciation of French General L. M. Chassin, who considered that "no interesting teaching, however, was transmitted by military writers." One of the causes of this regression was the character of the military conflicts in West Europe: they were caste or dynastic confrontations among feudatories, which put a stamp on both the military organization and the manner of conceiving and carrying out the combat actions.[23] and carrying out the combat actions.[23]

Fighting, from the very beginning, for the achievement of its ideals of liberty, unity, and independence, for the right to be the own master of its country, never coveting other's goods, the Romanian people were always promoters of the ideas of good neighbors, noninterference in others' affairs, relations of understanding and peaceful coexistence with other countries and peoples. One could say that being hard-tested by history, the Romanian people formed, from their early existence, their own way

of fighting that synthesized elements of smart military strategy and tactics inherited from the Dacian forefathers and permanently enriched in the epochs to come.[24] Analysis of the events and data in the first centuries of the Romanian army's existence thoroughly confirm the truth uttered by Romania's president: "The old traditions themselves—I could say from the epochs of the Romanian society's development—prove that the army always served the people's interests, was the main force of the struggle against the foreign domination for the conquest and defense of the independence."[25]

Early stages of the Romanian enlightenment were marked by the rich and fruitful activity of some political, military, and cultural personalities who, either in chronicles, annals, or other works, paid great heed to military problems. Against this background, the chroniclers' breaking of new ground was highly important. From a theoretical, methodological standpoint, the chronicles and works by Nicolaus Olahus—the first Romanian humanist of European fame, a man of vast culture, and a well-known polyglot—and by Grigore Ureche, Constantin Cantacuzino, etc. presented ideas of great importance for the development of Romanian military thinking in premodern times. Their sociopolitical thinking revealed the Romanian people's Latin origins and its unity as well. So, the great Ureche was the first chronicler who asserted in Romanian, clearly and convincingly, the Romanian people's unity in all three Romanian countries, as well as their common origin.

The sociopolitical thinking of the Romanian enlightenment was prefaced by the work of Prince Dimitrie Cantemir, a scholar with European and world fame. This great thinker is considered "the inspirer—through historical and political arguments encompassed in his works—of the independence struggle of the Romanian people and of the other peoples in southeastern Europe.[26] Using scientific arguments, he showed how righteous was the Romanian people's struggle for winning liberty and maintaining its independence. An idea may be traced through his book, namely: "there is a sole Romanian people, deeply rooted here from the time of Rome and never could they be taken from their roots."[27] These ideas propelled the military thinking and doctrines of the epoch and fertilized the theoretical concerns about the military problems. A brilliant assertin was in his work, he grasped the intrinsic relation between policy and strategy and between the goals of the struggle for the country's

independence and liberty and the building up of a suitable military establishment. He was the first military thinker who underlined the sociopolitical essence of the military doctrine of the war for the homeland's defense expressed in the entire people's taking up arms. "When any inimical power provokes the prince, at his order all the people should be obliged to take up the arms and defeat the enemy."[28]

In the development of the enlightenment sociopolitical thinking a higher stage, as for the building up of national military doctrine, was the Transylvanian School headed by its master minds Samuel Micu, Gheorghe Șincai, and Petru Maior. With scientific eruditino and ardent patriotism, they demonstrated the common origin and the continuity of living of the Romanian people on the ancestral Dacian land. Their works embodied the main ideas of the Romanian enlightenment, of the assertion of the national consciousness. Thus, Samuel Micu revealed in a unitary conception the entire history of the Romanians from their remotest origins to the modern epochs. By his outlook, he made the "leap from the provincial history to the Romanians' general history . . . established the role and place of the Transylvanian Romanians in the history of the Romanian nation."[29] His enlightened ideas would be enlarged and deepened in the works of Gheorghe Șincai, Petru Maior, and many others, supporters of the Transylvanian School. Their entire historical work had a strong militant character, arguing the main postulates of the Romanian political program, of the assertion of national consciousness. Their advanced ideas represented a genuine ideological foundation for the struggle for national unity and independence, a creed for the Romanians living within the frontiers of ancient Dacia. So, "the first manifestations of the Enlightenment opened a new epoch in the history of the struggle for political emancipation waged by the Romanian nation."[30]

Structures and Categories of Forces in the Romanian Military System. "The Greater Army"—Expression of the Doctrine of the Entire People's War for the Homeland's Defense

The most eloquent expression of the doctrine of the entire people's struggle for the homeland's defense was the "greater army," a creation that got European and world prestige for Romanian military thinking.

In the Middle Ages, the popular masses' participation in the struggle against aggressors materialized, as a rule, in two main forms: (1) "the smaller army" and (2) the "greater army." The former identified itself with the organized standing army. The latter was made up, in case of danger, of all social classes, especially from the peasants.

In the fourteenth to the eigtheenth centuries the peasantry, on the whole, both the free ones and those from the village communities, continued to be the basis of the military system, a unitary system embracing the whole Romanian statehood. Free or serf, the peasants were always the country's "greater army," the concentration of all village communities' military potential. The action of donation signed by Mircea the Great, dated 1407-1418 whereby the Wallachian village of Ciulnița was donated to the Snagov monastery is highly revealing. All the previous duties of this village's inhabitants to the prince were now owed to the monastery "except one, the greater army to rise for mȳ rule,"[31] specifically excepting the military obligation. This mention shows the great importance attached to the "greater army" in the general effort of defending the country.

The main instrument of the country's defensive effort, the "greater army" would be for all the fifteenth century and the first decades of the following one, the organizational framework that ensured the ruling prince his control over the country's whole military potential, the main force having given him the strength to successfully oppose the invading armies.

The greater army in Transylvania had a quasi-identical organization as compared to that in the extra-Carpathian Romanian countries; its peculiarities were engendered by some stronger influences from feudalism of the Western type. The latter were, in particular, typical of the previously colonized communities (Saxons and Szeklers), a method that the Hungarian royalty restored, aiming at breaking the political and ethnic unity of the Romanian world.

The military power of the voivodeship was grounded on the majority Romanian population's obligations, as well as on the three "privileged" nations: the Magyar noblemen, the Saxons, and the Szeklers. The knezate-type of Romanian organization represented an important military structure, this organization keeping up in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries its old military structure. The Romanian *knezes* came to the

army with a "lance," a combat unit made up, as in Western countries, of armed cavalry; the lance represented the basic military formation.

The *knezes'* military role grew during the wars waged by Iancu of Hunedoara when the Hunedoara and Banat *knezes*, directly subordinated (*familiares*) to Iancu, deployed in the first line against the Ottomans and counted for the greater part of Transylvania's army. For their bravery in battle, many of them, faithful to the great army commander, were recompensed with estates.[32]

In Transylvania, as in the other two Romanian states, numerous documents attest to the mobilization of the "greater army." For instance, by the end of the fourteenth century, a document of that era stipulated that all the country's inhabitants had a duty to go to the army, as the soldierly tradition (*more exercituantium*). This decision also applied to the serfs' recruitment, a document dated 1453 stipulated that when the general call to arms is ordered (*universalis exercitus generaliter proclamat*), for each thirty-three serfs one mounted bowman serve in the army. In 1454, in the time of Iancu of Hunedoara, the number of serfs that had to go to the army was increased to four horsemen and two bowmen on foot for each one hundred serf "gates." In 1459 and 1492, other provisions envisaged one armed horseman for twenty serfs gates so that, in 1498, their numbers were fixed at one horseman for thirty-six gates.

In the sixteenth century, the peasants in Transylvania, by majority Romanians, still had an obligation to participate in the country's defense in case of danger, the entire military effort needed to repel the foreign aggressions having been put on their shoulders.

Under the conditions of the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty, Transylvania had a standing army of 4,000 men with a stipulation that all the country's inhabitants had to take up arms in case of danger. All this attests to the continuity of the military tradition of the "greater army" made up, for the most part, of Romanian serfs; in hard times, the defense of the state was incumbent upon it.

Historic deeds convincingly demonstrate that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Romanians in Transylvania—although lacking political rights—bore the brunt of the struggle for their country's defense and put up adamant resistance. The Magyar nobility being inferior in numbers was far from being able to secure by itself the defense that it was obliged to secure according to its privileges; at the same time, it had

not coalesced enough with the military potential of the other two "nations." Therefore, the country's defense devolved objectively upon the majority of inhabitants, namely the Romanians, on whose effort the entire edifice was based. The "greater army" was called up in Transylvania during the campaigns led by Iancu of Hunedoara (over 1442 to 1456), when the army fighting at Kosovo Polje (1448) was called, for instance, the "Romanian (Wallachian) army" and in 1462 when, violating his vassalage obligations to Hungary's king, the *voivode* was ready, according to the information sent by Venice's representative in Buda, to come to the help of Vlad the Impaler, Wallachia's ruling prince, when he was attacked by the Ottomans.[33]

Historical sources attest to a new organization of the Moldavian army under the rule of Stephen the Great; having to cope with highly grave dangers and to defend the country's independence that was jeopardized by the Ottoman Empire first of all, but by the Hungarian kingdom as well, the great *voivode* appealed to the popular masses whose bravery and sacrifices ensured his brilliant victories. He fully grasped, better than any of his predecessors, that history verified the truth that the country could not survive the big neighbors' aggressions without the entire able-bodied population's participation in the struggle. Testimonies of those times, unanimously recongizing the prevailing popular character of the then Moldavian army describe the large-scale participation by the peasants in Stephen the Great's military actions starting with 1465 and to their decisive role in the victories scored on the battlefields. In the opinion of Polish chronicler Jan Dlugosz, the peasantry represented the big reserve of soldiers for Moldavia's army. Referring to the military measures taken by Stephen the Great after the big defensive war of 1475-1476, he wrote that the *voivode* reorganized his army by replacing the soldiers fallen in the anti-Ottoman battles with peasants.

Massive participation by peasants in the defense war is also noted in the battle conducted in 1497 at Codrul Cosminului where—according to the Polish chronicler B. Wapowski—Stephen the Great "made up a Moldavian army, as large as he could, of boyars and peasants. He ordered everybody to take up arms to defend their land, their wives and children. He gathered 40,000 men."[34] Two other Polish chroniclers M. Cromer and M. Stryjkowski asserted that Stephen attacked the Poles with "peasantry footmen" who fiercely struck the enemy.[35]

The successors to Stephen the Great would also appeal to peasants when the country was in danger. In 1514, J. Laski wrote that the Moldavian army was made up of about 40,000 "common people" (*rommunia populi*). About the same period, the Moldavian messenger Luca Cîrje sent to Poland pointed out that Ştefăniţă Voivode ordered both the boyars and the peasants to make ready for fighting against the Tatars threatening the country.[36] About Petru Rareş's army, Martin Bielski wrote that it was made up of soldiers "brave, deft in handling the pike and shield although they are common peasants taken from the plough."[37] Referring to the same ruler, the Transylvanian scholar G. Reicherstorffer asserted that through "public call-up—namely through general mobilization—Rareş could gather to 60,000 soldiers, either mounted or on foot.[38]

Starting in the mid-sixteenth century, the peasantry's being called to the "greater army" was less frequent than before. But this did not mean the disappearance of this traditional military structure of the Romanian people. The international status of the Romanian countries, on the one hand, as well as the deep changes that occurred in the aspect of the battlefield, put their imprint upon the efficiency of the call to the "greater army." So, in the conditions marked by the Ottoman suzerainty in the three Romanian countries, the Porte would be directly interested in impeding the call of the greater army, aiming at depriving the Romanians of changing their political status by real and efficient results. On the other hand, within the bilateral treaties between the Romanian countries and the Ottoman Empire, the latter was obliged, in exchange for the tribute, to guarantee the former's foreign security. At the same time, the changes that occurred in the military organization and technology on the European level, needed—in case of the mobolization of the greater army—huge financial expenditures beyond the Romanian countries' resources. To equip a large mass of people with firearms required either a suitable economic base, which the Romanian countries lacked, or costly expenditures above their incomes. Furnished only with the traditional armament—bows and arrows, swords, pikes—the greater army could be no longer a redoubtable force to successfully cope with modern equipped armies.

The principles, forms, and means of the popular masses' general call-up within the organizational structure of the greater army had an important place in the doctrine of the entire people's struggle for the homeland's defense. The call to the army was made by announcers who would shout the order of the *voivode* in all the boroughs and villages. Speaking of the

modalities of gathering the greater army in case of danger, Grigore Ureche shows that the call was sent all over the country "to have all come quickly to the army," that "they sent quickly all over the country to gather at Roman" the *voivode's* army.[39] The country's answer was always prompt and efficient. The military units were organized in each zone able to swiftly move towards the place where the army was to assemble at the order of the supreme command. The frequent calls to arms enriched the experience in mobilization, which would be always executed rapidly both in time and place.

According to the documents, the call to arms was made when the enemy was overrunning the country by surprise through the so-called "setting a rumour afloat," i.e., fires were set in places visible to the naked eye from a distance. The first information about this alarm system appeared in a Turkish chronicle referring to an expedition led by Umur Beg in Romanian territory; it said that when the Ottomans reached Chilia on Wallachia's frontier and began their plundering, the inhabitants "announced [if to] one another by firing the grass."[40]

In Transylvania, the call to the army was carried out through the *voivode's* order, which urged all the inhabitants to come equipped and armed to the place established for the army to assemble; thus, in 1449, Iancu of Hunedoara asked for the judge and jurymen of Braşov to take measures so that everybody would be told in the respective zone "to be all ready for the army."[41]

The information about the army's effectives are rich enough to permit precise estimates of the then Romanian military power. Comparing the then documents, the result is that the Romanian countries together could have mobilized impressive effectives as against the demographic potential, of 120,000 to 140,000 fighters (Moldavia 45,000 to 70,000; Wallachia 35,000 to 40,000; Transylvania 25,000 to 30,000) at a time when France or Britain had at their disposal 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers each. Obviously, the explanation lies in the general call to arms of the greater army. This army's call to the defensive struggle was also determined by the fact that the war was waged in the Romanian countries against the foreign aggressors.

In the normal situations, the prince or the *voivode* had at their disposal the standing army or the princely "court" with effectives of about 10,000 to 12,000 fighters.[43]

The development of the state objectively required a standing military instrument needed in the local administrative-fiscal bodies, but especially to cope with the sudden foreign menaces. So, two categories of soldiers emerged and developed: those who served in central and local administrative-military body (the *slugile* of the princely court) and those from the boyar's court makde up of their *slugi.* These categories formed the court or, in other words, the "smaller army" of the country; it carried out administrative tasks in peacetime and military ones in wartime. The soldiers, whatever category they belonged to, were called by Anton Verancsics, a diplomat of the sixteenth century, the generic name of "voinici" (in the Balkan Peninsula *voinik*). Alongside the *voinici* another category emerged, that of *viteji* ("brave"), a category smaller than the Western knights; they came from footmen-peasants who were raised to the nobility (boyars) because of some outstanding feat of arms performed on the battlefield.

From the mid-sixteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth, there was an important historical period for the Romanian military thinking and practice; a remarkable chapter was written in the Romanian military patrimony. The doctrine of the entire people's struggle for the homeland's defense enlarged and deepened, the old traditions blending organically with the innovations into a higher-level synthesis, thus crowning a long historical evolution that traversed the ancient and feudal ages to the early modern epoch.

Given new socioeconomic conditions and realities in that period, important mutations took place in the organizational structures of the armed power, in the fighting strategy, and in the tactics of the Romanian army. The popular masses' decisive role fully evinced in the previous eras by the greater army would embrace, in the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries, specific forms and methods of resistance against invaders, of mobilizing, and of employment of the material resources.

Big changes took place in the structure of the smaller army, as one of the main components of the Romanian military factor. Under new historical conditions, the Romanian society set forth the accomplishment of its supreme ideals of the political-organizational unity of the entire Romanian people within a modern state, sovereign and independent, which required the enhancement of the role of the smaller army and the making up, in the near future, of a modern army. The growth of the popular masses' role put its imprint upon the army's organizational structure

and on the military doctrine and strategy that preserved the peculiar traits of the entire people's struggle for the homeland's defense. The military service was not limited by age. "In those times, then, were no limits of age, except the physically powerless ones. Therefore all men had the duty to answer the call to the army, regardless of their age, how long their health permitted or their situation as free men."[44]

The first category was that of the *slujitori*, made up of the prince's courtiers who enjoyed a noble status, having been exempt from fiscal obligations in return for their service in local administrative-military bodies, both in peacetime and in wartime. Territorially, they belonged to one of the prince's residence towns. With the gradual decay of the *curteni* (courtiers) and the enhancement of the centralized power strengthening tendencies, the corps of the *slujitori* would be formed, to a greater degree, by free men risen from among the free people; they were usufructuaries of the lands owned by the ruler. In the organizational structure of the *slujitori* there were two main categories: the *călărași* and the *dorobanți*. The *călărași* were equipped with "shield, lance, armor and helmet," and did reconnaissance missions.[45] Those deployed at the frontiers had the main task of defending the borders of the country, and were named *călărași de margine* (the border *călărași*). In Wallachia, their effectives amounted to 8,000 men under Michael the Brave, and in Moldavia to 10,000 men. They would gradually decrease in the eighteenth century.

In the seventeenth century, the corps of the *dorobanțti* was made up of the *dorobanții de țară* (the country's *dorobanți*), a service that would become a hereditary one, bequeathed from father to son, which explains the autonomous character of this military structure. The *dorobanți* rose from the same social milieu as the *călărași* and had the same missions, with the only difference that the latter were foot soldiers.

The corps of the *vînători*, a category dating from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were made up of the prince's *slujitori* who were exempted from some taxes. Half of them were footmen, half were cavalry.

In their organization, the Romanian armies continued to include infantry, cavalry, and artillery with different roles and missions but called to fight according to a unitary conception, unfolding basic and complementary actions.

Infantry remained the basic arm, accounting for two-thirds of the army's effectives. Its organizational structure maintained the *ceata* (band)

but there would also appear, under various names, detachments and battalions. Its equipment was heterogeneous. Besides the traditional weapons (bows, lances, pikes, swords, etc.), firearms emerged and developed—harquebuses, pistols, etc. Over the decade 1580-1590, the Moldavian army disposed of about 3,000 harquebusiers.[46] In April 1600, Michael the Brave had at his disposal 20,000 fusiliers on foot and 8,000 mounted fusiliers.[47] Given the conditions, the troops were trained with priority in handling the firearms, but not renouncing employment of the traditional ones.

The cavalry continued to be the maneuvrable instrument in the reconnaissance actions. Compared with the heavy cavalry of the Western feudal armies, the Romanian was light, thus very flexible. The development of firearms led to important changes in the organization and combat-leading means of the cavalry. The shock actions of the cavalry would be evermore replaced with fighting actions that employed firearms, pistols included.

In the period discussed, the artillery developed both in quantity and quality. It was organized into an artillery corps in direct subordination to he supreme command. The cannon were placed in the middle of the dispositions, on its flanks, and even before it. A density of about 80 cannon per each kilometer of front was reached in the main effort. Using concentrated fire, something similar to an artillery cannonade was taking place. By holding an ever greater share, compared with other arms, the artillery would play an even more important role in winning victory on the battlefield. Besides these classic arms the logistics, sanitary, and intelligence services were organized, and entered the army's organizational structure.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the command structure would also develop; it was a well-organized leadership system. The ruling prince was the supreme commander; he established the level of the effectives, appointed commanders, convened the councils of war, and personally headed the army on campaigns.

The development of the complexity of the military problems needed the officializatin and clarification of some functions and ranks. Thus, there was created the function of *mare agă* who would become, in the seventeenth century, the commander of the *dorobanți*, there was stated the function and competences of Suceava's Porter playing the role of *hetman*, *pîrcălab* of the princely residence and commander of the *slujitori;*

the commander of the *dorobanţi* was subordinated to him. In Moldavia there also appeared the *hotnogi* who was to command the units of *slujitori* while the *vătafi* commanded the *curteni.* In the Wallachian military hierarchy, there appeared the *iuzbaşi* and captains who commanded both the *curteni* and *slujitori.* The smallest subunits were commanded by the *ceauşi* and *stegari.*

The relative variety of a logistics organization—an expression of social-economic features typical to Romanian soceity, as well as to the standards of the period—illustrates the complexity of the Romanian military establishment, its capability to successfully face strong foreign armies, and thus secure our ancient land's integrity and liberty. On a par with the other European countries, the logistics structure of the Romanian army also embodied original traits resulting from ancient traditions or imposed by political and military circumstances.

The army organization was made up according to the territorial principle, each administrative unit representing a military formation that operated either independently in small-scale actions—to repel plundering incursions, raids, etc.—or together with the country's army.

The oldest military unit mentioned in documents was the *steagul* ("flag" or *banderium*), common to all the Romanian principalities, the name of this military structure coming from the homonymic military sign. The "flag" was a militay unit organized on the administrative-territorial principle and was made up of soldiers from this territory. Around the flags, the soldiers of the respective military units gathered; Stephen the Great is said to "have distributed flags to his army, in November 1473, which means he divided his army into such units and gave them proper signs before starting the campaign.[48] The flags' strength varied according to the demographic capacity of the respective administrative structure. In the 1473 Wallachian campaign, Stephen the Great's army had forty-eight flags. As its strength amounted to 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers, that results in the average strength of a flag amounting to 250 fighters. In Transylvania, the flag numbered from 500 to 1000 soldiers, equally the prince's flag (*banderium*) in 1433.

The band was a big tactical unit usually operating within a joint army, but it could operate independently in reconnaissance, harassment, or diversion. According to data referring to Stephen the Great's 1473 campaign, the forty-eight flags were organized into twelve bands. Their strength

was not exactly established, but was set ad hoc as the needs required. The bands' names were also given to groups of soldiers gathered and led by boyars and, later, to courtiers' or servants' corporations. The strength and mobility of these big tactical units allowed for various missions, starting with the enemy contact to counterattacks meant to disrupt the enemy lines.

The group was a big unit that could carry out independent operations; it was meant to execute strategic marches and battle engagements, which made its strength be set up according to the immediate circumstances. In 1510 for example, Vlăduț the Young (1510-1512) divided his army into three groups and, in 1528, Petru Rareș, in his first Transylvanian campaign, had his army organized in two groups.

Superior organizational military structures, reflecting the flexibility of the Romanian armies' composition were the army corps, mobilized whenever necessary in large spaces. Thus, Moldavian documents record the "higher country" and the "lower country" armies, led by *vornici*, as assistants to the commander-in-chief; in Wallachia, there were the armies of Mehedinți and Buzău counties, as well as those of the Ban of Craiova; in Transylvania—the army corps of various areas, led by Romanian princes, and the Szekler *scaune* (an old territorial organization) army corps, led by a *comes siculorum.*

The Romanian doctrinal and strategic concerns were extremely interesting, genuine, and efficient as regards equipping the army and logistic support, which registered a significant qualitative leap as compared to the previous period (the eighth to the mid-fourteenth centuries).

Weapons were produced by Wallachian, Moldavian and, especially, Transylvanian craftsmen. Many letters have been preserved in which Moldavian and Wallachian princes were asking Transylvanian craftsmen for arrows, bows, swords, or iron shields, as well as iron to make weapons in their countries. Since Transylvania was the main weapons supplier, there was a certain uniformity of weapons used by the Romanian armies at the time.

Excepting sidearms purchased through common trade, the central authorities made massive orders for buying weapons at critical moments for the country; in 1432, for example, Alexandru Vodă Aldea (1431-1436) asked the people of Brașov to help him with "bows, arrows and weapons"[49] Vlad the Impaler (1436-1442, 1443-1447) also asked the

Transylvanian people to get for him "100 guns and accessories and bows and arrows and shields, as many as you can."[50] The same prince asked Braşov in 1445, for bows, arrows and guns.

Before the 1476 battles, Stephen the Great asked the *jude* (mayor) of Braşov to allow Michael the Craftsman "to come and fetch us swords and weapons, as we need them against the Pagans"[51] ; by the end of his long rule (1500-1503), the great Romanian prince sent, again to Braşov, one Spştar Trotuşan to buy weapons and stirrups. Referring to the army's technology in the time of Stephen the Great, Jan Dlugosz said that "if he found a peasant not possessing arrows, bows, swords and spurs, he ordered the man to be immediately hung."[52]

In 1443, Iancu of Hunedoara asked Braşov for *quadraginta puscas ac lapides* (forty guns and spurs) and, two years later, he asked for 15 bows, 2,000 arrows, and 200 low springs to be sent to Chilia (the low springs were to replace the obsolete ones).[53] Except for Braşov, the main town in weapon production of the Romanian principalities, weapons were also produced in the workshops of Sibiu, Sighişoara, Sebeş, and Orăştie.

Bows and arrows were the most widely used offensive weapon of the Romanians in the long-distance fighting. Used mainly in the preceding centuries, the bow and arrow continued to be (up to the sixteenth century) the Romanian armies' basic weapon. A 1332 Byzantine chronicle mentions that the Romanians "are more often than not mounted bowmen" using this weapon in their tactics against the Tatars, their most frequent enemy during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[54] In 1395, during battles with the Hungarian army, the Moldavian soldiers were mostly armed with bows, as the chronicler Antonio Bonfini says, and Stephen I "gathered an army lightly armed and a great number of bowmen."[55] In the Marienburg battle (1422), the soldiers sent by Alexandru the Good in support of the Poles distinguished themselves by pouring arrows against their adversaries, but they were protected against their arrows."[56]

The large-scale use of bows on the battlefield led to a specialized service in the army, that of the bowmen or arrowmen. Miron Costin recorded from oral tradition that Alexandru the Good's foot soldiers "were called arrowmen . . . because, in battles, they walked, not carrying any burden, but an arrow quiver, their bow on the arm."[57] As improvements on the bows, the crossbow or ballista, featuring a metal spring fastened on a wooden bed, were often used by Iancu of Hunedoara's soldiers.

In close fighting, straight swords or scimitars and sabers were used; in the fifteenth century, a Romanian-type of sword appeared (straight blade, two edges, and a median groove, with a two-bar guard and a long hilt ending in a flat disk)—the "spada ala faccione valachesca."[58] Also in wide use were scythes, axes, hatches, pikes, lances, bludgeons, cudgels, maces, and, as a combination of pike and hatchet, halberds.

Firearms had equipped the Romanian armies (according to the *Codex Latinus Parisimus*) since the fourteenth century when the first bombard workships (1372) opened in Transylvania (at Sibiu), with "specialists" in forging them, as the Niedel family, Andrei of Braşov and Iacovus Wahl of Sighişoara (1393). They used a mixture of saltpeter, brimstone, and coal for powder (*pulvis*), and stone or metal cannon balls.

Artillery was used in the bombardment phase of the battle itself and was effective even on people used to fighting. Describing the Valea Albă battle of 1476, the Ottoman chronicles mention that "on the *giaours* side, there were the carts, from where cannons fired, making the earth shake under their thundering. . . the janizaries, although accustomed to placing their bodies in front of cannons and guns, could not support these sounds any longer and put their faces down on the ground."[59] Sighting was done by aiming the cannon barrel toward the target; changing direction was more difficult because the barrel position had to be changed, and the barrel was usually fastened to the ground or mounted on a cart. The gunners fired the powder by means of a red-hot iron rod. While engaging in close fighting, cannons stopped their fire to avoid destroying their own fighters.

Fortress artillery, especially, improved and spread during the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries. A 1454 inscription mentions the improvement of the Cetatea Albă wall, which "was armed with cannons" under the leadership of *pîrcălab* Stanciu.[60] During the siege of Suceava fortress, in 1476, the garrison "defended with cannons and cared nothing about the Turks," as the Italian eyewitness Angiolello said.[61]

A significant resource for cannon purchasing was the spoils of war, which also gave some measure of the successes gained by the Romanians. Such rich loot was captured by Stephen the Great after the successful Battle of Baia (1467): "carts, tents and various bombards, machines as well as small and big cannons."[62] The same happened in Vaslui, where the Moldavian soldiers captured the cannon of the Ottoman army.[63]

A new element was the light artillery, equipping Petru Rareș's army. According to the contemporary Polish chronicler, Joachim Bielski, these cannon "were gathered 6-to-8 at a single place, on light wheels, so nothing is more useful to footsoldiers, who can put them wherever they go, turn them in whatever direction and, being surrounded by them in march, they should not be afraid of cavalry attacks. The barrels are so [made] that they light in turn, from one to another. Loading is done rapidly, the cartridge is wrapped in paper. The barrel length is a little bigger than a cubit. The balls are usually iron or lead ones."[64]

The diversification of fire weapons resulted in special producing centers; in Bistrița, for example, there were special craftsmen producing rifles (*büchesenmacher*), powder or saltpeter (*salitermacher*), bullets or balls (*kugelschüer*) and cannon (*geschützgiesser*). In 1516, Bogdan II, the Prince of Moldavia, sent a servant to Bistrița to buy cannons and rifles (*sclopetum et pixides manuales*)[65]; later, Stefan Lăcustă (Stephen the Locust, 1538-1540), thanked the people of Bistrița for the seven barrels and a half gunpowder they had sent.[65] These are facts certifying that the Romanian armies' equipment from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries was, as regards technical weapon performance, below the level of other armies in Central and Southeastern Europe, whom they often had to face.[66]

Besides the three basic services making up the army—cavalry (which, in special, circumstances was dismounted), infantry, and artillery—special attention was paid to developing the Danube and sea flotillas and to its land infrastructure. We possess interesting data referring to the harbors of Brăila and Armanul Negru (today Vadu, district of Constanța), to Vlad the Impaler's monoxyle flotilla, to Iancu of Hunedoara's small and flexible (*naviculae*) and big ships (*maxima navis*), to Stephen the Great's fleet, which in 1484 carried the army on the Black Sea to Cetatea Albă, to Michael the Brave's shipyards of the Danube ports, etc. The historical documentation allows for conclusions on certain information services and the logistical support of the army during extended campaigns, when support carts were assured (*proviantwagen*).

Combat training was done both when gathering the army in the camp and on the occasion of the two yearly "muster inspections" (*căutări, ilustrații*) on 23 April and 26 October;[67] special attention was paid to teaching the men how to handle the new types of weapons, to strengthening

the resistance during marches, as well as discipline and the ability to rapidly execute maneuvers in perfect coordination of action between arms and units.

During the period under discussion, fortifications could be included in a real system of defending the entire Romanian territory; there was an external belt, at the borders, and an internal belt that defended defiles and mountain passes, thus interdicting the main ways of access to the territory within the Carpathians. There were also the residential towns and the prince's courts and the main Transylvanian walled towns. All these formed the framework on which the entire Romanian defense system relied, resistance centers being obstacles in the way of the aggressor.

In the general strategy of the entire people's war, they hhad no longer the same importance they had had in the Middle Ages. The Romanian defensive war pattern relied on the organization of resistance and engaging in decisive battle around a fortified center. When arriving in front of the capital cities, the invading armies of the Hungarian Anjous, Mehmed II, Sinan Paşa, or Jan Sobieski did not encounter the army of the country. This would happen becuase it was everywhere, watching each movement of the enemy, attacking him by surprise and relying on a single stronghold—the natural one—that of the Carpathians, where older people, women, and children had taken shelter, as well as on the treasury of the country, also laying waste the territory in the face of the enemy (setting villages on fire, burying crops, poisoning wells in the aggressor's way). The real adversary of the Western mail-clad knight, of the German arquebusier or the Sultan's janizary or spahi was famine, thirst and a heavy silence, broken sometimes by deadly cries in their own language.

It was the fatigue following the night-guarding of the camp, the fear that little by little caught the enemy, suddenly destroying any desire to fight a never-coming battle. It was his own weakness that turned him into a loser long before the decisive battle, which the Romanians had planned in a place that seemed to plot against him by the moors swallowing him, by trees and rocks mocking at him, by death-bringing bushes. The entire nature and climate were his enemies. From repeated defeats, the aggressors learned that they were confronting not an army, but a people resolute to defend its freedom; not a small state on the map of Europe, neither Moldavia, Transylvania, nor Wallachia but the entire "country" of the Romanians. It is worth mentioning the information given by Anton Verancsics,

corroborated by other contemporary sources, that, in 1526, Suleyman the Magnificent was afriad that Transylvania or Wallachia or Moldavia might unite and fight when he wanted to occupy these countries,[68] a fear resulting from the fact that "the Romanians of Ardeal could easily join Petru Rareș because of their language identity,"[69] which happened in fact, according to royal secretary Petru Perembsky, in 1562, when they "easily united."[70]

Thus, foreigners recognized the existence of one and the same people on both sides of the Carpathians, whose autonomy and continuity from Dacian times were obvious, and whose consciousness of having a unique "country," Moldavia, Wallachia (Dobrudja included) and Transylvania being parts of a unitary political body "which had once been Dacia."[71]

Developing and improving military structures, weapons and command strongly influenced the Romanian armies, strategy and tactics. As compared to previous periods, the main form in which Romanian strategy materialized in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the offensive, whose main goal aimed at winning the independence and fulfilling the national unity. But battles were still waged in over 95 percent of the cases on national territory, that is in the Carpathian-Danube-Pontic area, and were mainly subordinated to achieving political and state unity and to driving away the occupation forces. They offered wide scope both to strategic maneuver on internal lines and on external directions.

Organizing and developing strategic maneuver on internal lines was the only optimum solution in the presence of several neighboring empires and expansionist powers permanently wanting to incorporate our ancient land within their boundaries. It was successfully used by Ioan Vodă when facing the threat of the Tatar forces penetrating the Moldavian territory from the east and of the Ottomans from the south. Under such circumstances, that Romanian commander initially deployed his forces in a central position, and, after he had gathered information, decided to attack the southern group, as being the most important and dangerous. In order to achieve this, he moved most of his forces in this direction and on 24 March 1574, he attacked the enemy by surprise and won a great victory.

In Michael the Brave's military art, strategic maneuver on internal lines flourished. After large-scale offensive operations carried out in the Ottoman rear, south of the Danube, the great commander ceaselessly harassed Sinan Pașa's forces, drawing them into the Călugăreni area where he

engaged in general battle on favorable terrain. He then executed a skillful strategic retreat and, a little later, launched the general counteroffensive, destroyed the Ottoman forces and forced the remainder over the Danube.

In the fights waged by the Romanians to achieve national unity, strategic maneuver on external lines was of great significance. It is worth mentioning Michael the Brave's concept of organizing and developing such a maneuve in the first campaign for nationalunity carried out on Transylvanian territory. Initially, the prince massed his forces in two faraway areas—the main group near the town of Ploești and the second ne near the town of Craiova. Then, the two groups entered Transylvania in two convergent directions, joined hands, attacked the enemy, and defeated him on 28 October 1599, at the Battle of Șelimbăr. The great prince also used maneuver on external lines in his second successful campaign for national unity, on Moldavian territory. Planned in full accordance with the main political and military goal—the making of the Romanian premodern national state—the strategic maneuvers on external lines carried out by Michael the Brave's armies were successful and marked a glorious chapter in the book of Romanian military art.

The Romanian armies' tactics did suffer, however, in contrast to strategy development; they were subordinated in its goal, with significant changes and improvements in many areas during this period. First, the tactics for organizing and developing marches improved by setting up a guard service and an outpost and a marching order, as well as by marching at greater speeds than in previous periods. Second, the Romanian armies' tactics changed in regard to stationing pickets, which involved making the right choice of the stationing place, troop deployment and organization of a protection and warning system to prevent surprise attacks. Third, the highest expression of Romanian tactics was the concept of organizing and developing a fight in which attention was focused on choosing the most favorable terrain, on setting a defensive line against surprise attacks, and tenaciously chasing the enemy forces from the national territory. In all stages of stationing, marching and fighting, the greatest attention was paid to using all natural terrain advantages. Fourth, the Romanian armies' tactics improved by maneuver, especially the outflanking maneuver, with its decisive form—double outflanking. Finally, the Romanian tactics emphasized the "surprise" in all stages of the fight, fiercely attacking the enemy and chasing him to the final defeat.

Continued and improved as compared to previous periods, the military strategy and tactics of the period dealt with represented a new and veritable chapter in the multimillenary thought and doctrine on the entire people's fight for defending the homeland. Their lessons and conclusions will be successfully applied in the struggle for social justice, for national liberty and unity which, during the subsequent period, will have the typical forms of the entire people's resistance.

Forms of the People's Resistance in the Struggle for Social and National Liberation Carried Out by the Romanian People for Preserving State Autonomy and Territorial Integrity

During the Middle Ages, the resistance struggle of the broad masses against invasions and national and social exploitation was usually carried out by an organized and institutionalized participation of the great army. In the territories in which there was foreign domination, this struggle had typical forms of organization and materialized in the growth of outlawry (*lotrie*), by uprisings or social and liberation peasant wars, and by strikes organized in the eighteenth century by workers in the Transylvanian mines and metallurgic centers.

It was against the increase of the Ottoman domination that the great people's uprising of 1671 was unleashed, with extensive participation by the regular army and of all social strata, and during the eighteenth century, the powerful risings at Iași (1795) and Bucharest (1764-1765).[72]

Of the gatherings by the Romanian masses for armes struggles for social and national justice on the ancient Romanian territories of Transylvania and the Banat, special mention should be given to the 1437 Bobîlna uprising, to Gheorghe Doja's 1514 peasant war, to the 1526 anti-Ottoman uprising led by "Black Tsar," Iovan Nenada, the anti-Habsburg ones that took place repeatedly in the Banat between 1735 and 1742, and of the Sofronie of Cioara movement for national rights (1757-1761), which became a rich source of teachings for the leaders of the 1784 great people's revolution.[73] In these large military actions—organized, led, and carried out by peasantry—with well-conceived plans, and well-elaborated programs of action, the elements of the entire people's war and the people's resistance were omnipresent.[74] Armed with classical weapons or only

with working tools, often manufactured directly on the battlefield, the broad masses of people, irrespective of their nationality, often put the foreign exploiters, nobles, and *gorfi* (counts) in great difficulty, inflicting important defeats and significant losses on them. Both in the 1437 Bobîlna uprising and in Gheorghe Doja's revolt, alongside the armed Romanian peasants—who represented the great majority—Szeklers, Hungarians, Saxons and other nationalities of Transylvania were found. Such strong uprisings by people resulted in ideas and programs that later inspired and guided the national and social liberation though of modern Romania.

During the eighteenth century, the Romanian countries' armies were characterized by reduced strength and a decrease in their role. But the Romanians' resistance could not be nullified; it simply took on other organizational structures and fighting forms typical of internal and international conditions. Among them, outlawry and voluntary service were of great importance.

Outlawry (*haiducia*) was a form of armed power typical of Southeastern Europe. It flourished widely in the Romanian principalities. Whenever social and national exploitation became unbearable and whenever neighboring empires' armies invaded the Romanian territories plundering everything, the Romanian peasantry and other social groups hid in the forests and mountains, organized into well-armed *haiduci* bands and fought against native or foreign exploiters.[75] The outlaw bands, made up of Romanians, operated for over a century; they were a threat to all kinds of exploiters. Some of the outlaws' actions became legends: the masses devoted beautiful ballads and *doine* (elegiac folk poetry or songs) to them, representing the outlaws as their bright ray of hope against social and national exploitation. The legendary heroic figures of such outlaws remained forever in the Romanian people's consciousness and history as glorious illustrations of the people's struggle for the homeland's independence and prosperity, for achieving national and social rights and liberty.

Volunteering, on the other hand, manifested itself on a large-scale and in various forms during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in all the Romanian principalities. Volunteering and volunteer forces as an institution resulted from the Romanian people's need to participate, arms in hand and alongside other peoples, to the fight against Ottoman domination in particular, as well as against other invaders who were robbing

Romanian goods and lands.[76] These military actions were embodied in the general struggle by the entire armed people for preserving its being. Most of the military actions by the Romanian volunteers in the period discussed were carried out, alongside the Russian army, against the Ottoman Empire's troops; in such actions, Romanians saw an effective way of weakening the Ottoman domination and to regain the Romanian countries' independence.

The preservation of national being and ancient land during the Middle Ages involved numberless material and human sacrifices by the Romanian people. Often lacking help from abroad and often deserted by "allies" (who looked for conquests themselves) at hard times, the Romanian people were obliged to accept certain territorial amputations and to endure the foreign occupation. At the same time, the frequent wars waged on the territory of our homeland led to the complete destruction of villages and towns, material goods or spiritual assets destroyed or disappeared, and sons killed in battles or taken prisoners. But, relying on their ability, on the masses' heroism and sacrifice, stoically, facing undepictable and unbelievable difficulties and privations, the Romanian principalities often thwarted the aggressors' plans, thus securing their state continuity. At the same time, the principalities made their significant contribution to the resolute struggle of other countries and nations against all kinds of invaders. Alone or in cooperation with other states, they played an important role in preserving European culture and civilization, the right to freedom and independence of the many countries located in this area. With good reason, the Romanian people are proud of not having been subdued by invaders. They have withstood all vicissitudes just like an oak tree in a storm. Led by brave and skillful princes who relied on the fighting force and devotion of the people's masses, the Romanian people stubbornly defended their land, independence, and state unity. As Romania's president points out: "In the glorious epochs of struggling for the development and preservation of national being, of our people, for freedom and autonomy, a special place is given to the heroic fights waged by Mircea the Great, Stephen the Great, Michael the Brave—who in 1600 achieved, for the first time, the union of the three Romanian provinces—as well as by other princes who never hesitated to sacrifice their life in order to defend their ancient land."[77]

CHAPTER 3

THE ARMED NATION AND THE ENTIRE PEOPLE'S WAR– FUNDAMENTAL COORDINATES OF THE ROMANIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE AND THE HOMELAND'S DEFENSE IN THE MODERN ERA

The Substantiation of the Homeland's Defense Concept Through the Entire People's Struggle

The Romanian society's entrance into the modern era marked a new period in the development of national military doctrine. Under the new social, political, and economic conditions of the beginning of this era, military theory developed as never before, being propelled by the sociopolitical thinking of the 1848 revolutionaries and 1859 unionists, by the orientations and tendencies of the Romanian society's spiritual life, and by the research in philosophy, history, policy, law, etc. This synthesis of military and revolutionary thought blended gradually through the first half of the nineteenth century, when that generation of social militants raised the standard of modernization and emancipation.

The revolutionary and progressive sociopolitical thinking of 1848 would bring about new approaches and solutions to the complex problems involved in the homeland's defense and the ever-increasing role of the military factor in the struggle for union, liberty, and state emancipation. Realistic and scientific conditions were created for making real the homeland's

defense through the entire people's struggle. With this end in view, the old traditions of popular war were analyzed and capitalized on in line with the "armed power" concept of military thinking and practice in the nineteenth century.

The most brilliant expression of the synthesis of revolutionary socio-political thinking and progressive military theory was embodied in the work and activity of Nicolae Bălcescu, the first modern Romanian military historian and thinker.

> The Romanians, from the very foundation of their principality . . . felt that the state needed a standing army that should be ready at any moment to repeal the foes from [wherever] they might come. Moreover, they grasped that such an army cannot be put a people's advanced detachment and the military establishment should also have a [large] national reserve; it is for this purpose that they organized from the very beginning the army, the militias and the multitudes' rising to arms because the Romanian was born with the duty to be a soldier and defend the country in case of need, and when an enemy would encroach on the Romanian land, all the country had to be at arms.[1]

In the last decades of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, following incessant national and social movements, the Romanian people's liberation struggle grew evermore to aim at the removal of foreign domination and the abolishment of obsolete feudal structures that impeded socio-economic and political progress. The interdependence between the revolutions of national and social liberation, on the one hand, and the struggle for the country's independence and territorial integrity, on the other, is highlighted by the Romanian state's leader:

> The big movements of social and national liberation like the revolution led by Horea, Cloșca and Crișan, Tudor Vladimirescu's revolution, the bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1848, the achievement of Union in 1859, the 1877 independence war, the peasants' uprising in 1907 and many other social and national fights demonstrate, through the power of very deeds, that while defending the ancestors' land and national being, our people stubbornly fought for liberty and social justice, to be the full mater of its destines.[2]

These events decisively influenced the development of national military doctrine, speeding up its modernization and imprinting upon it a militant revolutionary character on the one hand, and, on the other, original and indigenous traits already known in the previous Romanian combat tradition. Experience from the Romanian revolutions was corroborated by teachings from the American and French revolutions, which called for standing armies (characteristic of late feudalism) along with the popular masses' mobilization to fight against overwhelming outside military powers. Both revolutions demonstrated that the invaded state had to oppose the invading armies with a revolutionary system of "the entire nation's mobilization."

The Romanian Doctrinal View of the Entire People's Army as Shown by the Programs and the Unfolding of the Revolutions in 1784, 1821 and 1848

The Romanian military organization doctrine—based on the entire people's training and rising to arms—was expressed in the programs of the revolutionary explosions of 1784-1785, 1821, and 1848.

The uprising by masses during the 1784 revolution—headed by Horea, Cloșca and Crișan—highlighted ideas and aspirations that would inspire and later on guide the Romanian people's struggle for social and national liberation in modern times.[3]

The 1821 revolution, the name Tudor Vladimirescu gave to his army was "the people's assembly." That expressed its function, it was to be an exponent of the Romanian society's revolutionary rennovation and national emancipation. Vladimirescu's idea was not a military uprising, but a social and national revolution in which the army, led by people recruited from the free peasants and minor boyars (also of rural origin and recently in the ranks of the privileged). The "people's assembly" was to be a synthesis of tradition and innovation. By its very name, this army continued the tradition of the entire people's struggle, by the general mobilization of the country's human resources that had secured the Romanian countries' autonomy throughout the Middle Ages.

The specific conditions of the beginning of the nineteenth century, when military development required knowledge of handling weapons, the army already had become a distinct professional body in society.

The organization of the revolutionary army in 1821 envisaged first the making of a standing army comprising the main arms of those times: infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Vladimirescu understood that only a highly professional army could answer the exigencies of the new type of warfare in Europe. The "limited war" of the eighteenth century was to be replaced with "total war." Eastern Europe had not been affected yet by such changes, but it was feeling their impact. That is what that, among the most important demands stated in the "Requests of the Romanian people," that veritable "constitution" of the revolution and the country, was that the "country be able to train and keep 4,000 pandours-soldiers [gendarmes], with their commanders, and 200 *arnăuți* [irregulars]." This "constitution" established the single and fundamental mission of these standing military troops: "the country's defense against foes"—defensive duties exclusively.[4]

But, under any extraordinary circumstances—in the case of superior enemy invasion—Vladimirescu envisioned the entire people's rising to arms and the launching of a popular defensive war. It was only in this way, he thought, that resistance could be successful against superior enemies, in their numbers and equipment, because he said that "without weapons we cannot free our country from the hands of those who have devoured it for so many years, bringing it into such misery and indescribable despair."[5]

In 1821, Vladimirescu saw that his revolutionary program of liberating the country from Ottoman domination could not be achieved without the arming of the people and a popular war of liberation to embody, in doctrine and organization, both traditional Romanian military elements and modern forms and means of action. Many programs and demands of the Romanian sociopolitical renovation elaborated by various post-1821 political circles—from revolutionary to conservative—regarded almost unanimously, the reorganization of the national army on modern grounds as an expression of a traditional military model (even if not in all details). A program elaborated by the liberal boyars in Wallachia required the securing of the country's borders and the reestablishment of the "Romanian servants [*slukitori*] of yore." Moreover, they wanted the maintenance and enlargement of other military categories, then still in existence, such as foot soldiers, light infantry, frontier guards, county forces, and others that could bear arms.[6] A memorandum dated 22 August 1822, elaborated by Moldavian boyars, who were refugees at Czernowitz

(Cernăuți), included the same point, asking for the princely guard and the country's defense to be entrusted to the militias made up of Moldavains only organized "by the old rules."[7] Finally, a "constitution of carbonari," dated the same year, which was worked out by a group of advanced reformers, asked not only "to revive a kind of national army," but also for it "to be a standing one."[8]

Up until 1848, the program of the progressive groups and parties aiming at renovating Romanian society (for whom the desiderata of national unity and independence were closely interwoven with social development) included elements of military organizational doctrine grounded on the entire people's training and making ready for defense. We find such elements in the very structure of the modern Romanian army reorganized after 1829, which included from, the very beginning, modern standing units and the territorial formations. Recruitment principles and service by these territorial formations, taken over from the old indigenous military organization, contributed to the sensible growth of the effectives under arms. Thus, from the very beginning, the modern Romanian army contained the germs of military structures "clinging to the best, oldest and most solid traditions of the country itself."[9]

A doctrinal concept, only partially established, was formulated for the first time in 1838 by the Wallachian National party led by Colonel Ion Cîmpineanu. Its program demanded that, "apart from the standing army," a "national guard" be set up. Moreover, it stated that "all Romanians should bear weapons" and should be "soldiers" to defend the motherland's soil.[10]

The 1848 Romanian revolution and its leaders would show in a solid synthesis, the doctrine of the "armed nation" and the entire people's war; they also ensured in practice, although only partially, a suitable organizational framework. As far back as 1844, Nicolae Bălcescu, the great revolutionary democrat and initiator and leader of the 1848 revolution, said that the reform of "our military organization," was "to ensure us better defensive foundations." Bălcescu concluded that, to win liberty and national unity, the Romanian people should "enjoy all conditions of power" against foreign oppressors, and, in this respect, he underlined the absolute need of a national army adequate for the aims envisaged. He suggested that "every Romanian, with no exception at all, is born with the duty to be a soldier of the homeland, from 20 to 60 years of age." He

suggested a military system based on compulsory military service, in which a standing army would be "to expensive" and, moreover, "depriving agriculture and industry of so many hands" that should give priority to "national reserves" (militia, national guard, etc.) organized on the "Prussian Landwehr system by which this country [would try] to win to its side, to a greater degree, the people's armed power."[12]

The 1848 Romanian revolution stated, on the one hand, the need of setting up such para-military formations, of a popular type, and, on the other, contributing to the making of a real Romanian military doctrine —an expression of the specific demands of the bourgeois democratic revolutionary program. This was an outcome of the close collaboration between the revolution's leaders on both sides of the Carpathians—before and during the revolution—comprising traditional military elements specific to the Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic area. This doctrine was based on the "armed nation" concept and the popular war which had been, so many times, tested through the centuries-old struggle against foreign aggressions and could really serve the Romanian people's emancipation struggle in the mid-nineteenth century.

This concept would be translated into reality through the setting up of a national guard as the main formation of the "national reserves." The need for setting up a national guard focused the attention and concerns of the 1848 revolutionaries in Wallachia.[12] "The Proclamation of Islaz" of 9-21 June 1848, of the Wallachian revolution stated that "every Romanian is born to be a soldier [of the national guard], every Romanian is a defender of the public happiness and a guarantor of public liberty."[13] There was also the "Draft Constitution of Moldavia" that stipulated the national guard should comprise "all Romanians able to bear weapons who are not members of the active army"[15] that is, it should embrace all able-bodied men, and its setting-up would not entail the dissolution of the standing army, the national guard having been only an auxiliary force of the standing army.[14] The "National Petition of Blaj" of the Transylvanian Romanians ordained that the "Romanian nation requires the people's army or a national guard to secure the country's defense," and established the main mission of the guards as the defense of the revolution against internal enemies, as well as eventual outside foes. In other words, the setting up of town and village national guards were to "be a solid guarantee for the material and moral assets [and for the country's

defense as well," as it was stated in the "Wishes of the National Party in Moldavia," the program elaborated at Braşov by Moldavian emigrants.[16]

A national guard meant the people's own armed hand, a defense of the liberties won by revolution; as Eftimie Murgu, leader of the Romanian revolution in the Banat, said that "if we want to remain a free people, the nation's happiness requires that all of us take up arms so as . . . to be able to defend our rights. The army, therefore, or the national guard should be considered as a guarantee of these rights, of our national liberation."[17] Referring to the mission and importance of a national guard Simion Bărnuţiu, one of the Romanian revolutionary leaders in Transylvania, declared in his speech delivered in May 1848, that it represented "the strongest fortress of liberty, the wealth of every nation and without it and without national representation the people is only a herd of cattle."[18]

The Moldavian revolutionaries who took refuge in Transylvania, after the quelling of the movement in Iaşi in March 1848, appreciated that "the most important point . . .was the organization of the national guard" through the agency of which the "people's arming" could be achieved, an integral part of the reforms "aiming at the raising the Romanian spirit."[19]

Avram Iancu, leader of the peasants' defensive war in the Apuseni Mountains also considered that the national guard was intended "to both keep peace and good order in the Romanian counties and to defend us, if need be, against the enemy."[20] In a comment about the Islaz Proclamation, a contemporary defined the national guard exactly and comprehensively: "It [the national guard] means that every citizen of our homeland has the right [to] have weapons. Not for daily use like the standing troops or the border guards, but to have them in their houses so that in case . . . enemies would attack our homeland . . . only then should we all be armed and should fight our enemies and defeat them."[21]

The national reserves, in other words the popular military formations that translated into fact the concept of the "armed nation," was not confined in the military doctrine of the 1848 revolutionares, to national guards only. Conditions permitting, for instance in Wallachia where the revolutionaries took power for three months, other nonstanding popular military formations were set up and territorial units and frontier guards were developed. The latter both performed military service and worked at their regular jobs.

On 28 June 1848, the provisional government in Bucharest, installed after the victory of the revolution in Wallachia, issued a decree according to which "regiments of pandours and volunteers" were set up. Their effectives would comprise two-thirds of "the best and hard-trained"; the rest would be made up from pandours from the Oltenia region, as volunteers, reservists, and any other citizens wishing to defend the revolution. All members of these corps were exempt from the head tax and from conscript labor, either to the state or landowners. This measure was meant to attract more and more peasants to enlist in the popular units.

The national guards fully proved their combat power in the defensive revolutionary war fought by the peasants in the Apuseni Mountains. In 1848-1849, these guards gathered under their standard the entire Romanian population living in Moți. Their actions entailed employment of new and diversified fighting techniques, typical of the defensive popular war, gave birth to skillful guerrilla commanders, tested the strength of the principles on the entire people's mobilization and army, and demonstrated that it was the only way of organizing lasting resistance under conditions of inferiority in numbers of equipment. The heroic resistance by these armed peasant corps, often using improvised means, demonstrated the solidty of the doctrinal concepts put into practice by the Romanian revolution in the field, and their flexibility and adaptability to real conditions created by political-military developments in each province. For instance in Transylvania, where the national guards were the only Romanian armed force, they were organized and employed to successfully replace the national standing army. With good reason, Bălcescu, who saw how well the Transylvanian national guards had mastered armed combat, wrote with justified pride: "the need obliged them make themselves generals and win battles. . . . I was amazed how they grasped the real principles of war, how they understood the importance of natural positions and employed all opportunities offered by any places."[22]

The setting up of the national guard, the pandours, and volunteer regiments and the increase of the border formations' effectives and number allowed the Romanian revolution to keep under colors numerous effectives and to mobilize, in case of aggression, numerous "veterans" already trained in such popular defensive formations. These irregular troops could then contribute to the general mobilization of all combat material and capacities of the country, a positively necessary condition for conducting

a popular war. The 1848 revolutionaries demanded such a defense to be adopted by the Romanian countries since it was then the single most efficient resistance in the internal and international circumstances. "When it comes to defending the national territory," Nicolae Bălcescu wrote, "to protecting the homeland from foreign invasion or to sav it if it is occupied . . . then the army corps [or] soldiers are not enough; then . . . the entire population must be armed [and] fanatical peasants animated by the sacred fire of love for the homeland."[23]

Especially significant, from this viewpoint is the appeal launched by the newspaper *Pruncul Român* for the defense of the revolution when the country was invaded by the Ottoman and Russian troops to quell the victorious Wallachian revolution. "Anything can be turned into a weapon . . . each peasant has his scythe, and the scythe tied upright on a handle substitutes for a spear, a formidable weapon which well serves the purpose: the axe of the smith, the hammer, the spade, the shovel, the hoe, all of them make up for weapons in time of need."[24] Backing the same idea, another leader of the 1848 Romanian revolution, C. A. Rosetti, wrote in the summer of 1848 that "all citizens, belonging to all classes, of all ages, from 18 to 50 years old, should hurry to get enrolled, to defend the homeland and liberty, to be ready to shed their blood to the last drop."[25] In the interest of the country's defense, the 1848 revolutionaries also had in view the utilization of the same tactical methods specific to the people's war of the Geto-Dacian period and the Middle Ages. It was that for each fighter "any pole is a spear, any stone a rifle, any river or well a poisonous drink."[26] Such defensive means were to be used by all the people. "Every man is today a soldier and every mother, every sister, every wife is a resistance fighter. Only this can every man help the others."[27]

In September 1848, the prospect of the country's being taken and the annulment of the gains won by the Wallachian revolution urgently required that "all Romania, however small her defensive means" mobilize to fight, to try to "put up all resistance to secure its internal liberty and independence."[28]

In the early preparations for launching the 1848 revolution, the leading committees debated the measures to be taken in case of a foreign military intervention, and was for an armed resistance "to defend the country, arms in hand, against any invasion."[29] Were the country to be invaded, it suggested "retreat to the mountains, even if [only] 300 of us will be here

and there to keep up fighting until foreign nations help us; otherwise . . . die fighting."[30]

In June 1848, when the entrance of some foreign troops in the country to reestablish the old rules was imminent, Bălcescu wrote to A. C. Golescu what measures should be taken in such a grave situation. First, the leaders in all the counties should be ordered "to gather the people up into the mountains," then all grain and food stocks deposited in Brăila should be transported to the mountains "to have something to eat there"; finally, he recommended to the government in Bucharest an officer from Moldavia who was very skillful in "the partisan war."[31] In essence, Bălcescu was pleading for a veritable partisan war. In the same spirit, some revolutionaries envisaged a partisan war to engage to revolutionary forces in all the Romanian counties. On 18 July 1848, an appeal by Moldavian revolutionaries declared that they would not give up the idea of a Moldavian insurgents' retreat to the mountains and of setting up there a resistance center, which would rely on the strength inside the country, "especially on the effectives from Transylvania and the Banat who would be able to organize more efficient activities in consensus with Wallachia."[32] The partisan war was perceived by the leaders of the 1848 Romanian movement as a veritable popular war of defense and national emancipation, concentrating all the country's human energies and material means in which every citizen—military or civil—would become a fighter and a resistance member.

In the modern Romanian society visualized by the 1848 revolutionaries, the army was to play the role of the revolution's defender against its internal foreign foes. Internal structural changes and the strength of the revolution's foes—the three neighboring empires, defenders of the feudal system, and the landowners supporting them—urgently required a large-scale reorganization of the army to give the revolution an instrument capable of resisting both intense internal pressures and strong outside attacks. To best meet these requirements, the leaders of the 1848 Romanian revolution adapted the traditional way of fighting of the Romanian people against much superior enemies, i.e., popular war in the peculiar circumstances of the mid-nineteenth century. It is the great merit of the 1848 generation to have elaborated a solid synthesis of the experience of a centuries-old struggle to defend the homeland's independence and unity and the new principles of the army's organization in the modern era and

to hae substantiated in the Romanian military thinking a series of principles subordinate to the defense of national independence and integrity which principles were to keep up their validity over the dramtic times of their elaboration.

CHAPTER 4

THE MAKING OF THE UNIQUE NATIONAL DEFENSE SYSTEM BASED ON THE ARMED NATION PRĬNCIPLE– AN OUTCOME OF THE PRINCIPALITIEȘ' UNION IN 1859 AND ITS ROLE IN PREPARING THE INDEPENDENCE ARMY

Doctrinal Principles of Organizing the National Defense System

Theoretical developments in the military field in the first half of the nineteenth century, determined and guided by the sociopolitical thinking of the 1848 Romanian revolution's militants, was embodied in the concept of the homeland's defense and in the nationa military doctrine based on the principle of the "armed nation" and the entire people's war. New theoretical-ideological grounds for a modern Romanian military doctrine were established as a basis for the national defense system, in its contents and structures, as well as for building and formally explaining this system.

Under the ideal conditions created by Moldavia's union with Wallachia and by the intensification of the political-diplomatic efforts made to win the new cuontry's independence, building its unique national defense system became a serious, legally based need, as well as a fundamental objective of national military doctrine. The Romanian principalities' union in 1859 and the imperatives of securing a unitary national state made imperative the people's arming and the popular masses' organization and training

so that, in case of need, they could contribute to the gaining of Romania's independence through armed struggle.[1]

The suppression of the 1848 revolution did not mean at all the defeat of its innovative spirit in any field of activity, even less in the military domain. The Romanian army's subsequent development and its national defense doctrine were directly influenced by the revolution's ideas. Achievements made from 1849 to 1877 in the military field, with all improvements determined by the development of military means and sociopolitical developments, bore the stamp of the Romanian's 1848 military thinking and experience. That is why, in the fifth, sixth, and seventh decades of the last century, the concept of the "armed nation" and the entire people's war—embraced by ever more military and civil theorists—became the official doctrine of the Romanian state.

As far back as 1857, the newspaper *Secolul* made real again Nicolae Bălcescu's views on the needed ways and means for the homeland's defense not only as for its essence, but also for its formulation. This newspaper considered that, while a too large standing army was a burden for the country's budget—immobilizing "too many hands" required by agriculture—the establishment of an army ssytem in which "each Romanian would be obliged to serve" was less costly for the national economy and much more efficient for strengthening the country's combat and defense capacity.[2] I. Missail, a fighter in the 1848 revolution's barricades shared the same opinion in an article of 15 March 1861 in which he proposed that "all citizens should carry out military service . . . the training and the multitudes' rising, in case of need, should be general."[3] Another leader of the 1848 revolution also considered that the only solution for the army's establishment, compatible with the Romanian society's development and political targets, was "the country's general arming through standing and nonstanding army, through the militia's and the villages' arming."[4]

Implementation of the principalities' union and the prospect of winning the country's independence by force of arms strengthened belief in the righteous concept of the "armed nation." Ion Ghica, one of the participants in the 1848 revolution, suggested that an army be set up to rely, in the main, on the village armed corps to supplement the standing troops (which were very costly to the country's economy); he considered as most proper the establishment of some "corps made up of . . . county

inhabitants, well tried in defense and knowing very well the valleys and dales, the paths and hillocks, the hills and the mountains" who "might oppose the foreigner with a more efficient resistance than regiments trained with much work and money in barracks and camps."[5] Knowing the difficulties of organizing the standing army and the difficultues in the way of establishing technical units and subunits–artillery, engineering, etc.–Ghica considered that the "general arming was the single solution for breaking the deadlock; it could be achieved through the 'organization of corps of counties or large regions as a network covering the entire country, commanded by skillful officers, capable of conceiving and carrying out strategic maneuvers that took into account opportunities they could seize upon by the reduction of the standing or active army only to a special corps'."[6] These armed peasant corps could strike at the enemy "from all sides ceaselessly, by day and night, and be impossible to track in our valleys and mountains, permanently scattering and reshuffling themselves so that the enemy could not know where to find them,"[7] which would make them very flexible and enhance their striking power.

The armed nation concept would win to its side more and more supporters within the Romanian army. Among the first who sought to popularize it, incorporating its principles into a draft document referring to the army's organization was Major George Adrian, a former fighter in Avram Iancu's popular army in the 1848-1849 Transylvanian revolution. He advocated that the military establishment include, besides the standing army, military toops and, in certain situations, the "masses' call-up."[8]

The "armed nation" attracted a large audience; it seemed to be the most appropriate one for the Romanian political, social, and military realities, and able to assure the success of the struggle for the defense of the country's autonomy. "To be fully independent in exerting its rights, a nation has the right to an army able to make its nationality be respected outside . . . . That is why, when the country would be in danger, when its autonomy or independence would be threatened then each citizen able to bear weapons is obliged to defend it, and it is only through the support [by] an entire population that an army can be strong."[9]

This also showed that the army's decisive role in the general effort by the Romanian people to free themselves from any foreign domination was of paramount significance. It would be only "through the army that we [could] win the right to count [ourselves] among the other free

nations . . . the people mastering the nation's destinies won't be respected by it [if] they neglect anything to give us a good military establishment securing our . . . independence."*10* And that military establishment, able to help with winning of national independence, should mirror in its structure the main lines of the "armed nation" concept, with its natural corollary, the entire people's war. But for this to become true, it was necessary that "each Romanian able to bear arms give in case of need, his share of duty to the homeland's shrine" and the defense of the country and of its borders; this had to be considered by "all the people as everybody's duty," a duty that "each Romanian should have at once with his birth."[11]

The Making of Structures and Categories for Standing Military Forces and Popular Defense Formations

The approach to and solving of the problems of homeland defense, of the "armed nation" concept, and of the entire people's struggle clarified and outlined a modern Romanian military doctrine regarding the organization and the establishment of a unique national defense system, the setting up of structures and categories of a standing army, and popular combat formations. On this theoretical basis, steps were taken to establish and legislate a formal doctrinal framework to institutionalize all suitable and realistic orientations and actions regarding national defense within Romania's internal and international conditins of the mid-nineteenth century. With this end in view, the Military Commission of the country's Legislative Assembly passed a Bill on the Organization of Romania's Armed Power stipulating the calling to arms of all Romanians aged twenty to fifty within the standing army, the militias, and the multitudes. The militia would be divided into "active" militia (1) made up of *dorobanţi* and frontier guards and "non-active" militia (2) made up of all those who were not recruited for the standing army or for the active militia, as well as those aged twenty-six to forty years who had not previously served with one of the two categories. The multitudes would encompass the able-bodied citizens aged seventeen to twenty and forty to fifty. Their training would be done by the non-active militia. The principle started from was the military training of all able-bodied citizens so that, in case of war, or grave danger to the state's integrity, as many as possible armed units were

to support the standing army in its operations or to act independently, but aiming at one and the same objective: the repulse of the aggressor.

After hot and long debates, on 7 February 1864, the Assembly endorsed the bill by a great majority. The "armed nation" concept finall triumphed, and the law stipulated the following: (1) the standing army with its reserves; (2) the active militia, made up of *dorobanți* and frontier guards; (3) the town guard in all the towns of Romania; (4) the non-active militia, organized in three classes; (5) the multitudes, also organized in three classes in the villages. According to this law, all able-bodied citizens, including the peasants, at that time being the majority of Romania's citizens, were obliged to secure Romania's defense.

Unfortunately, the opposition by some internal forces, and especially hostile reaction to the provisions of the law in the capitals of Romania's guarantor powers (Constantinople, in particular), made that the law—in the form endorsed by the Assembly—unsanctionable by Prince Alexandru Cuza. Nevertheless, it was for the first time that attempts were made to legislate a national defense system on the doctrinal principles of the "armed nation."

Given these conditions, the government turned toward apparently more moderate measures to provoke on the one hand, less apprehensions abroad and, on the other, to eliminate inadequate stipulations that certain political forces tried many a time to impose. On 27 November 1864, a new law on the organization of the armed forces was promulgated, which stipulated the setting up of only two elements: (1) the standing army and its reserves and (2) the militia comprising *dorobanți* and frontier guards with their reserves. In "extraordinary" situations, all able-bodied men aged seventeen to twenty and twenty-six to fifty, who were not recruited for the standing army or for the militias and their reserves, were divided into three categories that might be called to arms.

The 1864 law, in spite of all its limits, kept the main structures envisaged in the bill endorsed in February. Their sense and spirit provided the framework for the organization of the Romanian national defense system grounded on the "armed nation" and the entire people's war.

In the seventh decade of the last century, the organization of such a defense system focused the attention of ever more decision makers in Romanian political and military life. Consequently, the 1866 Constitution had a provision that established the general juridical framework of

the organization of the country's armed forces based on wide popular participation. Article 118 of the constitution stipulated that "every Romanian belongs to either the regular army or militia or to the civic guard in keeping with the laws in force."[12]

The more obvious orientation of ruling circles in Bucharest toward a popular armed instrument would be remarked on as early as the spring of 1866 by a foreign traveler, who wrote that "today's Romania . . . after some years without having ruined herself with taxes for the standing army, has already become an armed people as Prussia did."[13]

Simion Bărnuțiu, one of the leaders of Romania's 1848 revolution and an advocate of the armed nation concept, considered that the more citizens who could bear weapons, the stronger would be the resistance against aggressors. "Formerly," he wrote, "only some social classes were familiar with weapons. But experience proved that the homeland is much safer when all able-bodied citizens know how to handle weapons; as a matter of fact, this defensive method is less hard than the standing army. Because the public spirit, once [in] the people's mind, is the most efficient means against conquest from whatever quarter it might come."[14]

With the coming to power of a liberal government (1867-1868), a new bill on the organization of the armed forces was submitted to the Assembly. Naturally, this bill included some of the previous suggestions that were not included in the law endorsed under Cuza's rule. The bill was passed successfully in the Assembly in which the government coalition held an overwhelming majority; it it met some obstacles in the Senate, where one could hear the usual arguments against "arming the people" in particular, determined by the big landowners' fear of social upheavals stemming from the peasants' unrest. In spite of the opposition, the law would be passed on 27-29 July 1868.

According to that law, which in 1872 and 1874 would be amended, the armed forces would comprise the standing army with its reserves; the territorial army (made up of *dorobanți* and *călărași* regiments) with its reserves; the militia, the town guard for towns, and the multitudes for villages. All able-bodied citizens aged twenty-one to forty-five were included in one of these units; from twenty-one to twenty-nine years of age they were recruited for the standing army or the territorial one; those aged twenty-one to thirty-seven, who were not enrolled in the standing army or the territorial one, as well as those who had already finished

military training in one of the two military categories, would be included in the militia; those aged thirty-seven to forty-five were enrolled in the town guard or in the multitudes for the villages according to their place of residence.[15]

The standing army with its reserves and, starting 1872, the territorial troops would be organized into the "campaign" army, also called the "active" or the "first-line" army; the militias were meant for the formation of a "second-line" or a reserve army; the town guards were meant to keep order and secure the urban localities; the multitudes' missions were optional. The town guard and the multitudes could take part in maneuvers or even in armed actions as the supreme commander would decide and, of course, take into account the needs. In wartime, the gown guard might be called on to "defend the town, [being] under the authority of the army's supreme commander and respecting all military rules [about] discipline."[16] In their turn, the multitudes, in special cases and when the other elements of the army "would not be enough," were to be mobilized and organized in "small corps" for "keeping order and calm in their communes"; some of "the most capable" ones could join the "militias corps"[17]

In order to habituate the population, in due course, to military training, the 1868 law had already provided that, "in order to facilitate the process of instruction in the militias and the town guard," elementary military knowledge should to be taught in each primary school.[18] The officers in the standing army, in the territorial one, and in the militia were obliged to teach courses on the "soldier's training"; in July 1874, a regulation was issued, according to which the military training was compulsory for all pupils included in the primary and secondary state schools.

The 1868 law, with the 1872 and 1874 amendments obviously mirrors the continuity of thinking on organization of the national military power, which was propounded by the 1848 revolutionaries, the makers of the principalities' union, and those preparing the winning of independence. This standing army was conceived of as a restricted nucleus of professionals, the bulk of the fighters having to be supplies by the nonstanding formations. The latter, which carried out military service by turns, and were trained in periodic musterings and maneuvers could assure an organizational framework for a more rapid and less costly call to arms.

The first-line army was considered, in the eighth decade of the last century, "the higher military school of the motherland," but the "country's strength" should rely on the militias because whether the standing army was "meant, in particular, to train the cadres," the territorial troops counted as the "masses" of fighters and the bulk of the operational army.[19] Hence, heed was paid to the recruitment and training of these territorial formations and efforts were made so that all conditions were created that they might participate in partial and general maneuvers by the standing troops.

Their strengthening was to consolidate the entire national military establishment. As far back as 1870, it was emphasized that the "gathering of the militias and the repeated concentration of the border guard and the *dorobanți* consolidated Romania's military training."[20] In the draft decree on the militias' concentration of 15-31 October 1871, General Florescu, minister of war, plainly declared: "The militias set up by the Law on the army's organization having been meant to represent the base of our future military establishment, the development of these troops' training should enjoy priority."[21] Quite significant for the increase of the military strength of the popular formations was their gradual inclusion in the operational army. On the occasion of the Romanian army's mustering the autumn of 1873, "the sacrifice and ardor of the young men called to enroll in the militia battalions" was noted. In all district residences and in all small rural districts they enthusiastically answered the appeal, thus proving that country's defense has fresh soldiers to be committed to the first line."[22] Propitious conditions were thus created for a large-scale concentration of trained troops. In the message addressed in 1873 to the legislative bodies, Prince Carol I, would point out that "two musterings, on in the last year and the second one this year, organized by territorial formations proved how easily the people can take up the lofty career of arms. The standing army, the territorial one, the militias, and the town guards, all these elements of our armed forces answered the call with a truly patriotic zeal."[23] In this context, the statement made in 1874 on the occasion of handing over new combat colors to some military units is quite justified: "They [the colors] are note any longer the symbol of the single standing army as the old ones were . . . . The new colors show all elements of the military power, the entire country in arms."[24]

Guided by the concept of the "armed nation" and popular war, the organization of the armed forces in Romania created a favorable environment

for developing a broad national defense system that could bring to the colors numerous and strong effectives with solid training, continually practiced, capable of standing all demands and hardships on the battlefield, and with a well-developed spirit of cooperation and excellent moral. The system was strengthened by the mission incumbent upon it in the struggle for attainment of the idea of emancipation from the foreign domination. That is why one should mention that, to a great degree, the successes recorded by the Romanian army in the War of Independence south of the Danube were because of this system. Two reflections are quite revealing for a better understanding of a truth not obvious at first sight. One was made by a foreign observer during military operations. "Allow me," he wrote "to express my highest admiration for the Romanian army. The Romanian army is not an army in the common sense of the word; it is a national army made up of all social elements."[25] The other, equally right, comes a professional Romanian officer, General Grigore Crăiniceanu, a prestigious personality in the field of military history and thought and a member of the Romanian Academy, who declared in 1912; "It was only due to this original system that the Romanian army could enter the war and win those everlasting victories that gave us the country's independence."[26]

The armed national concept equally explains the soldiers' heroism and the commanders' valiance, at the head of the Romanian units and subunits, as well as the big sacrifices and the great victories, in the second Balkan War. Because, unquestionably, beyond the righteousness of the cause and the legitimacy of the claims, the upsurge of real enthusiasm, the innate heroic virtues of the Romanian people, and the patriotic zeal feeding the fighters' ardor, the victories won on the battlefields were also due to the system of recruitment, training, and mobilization of the troops that derived from the application of the Romanian people's traditions in the liberty struggle, of the armed nation, and the popular war concept. The army was integrated a united group whose elements complemented one another, each of them having to perform those missions that should use most efficaciously their equipment and combat training.

The organization system of Romanian armed forces, through its flexibility and suppleness permitted, at the same time, the diversified development of all its contituent elements, thus assuring the individuality of each element and the unity of the entire whole so that, on the eve of the second

Balkan War, the army and the national defense system whose main component it was presented themselves as a complex organism well articulated as the expression of the armed nation and popular war.

CHAPTER 5

THE WAR FOR WINNING ROMANIAN INDEPENDENCE (1877-1878) AND THE WAR OF NATIONAL RECOMPLETION (1916-1918): IMPORTANT STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE

The Assertion of the Combat Doctrine of the Romanian Army in the War of Independence

The 1877-1878 war for Romanian independence takes a distinct position in the evolution of the Romanian national military doctrine in the modern epoch; it was, on the one hand, a rigorous test of the rightness of doctrinal orientation and options and the capacity of the country's military power and, on the other hand, an occasion to enrich the combat experience whose generalization was to give a strong stimulus to Romanian military thinking and practice.

Romania's independence of 9 May 1877 was proclaimed in the context of the burgeoning crisis in the Balkans determined by the intensification of the liberating movements of the oppressed peoples living in this area, and by the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877. After unsuccessful negotiations for the diplomatic settlement of the dispute with the Ottoman Porte, the Romanian government reached the conclusion that the country's full independence could be won by appealing to arms exclusively.

Consequently, it was obliged to look for a military alliance with Russia whose interests in Southeastern Europe involved weakening the Ottoman Empire. With this end in view, on 4 April 1877, a convention was concluded whereby Russia government was permitted to pass its troops toward the Balkans through Romanian territory, and pledged at the same time to "observe Romanian political rights under the extant internal laws and the treaties, as well as to maintain and defend Romania's integrity.[1]

Two days later, on 6 April 1877, the Romanian government decided on the army's general mobilization, with the view of securing the country's defense against the Porte's eventual attack. The country's entrance into the war and the army's direct participation in the military operations opened a new stage in the evolution of the Romanian military doctrine, which was characterized by the mobilization, training, and employment of all the country's resources victory on the battle field. The achievement of this fundamental political-military objective required that entirely new doctrineal-strategic problems be solved: the strategic covering operation at the southern frontier of the country, the army's commitment to the operations, Romanian-Russian cooperation, the setting up of a supreme national command, and the working and carrying out of a strategic plan of operations on the battlefield in Bulgaria. Concomitant with general mobilization, the Romanian army performed the strategic covering operation on the Danube, then Romania's frontier with the Ottoman Empire, to impede the Ottoman troops' advance southwestward (which were massed in the Vidin area across the Danube).

With the Russian army's massing north of the Danube, Romania proposed collaboration between the two armed forces in the battles to come. But the Tsarist government counting on an easily won victory in the Balkans, declined this offer so as not to assume—for the postwar period—any political comitments vis-à-vis Romania. The development of the military events south of the Danube and the Russian army's failures at Pleven, in particular, made the supreme command of the Russian forces in the Balkans to request, in July 1877, the immediate intervention of the Romanian army. Referring to the significance of the Romanian army's entrance in the war at a hard time for the Russian army, the Turkish General Izzet Fuad was to write that (he) had been a step from victory, and that Grand Duke Nicholas was obliged to resort to the Romanian

army's collaboration to overcome the admirable defenders of Pleven.[2] In his turn, William V. Herbert pointed out that, "Romania's active cooperation [which was] declined disdainfully at the beginning was to be accepted with avidity later on."[3]

In this context, the reorganized Romanian army, started the anti-Ottoman campaign alongside the Russian army, its greater forces crossing the Danube; three divisions made up of forty-one infantry battalions, thirty-two cavalry squadrons, eighteen artillery batteries and five engineering companies totaled 38,000 men, 7,000 horses, and 108 cannons. The Romanian soldiers were to cover themselves with glory in the battles at Pleven, Rahova, and Vidin, and were eulogized by foreign observers, of whom many had been eyewitnesses to their feats of arms. Lachman, correspondent for newspapers in the United States and Switzerland, who attended the Pleven operations, asserted in a letter also published in Romanian gazettes: "I did not expect to see such valiance in an army which had not been in the fire until then. . . . The Romanian army is worthy of comparison with any other army in Europe, and any other country should be proud if its soldiers and officers could have carried out so brilliant deeds of bravery."[4]

Besides the soldiers' virtues, the independence war of 1877-1878 brought into bold relief the high competence of the army command, the superiority of Romanian military doctrine and art, and the strategy and tactics that capitalized on the old traditional elements, making them suitable to the then situation, to the structure of the Romanian military establishment, and to its training level. In summing up the main traits of the Romanian military are revealed in the battles south of the Danube, one must mention that the offensive prevailed; at Plevna, Rahova, and Vidin, the attacks were pinpointed on an enemy superior in tactical methods and technology and protected by fortifications.[5]

The tactical thinking of the Romanian army rapidly grew during the operations, which raised the competence of command and execution. In its cooperation with the Russian army in the assault on Pleven, the Romanian army, although lacking the combat experience of its ally, manifested its own individuality in conceiving, organizing, and carrying out combat actions. Distinct doctrinal principles confronted one another even in the joint Romanian-Russian supreme command at Pleven, headed by King Carol I of Romania. After three unsuccessful attempts at taking

by storm the strong Ottoman fortifications, the Romanians suggested that the ambitious plan of the Russian generals to win the victory "at any cost," no matter how many their own casualties, be replaces with the force-saving plan to thus avoid useless casualties.

Tactically, the Romanian units resorted to various methods of deceiving the enemy to score the best results with minimal losses. In the previous war, in particular, they had made general attacking the enemy in misty weather, under cover of dark, or at dawn to achieve surprise; and feints to oblige the enemy to disclose its disposition were successfully used. Both the commanders and troops showed a spirit for manuever and initiative, and adopted and used new "on the run" combat methods that stemmed from the very realities of the battlefield.[6] An eloquent example, in this respect, is the turning from the "in column" attack disposition employed in the previous wars to the "line of skirmishers," a method adopted by the soldiers more instinctively and engendered by very necessity. The column had become highly vulnerable under enemy fire that was both accurate and fast. The new fighting methods were to be put into military theory in the years to come and made general in World War I.

During 1877-1878, the political and military leadership of the Romanian state was highly receptive to the new ideas concerning the role of the popular element in the homeland's defense system. If the complete standing military forces, as well as the reservists, were to perform combat missions in the "hot" zone of the operations theater, either south of the Danube (the operational army) or on the left bank of the river (the observation corps), the defense of the national territory was to be entrusted to the popular military formations.

Therefore, the mobilization decree the Romanian army's of 6 April 1877 mentioned that "the militias will be organized, as need be, into active corps to take part in this mobilization." For the town guard, it was established that they were called "to carry out all services stipulated by law during the concentration of troops."[7]

With that end in view, on 11 April 1877, a special law stipulated that a militia battalion made up of four companies (on the model of the standing army) be organized in each district of the country. One month later, a law established the setting-up of a mounted militia regiment for each territorial division. The militia officers for the newly created units

and subunits were appointed by decree from among the officers of the standing army and of the territorial one. Following these measures, the mobilized forces of the militia totaled thirty-one infantry battalions and one cavalry regiment with four squadrons, whose strength rose to 33,000 men, namely a third of the entire effectives (100,000 men) mobilized during the war of independence.[8]

The development of military operations during the war did not require the commitment of the territorial defense units, the issue having been decided south of the Danube. For all that, a great part of the mobilized militia made its contribution to the general effort of the country. The organization of the militia troops, their training, and the habit of acting in a tactical framework similar to the real fighting situations made them able to take over some missions entrusted to the units of the standing and territorial armies, which were carrying out the strategic covering of the frontier.

In that stage of the war, the riposte to the Ottoman troops' inroads into Romanian territory employed popular formations as well. So, an order from I Army Corps to the Bechet Detachment pointed out that all forces in that zone should be employed in fighting: "Battalions of militia, *dorobanți* from communes and pickets, [and] irregular *călărași*, all of them should [assume] the defense of the commune."[9]

As for the town guards, whose effectives totaled about 15,000 men on mobilization, approximately 7,000 of them in Bucharest were intended to "make up the garrisons and guard the towns."[10]

The contribution of the nonstanding military structures to the war of independence embraced other forms too. So, the militia sanitary corps treated the wounded and fought epidemies. The artisans from the people's militias carried out works required by the military campaign and took an active part in the military transport. A number of militia officers passed into the active service of the army and gave proof of great heroism during the battles south of the Danube.

The 1877-1878 war for independence made a valuable contribution to Romanian military doctrine. New very original elements were added to military thinking compiled over the centuries in the process of forging doctrinal ideas and principles. So, the concept of the "armed nation" and the entire people's struggle for the homeland's defence acquired new dimensions, reflecting the geographical area on which the armed confrontations had developed.

If the previous defensive wars of the Romanians were waged on national territory against invading hostile forces, in the 1877-1878 war the decisive military operations unfolded on the enemy's territory without it change the rightful character of the Romanians' struggle in any war. The Romanian army had crossed the Danube and waged fierce fights beyond its frontiers not aiming at conquering foreign territories, but at making the Porte acknowledge the independence of the Romanian state. The war that Romanian waged was a national and popular war. Through the Romanians' unanimous adhesion to the cause of winning full independence, it was a war of the entire people. The war effort mirrored the Romanian people's aspirations in all provinces making up the ancestral hearth for independence and national unity.

Quite telling, from this point, is the participation by Romanians living in the provinces then subject to the foreign sway. This mass phenomenon embraced various forms: many young people from Transylvania and Bukovina came to enrol in the Romanian army, donations and subscriptions were collected, victories won on the battlefields were celebrated in public, and the Romanian press in Transylvania and Bukovina propagated national pride and dignity. All this fully proves that the 1877-1878 war was a national and popular work.

Numerous volunteers fought with heroism and sacrifice in the ranks of the Romanian army; it is worth mentioning Moise Groza from the Banat, a former officer in the Austro-Hungarian army enrolled in the Romanian army with the rank of captain, and many others about whom a contemporary said that they "were driven on by the desire for also helping in the liberation of dear Romania from the yoke of the Porte."[11]

The solidarity of the Romanians living in Transylvania and Bukovina with Romania's war effort aroused alarm in Vienna. The authorities feared that the union of Transylvania and Bukovina with Romania was aimed at because, as the prefect of the Storojinet district in Bukovina reported to his superiors in December 1877, "the peasants bluntly declare that they came to an accord with the Romanian priests and boyars to seize Bukovina from Austria and unite it with Romania."[12]

Volunteering, characteristic of the entire Romanian people, showed especially on the occasion of the April 1877 mobilization, and it was closely interwoven with another characteristic, also representative of the national and popular character of the war, namely the entire nation's large

material assistance in winning the victory. By subscriptions and donations, the sum of 1,639,798 lei was collected for equipping the Romanian army. More than 1.2 million lei were for weapons purchase (the sum was the equivalent of 20,000 Peabody rifles). The donations totaled more than 9 million lei (more than 75 percent of the budget of the ministry of war for 1877), and the requisitions rose to 11,227,098 lei (82.7 percent of the same budget). For the army's needs, Romania's populations offered great quantities of food, cattle, clothes and footwear, medical materiel, etc. For the logistical support of the army, the peasants performed with their own carts more than one million work days in transports and over 53,000 days in construction works. In Transylvania and Bukovina, numerous Romanian commities collected donations in money for the Romanian army that totaled 124,700 francs and great quantities of clothes and medical materiel.

At that time of supreme national effort, this popular solidarity profoundly impressed European contemporaries. "A great many young men," wrote one of them, "enroled willingly and ran full speed to the battlefront and those unable to fight offered wholeheartedly everything they had, horses, cattle, sheep, food, money for the army's equipment. Our women and girls stayed day and night in hospitals."[13] "All war wounds [taken] in Bulgaria," said another, "were endured stoically and joyfully."[14]

The national composition and the popular character of the effort made the war of independence of 1877-1878 a heroic war. Romanian casualties give telling proof of its spirit on the battlefield. More than 10,000 killed, wounded, or missing (namely 10 percent of the effectives comitted to that war) speak convincingly about the Romanian soldiers' bravery and sacrifice. The fighters' heroism against the enemy and the heroism of the popular masses, who supported the war effort with all their might and stoically endured its hardships, placed in the entire people's consciousness the righteous cause for which the country had entered the war and in the centuries-old aspiration to liberty, independence, and sovereignty.

National Defense in the Programs and Activity of the Political Parties in Romania: Forms of Organization and Training of the Population for Securing National Defense in the 1878-1916 Period

In the years following the war of independence, the political and military forums paid even greater heed to military problems of utmost

importance for the Romanian society's general development. The Romanian army, which through its exemplary behavior on the battlefields, decisively contributed to the implementation of national political objectives enjoyed later on by the governmental circles. The political parties, liberal and conservative in particular, succeeding to the helm of the country, alloted funds to strengthen and modernize the Romanian military establishment.

The development of a national military doctrine, not without difficulties and contradictions, set forth two fundamental goals that the army was called to fullfil: (1) to secure the state's inviolability and sovereignty, and (2) to accomplish the national ideal of the liberation of the Romanian territories still under foreign rules.

Even a brief insight into Romanian sociopolitical thinking of the end of nineteenth century and early twentieth, an epoch marked by competing concepts of restructuring and modernizing the country's military system, reveals the preponderance of the progressive ideas that placed in the fore the entire people's participation to the homeland's defense. Many politicians and military specialists expressed their viewpoints about this domain of the social life, suggesting different solutions that blended economic and political reasons with those subordinated to the national defenses. There was no political party that included in its program at least one one reference to the army, either they considered a more or less radical reform, or everything was confined to declarations "of love and gratitude" for the country's army.

If the programs of the National Liberal party showed a gradual renunciation of the democratic concepts voiced during the 1848 revolution, the radical wing would continue to carry to the end of the nineteenth the idea of consolidation of the popular element in the organization of the national army. So, in the 1889 program, setting out from the ascertainment that a general disarmament could not be envisaged when an entire Europe was arming, the liberal-radical groups suggested a system that, in the authors' opinion, was "to ensure every the training of citizen, who should stay as little time as possible in the barracks." It was about the reorganization of the *dorobanți*, "more democratically reformed and turned into a genuine national army."[15]

The other bourgeois and landowner parties did not formulate program-objectives aimed at restructuring the country's military organization.

The Conservative Democratic party would state in its 1908 program that it would "support the army in its strengthening [to] entirely [get] it out of any party considerations," and the National Democratic party, led by Nicolae Iorga, visualized in 1911 "the raising of the Romanian army to a strength at least double that of any Balkan state and [its] people's military training."[16]

Unlike the bourgeois political parties, the socialist movements in Romania embraced, from its very beginnings, the Marxist thesis referring to the dissolution of the standing army and its replacement with the arming of the entire people. The "armed nation" concept was made known in the newspapers of this movement, having been backed up by original suggestions and solutions for the practical achievement of this desideratum.

Thus, a study by socialist thinker Constantin Dobrogeanu Gherea, "What do the Romanian Socialists Want" of September 1855-May 1886, considered that the first program of the Marxist revolutionary movement in Romania visualized, among other stipulations; after universal suffrage, the "dissolution of the standing army and the arming the people."[17] The standing army's turning into the "armed nation" was also written in the program adopted at the 1893 congress for the establishment of the workers' Social Democratic Party in Romania. Referring to this claim, the paper of the first political party of the working class in Romania remarked: "Arming the people should be the last requirement [for the military problem]. Arming the people by itself may give a handle to every man to prove his patriotism in defending his homeland in case of need."[18]

With the development of the socialist and workers' movement in Romania by early twentieth century and with its political and social ripeneses, the thesis of the standing army's dissolution was renounced. "We don't ask for more dissolution of the standing troops but their transformation into genuine national armies. Those who say that we, the Romanian social democrats, do wnat the army's dissolution do not know our program or willingly mislead our readers."[19] This doctrinal orientation had in view, on the one hand, the supreme interests of our people in the struggle for the nation's recompletion and the completion of the modern Romanian state and, on the other, the evolution of the international political-military situation characterized by the escalation of the conflicts of interest among the big powers and the preparations for World War I.

The Romanian army's cadres were also concerned about a new military organization of the country. Many officers and generals with progressive ideas made pertinent observations on the army's structure and suggested new models, some of them original, for the establishing a defensive national force as strong and inexpensive as possible. Most of these projects envisaged a mixed military system to include, besides the standing army, various nonstanding formations like the militias and the multitudes, adequately trained and equipped. So, General Scheletti pleaded for the reduction of standing troops concomitant with the people's military training. "Our axiom for the military organization," he wrote, "should be as follows: empty barracks, and the country full of soldiers . . . . The youth's training, in the public schools, for military obligations should be the basis of our military organization and of the military service term reduction as well."[20] Another Romanian military author, General C. Ionescu, asserted that an army of militias represented the most suitable organic form, taking into account the political, economic, and social conditions of the nations, so that this nation "through its own arms be able to defend its individuality among all other nations."[21]

In his turn, the well-known military theorist C. N. Hîrjeu considered the Romanian army as an army in which the standing element—the officers the NCOs—had the mission to militarily train the twenty-four contingents under the army's control, during both active and reserve military service. Expressing more a desideratum than a state of things, he noted in his view: "Our army's character is of an armed nation in which the standing element is getting lost in the mass of the reserves that gives it both number and strength."[22]

In spite of the numerous economic and military advantages offered by the projects of the 1848 progressive thinkers, civil and military, for a democratic reorganization of the Romanian army through the nation's arming, the solutions forwarded did not pass beyond the stage of intentions even when they got to be discussed in the country legislative bodies.

For all this, in the years following the winning of state independence, a series of measures were taken to militarily prepare the population as well as possible, in case it was needed to efficiently participate alongside the standing army in the homeland's defense. In this context, capitalizing on the experience from the previous years, the Ministry of War would, in August 1879, ask the commanders of the territorial military divisions

to pay heed to engaging competent cadres for military instruction in the general education schools.

An important role in the pupils' military instruction devolved on the "Association of the Little Foot Soldiers" (Asociația "micilor dorobanți") after 1878. The children in this association, organized into companies and battalions and under the leadership of their teachers and active and reserve officers, were taught elementary military notions, were trained physically, and were instructed in the spirit of a strong patriotic education.[23]

In the years following the war of independence, the state bodies paid greater attention to the population's preparations for securing the country's defense. The bill for the organization of the civic guard, elaborated in 1879, stipulated that "all inhabitants of the towns, aged thirty-seven to fifty and between twenty-one and thirty-seven, who are not enrolled in the army are conscripted into the guard and that no reason may exempt someone from serving in the civic guard, barring those on military service." Later on, other measures were taken for attracting the population in an organized manner to the defense of the country. So, in April 1887 a law on the organizing of the militias and the multitudes was promulgated; in the same year, The Marksmanship Society was reorganized. In 1905, The Romanian Cultural Societ for Arms, Gymnastics, and Target Practice acquired legal status, and any Romanian citizen who had come of age and who wanted "to strengthen the group" by spreading among the people a taste for gymnastics and target practice, "could become a member."

In the spring of 1906, the law on compulsory military training in primary, secondary, and vocational public and private schools for boys was enacted. The general stipulations of this law provided for starting a special service called the "School Military Instructors Corps." Military instruction in the schools was to be conducted by "officer rank cadres" appointed by the Ministry of War; and a "Practical and Theoretical Regulations Handbook of Infantry Drills" was used.[24]

In 1908, also in connection with the training of youth for the country's defense, the preamble to the law on organizing the army stated that "the youth should belong to an army element before they are enrolled so that they might receive military instruction, especially in target practice."[25] Unfortunately, numerous material difficulties confronting Romanian society during those years impeded the nationwide implementation of these practices.

Starting in 1913, the training of youth for the defense of the country ambraced another organization. Thus, the Romanian Scout groups were formed. In 1914, the Scouts Association of Romania was set up, and, one year later, a law for the establishment of the Scouts Association of Romania was adopted. The aim of this association, in accordance with Article 3 of its rules was "to develop in youth, irrespective of their social status, individual traits such as vigor, physical skill, initative, courage, dignity, and honor, as well as social and human qualities like solidarity, patriotism, and selflessness. In this way," the rules emphasized, "future generations of men of character and citizens aware of their duties and useful to homeland can be molded."[26]

From their establishment and until Romania's entrance into the World War I, the Scout formations carried out the premier activities of practical training and patriotic education of the youth. In August 1916, along with the mobilization of the army, "the Scout detachments trained and organized before came spontaneously into action in all the auxiliary services reserved for them in accordance with their capacity and in which the [young] scouts fulfilled their duty with ability, zealous docility, and a devotion bordering on sacrifice."[27] Shortly after the country's entering the war, the orders for mobilizing the scouts were given. It is to be mentioned that the scouts enthusiastically answered the calls. Numberless feats of arms accomplished by the young Scouts, for which they were awarded military orders and medals stand as proof of the popular and national character of the war that Romania waged between 1916 and 1918, a war that became the Romanian people's "war of national completion."[28]

Romanian Military Doctrine During World War I

The struggle for full state unity represented a new stage, qualitatively superior in the evolution of the Romanian doctrinal phenomenon. The entire work of strengthening the country's military power was subordinated to attaining the main political-military goal of the Romanian people—the completion of the unitary national state. "Although the First World War had an imperialist character," Romania's president pointed out, "the Romanian people did not take part in that war guided by intentions of invasion and territorial annexations. Giving war to the pressure exercised

by the Entente powers, the ruling circles of the country joined the war on the side of Britain, France and Russia, who promised to satisfy our desire for national unity."[29] This doctrine of great significance reveals the just character of the war for the nation's completion and the righteousness of the Romanian people's struggle for unity and independence.

In the summer of 1914, Romania temporarily took a stand of neutrality. But the Romanian state could not remain a long time in such a situation given her geographical position among the big powers and the imperialist powers' interests that intersected in this area. In the summer of 1916, Romania was in a situation with no other alternatives. On 4-16 August, the Romanian government through the prime minister, Ion Brătianu, signed a treaty of alliance and a military convention with the Entente. To the member countries Romania pledged herself to mount an offensive for the liberation of Romanian territories subject to Austria-Hungary no later than in ten days, her Entente partners—Russia, France, England, and Italy—committed themselves to the right to self-determination for the Romanians inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire and the union of the Romanian-inhabited territories with Romania. The military convention comprised mutual obligations concerning collaboration on the battlefront, with the Russian troops, in particular, being stipulated in military assistance by the Allied expeditionary corps at Salonika, which was to launch an offensive to secure Romania's actions on its southern flank.[30]

From a doctrinal, political, and military viewpoint, the beginning of the war for the country's national completion had particular significance. The Romanian people did not want to stay passively waiting for the final outcome of international developments. It had already chosen the armed fight because it understood how to attain its ideals of liberty and unity by its own forces. Romania's entrance into the war was the expression of the Romanian nation's will to self-determination and of the need to assert itself as an independent and unitary state.

Romania's armed forces accounted for 15 percent of the entire population of the country, all men aged eighteen to forty-five included, namely 1,083,000 men. This high figure, eloquent in itself for the popular character of Romania's war, included the forces mobilized in August 1916, i.e., 833,758 troops and about 18,000 officers, with the reserves totaling 416,000 men. The effectives mobilized were organized into twenty-three

infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, uneven in number and combat technology.

More objective factors closely related to Romania's strategic situation and the character of the envisaged combat actions required the mobilization of such numerous effectives. Given the then frontier between Romania and Austria-Hungary, which followed the line of the eastern and southern Carpathians, as well as Bulgaria's stand, Romania's entrance into the war opened the longest front in Europe: 1,200 kilometers, longer than the Russian one from the Baltic Sea to Dorna, which did not exceed 1,100 kilometers.[31]

On this extremely wide front, on which Allied assistance was not expected, at least initially, the Romanian forces were no sufficient. So much more difficult did the situation seem, as the majority of the Romanian forces (three of the four armies then organized), was to mount, according to the campaign plan elaborated by general headquarters, large-scale offensive actions beyond the Carpathians with the rest defending the country's southern frontier against an eventual Bulgarian attack.

The mobilization in the summer of 1916 took place in an atmosphere of impetuous patriotism. The appeal addressed to the soldiers by King Ferdinand I, the army's supreme commander, when he called on them "to carry your colors beyond the frontiers where your brothers wait for you impatiently, with hearts full of hopes," resounded strongly among the masses. A memoirist wrote that the "mobilization was done in the most perfect order and with undepictable enthusiasm. In five days the entire army was mobilized. . . 800,000 men, namely 13 percent of the entire population, a figure reached by other belligerent states a long time after their entrance into the war."[32]

Also original was the doctrinal solution to the enhancement of the command cadres. The relatively small number of the active officers required that numerous reserve officers, chosen from the village teachers in particular, be trained in a short time. "The guiding principle," a contemporary wrote, "was that almost all public leaders in civil life be trained and transformed into commanders on the battlefields too. This led to a great many reserve officers in the army: about two reserve officers to one active one."[33]

On 15-28 August 1916, the Romanian army started its liberating mission, it entered Transylvania through eighteen points, being received with

with great enthusiasm by the Romanian population, which ready at any moment to render help.

The first campaign was unfavorable for the Romanian army in spite of its bravery and sacrifice. After a short period of strategic initiative, it was compelled to build up the defenses; then, under the strong pressure from enemy forces superior in numbers, equipment, and war experience, it had to retreat eastward. The withdrawal was executed through fierce fights, with many counterattacks that impeded the enemy's advance, finally checking them at Moldavia's gates. The lack of success suffered by the Romanian army in the first campaign was determined by other factors, too, not considered in advance by the national supreme command.

It had had full trust in the engagements previously taken on by Romania's strong allies, but the evolution of events would teach it a strong lesson in political realism because the decisive actions that were to assist Romanian army did not take place at all. Neither the Russian offensive in Galicia nor that promised on the Salonika front were mounted and a substantial intervention by Russia on the Romanian front would be done too much later, when the first campaign had been already lost. So, by the end of 1916, the front was stabilized by the Romanian army in cooperation with Russian troops in the eastern Carpathians and along a line linking the Carpathians to the curvature of the port of Galați and the maritime Danube.

The righteous character of the war and the Romanian people's trust in final victory helped surmount all hard moments engendered by the loss of two-thirds of the national territory, and the sufferings endured in the winter of 1816-1917 when tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians died. Through a sublime joint effort, the Romanian nation succeeded in the spring of 1917 (after having received more substantial material assistance from the Allied powers) in retrieving the country's economic and political situation and in solidly reorganizing the Romanian army. Surrounded by the entire people's love and confidence, it inflicted on the invading German and Austro-Hungarian troops severe defeats with wide reverberations in legenday battles.[34]

The Romanian army's victories scored in July and August of 1917 led to the breaking down of the Central Powers' plans to get Romania out of the war, crush her defensive capacity, and entirely occupy her national territory. The traditional Romanian doctrine of the defense of

the ancestral land through the supreme effort of the whole nation, through surmounting the temporary lack of success, and keeping on fighting until the final rout of the enemy from the country proved its strength in the great battle at Moldavia's gates too. Not only could Romania not be taken, but it also remained a distinct, sovereign, and independent entity in the international arena. So much greater is the significance of the Romanian victories, since they were scored almost exlusively through its own efforts; the Russian troops' assistance having been not only minor, but at some moments even impeding the Romanian troops in exploiting the drive.

The Romanian army—itself an expression of the nation—enjoyed substantial popular help in various forms. It was completed with important volunteer corps recruited from men who were no required to take part in the war as combatants. Romanian refugees from Transylvania, Bukovina, and the Banat—for native land—enlisted, as did Romanian prisoners who were soldiers in the armies of the Central Powers. The ideal of accomplishing full national unity mobilized Romanians from everywhere. Immigrants of one of two generations in North America and young people sent to study in various European countries, with no chance to come back to their homeland, enlisted in the armies of the states in alliance with Romania and fought the common enemy. The U.S. units that fought in Western Europe included many Romanian-born fighters. After the first months of U.S. entry into the war, almost 18,000 Americans of Romanian origin asked to be enrolled.[35]

In the unfolding of the military operations, there were moments when the civilian population joined the combat troops. In this respect, most eloquent was the heroic resistance of the inhabitants from the Tîrgu Jiu who, in the autumn of 1916, fighting alongside the army, considerably delayed the advance of an enemy group superior in number.[36] Supplying information about the enemy and guiding subunits and large units furing battles fought in mountainous, wood-covered terrain were frequent contributions by village inhabitants in the operational zones.

Civilian resistance, in the occupied territory was the most outstanding proof of the masses' participation in the struggle against the invaders. Countless actions, either spontaneous or organized, made the rear permanently unsafe for the invaders, and a real battlefield. The attempt at "pacifying the occupied territories entailed numerous enemy effectives,

as well as the installment of an excessively harsh regime over the Romanian population." Not only could resistance not be blocked but it continuously grew. From sabotage to the extermination of isolated enemy units, from harassing the occupiers' communication lines to [establishing] partisan detachments, this was the scale of the Romanian popular resistance to the occupiers during World War I. Despite all repressive measures taken by the occupation authories, the struggle for liberation continued, so taht, as a representative of the German command declared, "there was no question of any military collaboration by the Romanian population in the territory occupied by the Central Powers."[37]

The concept and waging of the righteous war of national liberation and completion, the main trait of Romanian military doctrine, made Nicolae Iorga appreciate, ever since the hard days of December 1916, that "our army under present circumstances represents an entire people. Besides those who fight and those who help them with whatever they can, besides those who accompany each battle with their suffering, with the deep [feelings] of their entire being, besides all of them there is no Romanian people. The Romanian people consists of those with weapons in hand, of those who give all help against the enemy and of those who live only to admire this heroism, to gather its fruits for the people and to give the helping hand required to guarantee victory."[38]

While the great powers were fighting for economic, political, and military preponderance, for the Romanian nation there had come "the time when we also ask[ed] the world, fairly, [for] the right to give nobody the fruit of our endeavors."[39] The Romanian did not enter the war "for conquests, but for liberation," and not "to shape a new homeland sword in hand, but to complete it."[40]

CHAPTER 6

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE'S FIGHT TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

The Whole People's War as Reflected by Romanian Military Thought on the Defense of the Romanian State's Sovereignty and Integrity

The creation of the unitary Romanian nation-state, on 1 December 1918, provided favorable premises for Romania's many-sided development and had a whole series of major consequences on a political-strategic plane. Besides the nationwide extension of legislation and of the other modern reforms to boost society's progress, Romanian governments were pressed by the problem of defending the independence and territorial integrity of the unitary nation-state, which was threatened after World War I by countries whose reactionary forces enthroned fascist dictatorships and promoted foreign policies aimed at redividing the world, and enslaving the peoples of the Continent and, eventually, the whole world.

In the interwar period, Romanian military thought and practice were influenced by a whole series of tendencies and orientations, stemming from the foremost ideals of the Romanian people, its genuine possibilities, and its historical traditions, as well as from the European and international political-military context in which Romania was involved.

First of all, the attainment of the Romanians' great ideal—the creation of the unitary nation-state—made the military thinkers conscious of the conviction that national achievement had to general defensive doctrinal and strategic theories. "Consequently, our attitude cannot be aggressive, as there is no reason for that; it can only be a wait-and-see attitude, pursuing a defensive goal."[1]

Second, as shown by the experience of World War I, by Romania's experience more particularly, the mobilization of the whole population to support and wage a war had become a necessity, and the population's general contribution could no longer be confined to the partial involvement of certain individuals. The doctrinal debates that followed World War I brought to the fore ideas advocating the mass character of modern armies, which were made up of members representing all social classes and sections.

Third, the whole people's war for the defense of the homeland was asserted by historical tradition as a doctrine characterizing the national military heritage.

Last, but not least, there was a national consensus on foreign policy goals and the practical ways to attain them: the defense of the territorial status quo and the establishment of alliances with states taking similar stances.

Because of the interplay of those doctrinal orientations, the Romanian idea on the way of waging a defensive war, which mobilized the whole people, was brought up to date and adjusted to the new conditions: part of the people would fight alongside the regular army, whereas the rest would be involved in supporting the defense effort. The nation's general involvement was all the more necessary as fascism and revisionism threatened Romania's independence and territorial integrity. This situation, too, asserted the "armed nation" doctrine as the only realistic solution and conception that best suited the economic and demographic resources of a medium-sized country like Romania, which was threatened by superior, hostile forces.[2]

Foreshadowing the military doctrine of Greater Romania, senior officers in the army command pointed out, in 1920, that "not only the thriving and consolidation, but also the very existence of the Romanian state can be guaranteed, in the present situation, only be aligning all the forces and resources of the nation to defend the state. This means that . . .

we cannot renounce the obligation to provide proper military training for every able-bodied citizen, in keeping with the duty he will be assigned in defending the homeland."[3]

The lessons and conclusions drawn from the analysis of military developments during World War I showed that "the fight will not be restricted only to the front, but it will stretch back, deep into the heart of the country, seeking to demolish the moral and vital force of the civilian population, with a view of exerting a negative influence on the running of military operations." There was but one solution for the Romanian state, viz., "that the whole nation should be prepared in advance to bear the brunt of a war that we do not want, but that we have to know how to wage, if we were dragged into it."[4]

In the international conditions of the 1930s, when the fascist and revisionist states increased their revanchist acts and there was an escalation in war preparations against the background of the growing disinterest by big Western powers in the security of small countries, the advocates of Romanian military doctrine considered that the defense of the national heritage had to be the work of the whole people, whose peaceful, constructive vocation "poses no threat . . . of war to anybody. Nevertheless, this country cannot fail to react when foreign interests threaten its existence . . . . The war is the whole people's work. Therefore, it was a mistake to load the military with the burden of responsibilities incurred by the preparation and conduct of war. All the country's citizens carry that responsibility. Hence, the entire nation must be prepared for the war . . . . In the future, victory will belong to the whole nation, which, with its entire material and spiritual potential, will prepare and wage the war on its own."[5]

Quite significant for Romania's stance was the fact that, in 1932, at the Geneva conference for arms reduction and limitation, this country's representatives urged "the strengthening of international justice," as well as building world security, through cuts in military budgets, troops, etc.[6] Geneva failed to produce a consensus—but Germany got the *gleichberechtigung* (equal rights in arming matters) that "would directly lead to the question of frontiers because, when Germany, Hungary, or Bulgaria [spoke] about equality of rights, what they actually mean[t] [was] the reconsideration of frontiers."[7] In this, the Romanian decision makers stressed that "we [would] defend with utmost resolution the Romanian state's boundaries, as we would a sacred heritage."[8]

They believed it necessary—in light of the gloomy political-military circumstances—that the responsible departments should take all the steps required to prepare the nation in such a way that each citizen "should grant his unconditional support, out of sheer feeling, to the Romanian authorities." For Romania to withstand the converging revisionist pressures and the whole people to be mobilized to defend the national territory, "the idea of the armed nation had to become entrenched in the conscious of all the citizens, as no one can be exempt from cooperating, in various ways, in the fight to be carried on."[9]

Starting from the experience our army acquired during World War I, Romanian military theorists pointed out that, "owing to the huge strides taken by science and technology . . . , tommorrow's armed nation will have to fight tough means and conditions" and that, without a national defense industry able to supply arms to the whole people and proper equipment to the military, the idea of an "armed nation" would be deprived of its substance. In the opinion of the military thinkers who approached this question, "more often than not, preparing the nation for war was more difficult and complex than preparing the army, for the simple reason that it covered a lot of problems related to all the fields of activity [industry, agriculture, finance, politics, etc.]."[10]

The Higher National Defense Council was created in 1924, as the top political and military body responsible for the preparation and approval of the national military effort; in keeping with its membership (the Prime Minister; the heads of the following ministries: National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Industry and Trade, Agriculture, Finance, Communications, Public Works, Public Health, Internal Affairs; the Chief of Staff), the council had to "examine, coordinate and solve all the questions relating to national defense," its decisions were "binding and incurred the respective minister's liability" after they were approved by the Council of Ministers.[11] The same year, Romania's parliament passed the Army Organization Law, which stipulated that the "militias" were part of the military body: they would be deployed behind the operational army. Moreover, the law stipulated that premilitary training was compulsory for youths aged nineteen to twenty-one.[12]

Aware of the aggressive nature of the regime that came to power in Germany on 30 January 1933, the military decision makers initiated a whole series of steps to mobilize the entire economic and demographic

potential and to concentrate all the resources with a view to consolidating the country's defense. As such, the Law of the Wartime Organization of the Nation and of the Territory came into force in April 1933.[13] A general staff survey that provided the groundwork for that law showed that "the defense of the nation and of the Romanian territory is the Romanians' only reason to be."[14] According to the law, "the organization of the nation and of the territory is aimed to turn to account all the forces and resources of the country, in order to ensure the national defense"; "the responsibility for preparing the nation and the territory belonged to the whole government," not only to the military. The law made a series of specifications regarding the translation into fact of the "armed nation" idea: sensitization of public opinion so that the whole people should become aware of the efforts it should deploy for national defense; development of industry, agriculture, trade, and communication so as to meet the demands for defense; organization of the military; premilitary training of youths aged nineteen to twenty-one; defensive organization of the territory. The law stipulated that "all citizens subject to military duties belong to the armed forces," whereas those who were exempt from such duties "can be compelled, in wartime, to fulfill an assignment in the interest of national defense."[15]

The intervention of the fascist powers in the Spanish Civil War, the *anschluss,* the Czechoslovak crisis, and other attacks on the territorial status quo prompted Romanian ruling circles to step uo their defensive measures for the implementation of the "whole people's war" doctrine. That is how, a Law for the Establishment of the Romanian Youth Education Office (1934), and the Law for Youth's Organization and Utilization in Case of Mobilization (1939) came in force in the 1930s; those regulations were meant to prepare the population for the homeland's defense. Backed by nationwide military measures, which concentrated especially on the western frontier where the Horthyist threat was looming large, those measures actually mirrored the whole Romanian people's wish to preserve unmarred its national heritage, and to defend the country's unity, independence, and integrity under the conditions in which the Western democratic powers had launched their famous appeasement policy.

The Whole People's Defense of National Independence and Territorial Integrity—A Principal Goal of the Activity of the Romanian Communist Party and the Other Political Forces in the Interwar Period

As early as its creation in 1918, the unitary Romanian nation-state was the target of attacks, pressures, and threats from countries that had focused their activities on the revision of European territorial status; those actions became most virulent after the Nazi dictatorship was set up in Germany.

Under those circumstances, the problem of defending the country against the fascist and revisionist threat was a binding idea that created a national consensus of all the parties that operated—either from central or revolutionary positions—on the interwar political checkerboard. Nicolae Titulescu, the well-known Romanian politician and fervent advocate of a collective security policy, expressed that state of affairs, when he pointed out that "for all the internal divergences, when Romania is at stake our hearts beat as one."[16]

The working parties took action to defend the country, and hence shared with the major ruling parties similar preoccupations in that field. The basic differences in their programs for the development of society, as opposed to the bourgeois programs, did not affect in the least the common goal of defending Romania, and they deemed that the only way to attain that goal was to arm the whole people.

The creation of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) in May 1921 took the doctrinal theory and the practical activity relating to the whole peopl'es fight to a higher stage, imparting to them wide and novel dimension. When debating the party's military policy, its first Congress underscored the obvious connection between the fundamental, substantive transformation of society and national defense, stressing that the political, economic, and social goals could be attained only by a fully independent state. The Romanian Communists believed that the only way to guarantee the state's sovereignty lay in arming the people. "The national militia," the program debated at the Congress pointed out, "is organized according to the following principles: the arming of all poor workers and peasants and of the entire poor population that can bear arms."[17] As far as the regular army was concerned, the document showed that it had to make

up the active, key element in a defensive war as a component of the "armed nation" system. Moreover, the army would be truned into a body meant to push back, alongside the popular masses, any attack on the national interests and to defend the country's independence and integrity.

In that period, the Romanian Communists took a stand against the fascist threat, working for the mobilization of all the patriotic forces, with a view to countering the aggressions of the fascist and revisionist states. Analyzing the lines of activity the RCP followed in the interwar period, the president of socialist Romania emphasized that "the Communist party militated for a foreign policy able to defend the country's national independence and sovereignty against the rule of foreign imperialism, for peace and international collaboration."[18] Gauging the threat posed to our country by the schemes of the Nazi Reich, the RCP believed that the doctrine of the whole people's defensive war was the only viable solution in Romania's specific conditions and stated that "the people's capability for preserving its independence depends on the brotherhood between the people and the army, not on their hostile opposition."[19]

Pursuing the immediate and efficient translation into fact of the theory related to the whole people's arming, the Communist party urged the creation of favorable conditons for "the workers' and peasants' sporting organizatins to be able to learn the military art" and militated for the youths' premilitary training, with a view to mobilizing them in the event that the country's frontiers were threatened.[20] The RCP believed that the activity aimed at drawing the youth into training for the country's defense against revanchist fascism and revisionism was an integral part of "arming the working people as a whole and the only true defender of its independence."[21] Subsequent developments proved the correctness of the Communist party's thesis regarding the whole people's participation in the war to defend the homeland's independence and sovereignty.

In its turn, the Social Democratic party, whose political program also included the creation of a new society, was, "in principle, a resolute adversary of war," and militated for "cuts in the numbers of all armies, arms reducations, cuts in the number of heavy guns, tanks, planes, warships and the reduction of military budgets," and for "national and international control of the production and trade in any kind of war materials."[22]

Owing to the fact that "the small nations lack the imperialist interests driving the big countries," which can become a cause of war, they are first

of all interested in maintaining peace and excluding war as a means of settling conflicts."[23]

As for the ruling parties, with the Liberals and the National Peasant party holding center stage (between them, they made up twenty-two out of twenty-nine cabinets, from December 1918 to February 1938, twelve of which were Liberal and ten National Peasant), they also approached, either in electoral campaigns or on various other occasions, questions related to maintaining the country's territorial status quo, implementing the "armed nation" doctrine, and strengthening the military body.[24]

The ruling or electoral programs advanced by the National Liberal party expressed the stand taken by that major political force of the Romanian bourgeoisie on the question fo national defense. In the realm of diplomacy, they spoke of "the furtherance of a foreign policy raised above war [1932] for the consolidation of peace and the maintenance of the existing treaties," the fostering of "friendly ties with all the states," and the keeping to the initiatives "that will pursue the establishment of ties based on understanding among peoples and international concord."[25] In the realm of military policy, they wanted "the strengthening of the army, to which end no effort shall be spared. The nation's integral organization for national defense, the organization of youth premilitary training, the immediate supply of the army with the whole range of arms and means required by modern techniques, the development of military industries and the adjustment of private industries to the mission they will be assigned in case of war . . . will be measures able to boost the strength of our army, the eternal shield of our nation's independence."[26]

The Liberal Party, during alternate periods of rule (1924-1928, 1934-1937), pursued the creation of a legal framework favoring the development of a defense industry. In 1925, the Liberals succeeded in setting up the Romanian Aircraft Industry (IAR) and in founding an industry manufacturing infantry and artillery armament.

Originally in a center-left position, the National Peasant party (PNT) carried on, in its periods of rule (1928-1933) constructive actions in the field of national defense, showing "special concern for the army, in order to fully meet the demands of defending the state,"[27] for "defending Romania's territorial integrity."[28] In 1928, the National Peasant party's program pointed out that "great attention will be given to the army, which must become the powerful and exclusive instrument of

national defense," being the treasurer of "the glorious traditions of the past, the keeper of liberty and territorial integrity."[29]

The military policy promoted by the National Peasant party materialized in a wide range of laws, whose debate in the House of Deputies occasioned the assertion of a genuine doctrinal theory:

> We are a state that has attained its national aspirations. Today we have placed ourselves on the line of fully defending our territory; consequently, a notion of national defense also contains that statement which we make before all those that would ever dare to violate our territory.[30]

Although the two major bourgeois political parties did not explicitly state the idea of arming the whole people, the fundamental demands for defending the country against fascist and revisionist threats made them adopt the same stand as the Romanian Communist party on that question of paramount importance for the Romanian people.

It was not only the ruling parties that were concerned with national defense, but also many othe political groups and organizations. The Democratic Conservative party, for instance, militated for the organization of national defense "by taking into consideration the fact that the future wars will no longer be waged between armies, but between peoples, and the fact that technique will be the decisive factor for success."[31] Another political group, the Radical Peasant Party, stated that "Romania's present-day frontiers, established through the willing sacrifice of those [working] classes and sanctioned by treaties, are, and remain, unchanged."[32]

Shortly after Hitler came to power, the Romanian left-wing political forces showed that Hitler's Germany was preparing a war "for supremacy in retail markets, on the seas and spheres of economic influence, and for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles," and that Romania held a central place in the expansionist schemes of the Nazi Reich.[33] Studying German foreign policy, historian Andreas Hillgrüber pointed out that, in the 1930s, it had stepped into its third "offensive stage . . . . Resuming its old aspirations toward supremacy and shifting the centers of gravity towards the southeast of the Continent, more particularly to the Danubian area, its goal was a Central Europe under German leadership."[34] According to the same researcher, one of the means used by the various Hitlerite bodies to

implement the program was "to instrumentalize the so-called fascist movements [although they were, more often than not, small and divided] and to use the German political groups in Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and especially in Czechoslovakia as a lever or threat, to eventually produce an overthrow or even an internal commotion."[35]

Consequently, Germany granted support and material and moral assistance to the Iron Guard, a fascist organization that claimed Romania's alignment with Germany's policy. Although it received substantial foreign support and it resorted to the assassination of its political opponents, fascism, in its local forms, could not go beyond the fringes of the Romanian political life. Indeed, until the summer of 1940, the anti-national activity of the Iron Guard could not even influence domestic or foreign policy. All the democratic forces unanimously considered the Iron Guard as a product of foreign interests, opposed to the aspirations and to the intrinsic nature of the Romanian people.

In step with its activity to annihilate the members of the Iron Guard, the Romanian anti-Fascist movement focused its efforts on countering fascist and revisionist policy, and therefore, the fight against fascism defined its major strategic goal as the defense of national independence and unity. The viable solution was the general commitment to fight, hence, the implementation of the idea of the defensive war waged by the whole people. In this respect, the Romanian Communist party showed that the fascist states' attacks should be parried by the broadest popular masses, ralled in a common front of all social sections and political forces interested in Romania's democratic development and in the defense of its territorial integrity, national independence, and sovereignty.

The documents elaborated by the Romanian Communist party concentrated on the debate of problems related to national defense. "The existence of the Romanian people as a nation, Romania's existence as a country, and its independence are at stake. The Romanian people must decide whether it understands how to defend its existence and independence, and there can be only one answer for the Romanian people: with its entire strength, if need be, arms in hand, the Romanian people shall defend its existence against the Hitlerite outlaws who want to steal our national independence."[36]

With the aggression against Ethiopia and the intervention by Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Italy in the Spanish Civil War, and against a background of an utter disinterest by the powers that had declared for the

status quo, analyzing the international situation and its effects on the status of our country and providing an in-depth knowledge of the salient features of the Romanian people's history, the RCP pointed out that "Romania [could] become the object of a new, imperialist redivision of Europe, and not a subject," which prompted its support of "a foreign and domestic policy able to guarantee the country's real defense against the military attack of German facsism," as the Communists believed it "necessary that each patch of Romania's land should be defended" through the whole people's commitment to fight.[37] As an outcome of the activity the RCP carried out in collaboration with the other patriotic political forces, in the autumn of 1936, after Mussolini's provocative speech in Milan that demanded the reconsideration of frontiers in the Danube area, the unaminous decision to defend the national frontiers was evoked. "The Communist party," a document emphasized, "is resolved to fight against any revision of the peace treaties."[38] In huge demonstrations and anti-revisionist rallies, milliions of Romanians voiced their determination to repel the fascist and revisionist states' aggressions, stating their readiness to enlist in the army. "We want and are resolved to defend by all means the national unity that we won with so much sacrifice," stated the Radical Peasant party leader.[39] Before an assembly of 100,000 people in Oradea, a government member pointed out: "The Romanian people everywhere are ready to an sacrifice to defend the boundaries and guarantee the continuity of its constructive work. . . . We want it known to anybody who would be greedy for our land that he should heed the strength of the Romanian arm."[40] The stand of the working class was clearly set forth during a rally in Cluj, organized by the Romanian Anti-Reivionist League: "We, Romanian workers. . . know only one thing for sure—that the land of this country was defended and worked by the hands of our parents, who suffered a great deal during the Hungarians' rule. It is our land, and we are ready to shed our blood to defend it. We, Romanian workers, who have toughened our hands in work, know how to carry arms too. And to whomever wants to trespass our country's frontiers, we resolutely say that he should, if only he dared to."[41]

As the fascist states pushed their actions, in the spirit of doctrinal theory, the Romanian left-wing political forces pointed out that "the people's armed resistance is legitimate in case of an aggression," and that the Romanian workers "will march on in the front lines of battle."[42]

The National Peasant party and the National Liberal party, as well as other democratic, patriotic political groups, spoke for the defense of the country's frontiers and its national independence; they stressed that "the cardinal issue that has been given top priority of late has been the defense of our boundaries, guaranteed under the peace treaties following World War I. The defense of the boundaries calls for a consolidated internal situation and for a clear-shaped foreign policy."[43]

The Romanian decision makers met the international political-military crisis in the 1938-1939 interval through a series of resolute measures, through partial drafting of reserve forces, and the implementation of the total defense principle. Echoing the mood that characterized the Romanian people, Nicolae Iorga wrote: "We have to defend our boundaries such as they are, such as realities demand, but then also such as the national interests require . . . and we have to preserve our absolute independence against any intrusion and against any state."[44] Following the actions taken by the Communist party and the other democratic political forces, the popular masses answered the draft in the autumn of 1939, reporting to their units in numbers that were three to four times larger than expected. In a reference to the people's will to defend the country—a shining confirmation of the doctrine of the people's war for the national cause—the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Armand Călinescu, pointed out that whenever "there is the slightest sign, from somewhere, of an attempt to violate our territory, it will be thwarted by the most resolute and firm resistance. This policy is not only the government policy or the policy of the country, it is the national policy."[45] Outlining the character of the Romanian people of over two thousand years, Nicolae Iorga stated: "Passions that are alien to our nature divert from their honest work the youths of this nation, who are called to protect us against any oncoming threat. Yet the people come in time, without uttering a single cry of hatred against anybody, yet fully resolved to do their duty."[46]

As an expression of the state policy, the doctrinal theory was also mirrored by the operational plans drawn up by the army high command and by alliance treaties. The external military conventions concluded over 1921 and 1922 and renewed in the 1930s (the Little Entente and with Poland) or signed in February 1924 (the Balkan Treaty) and their bases for action translated Romania's military policy into technical terms. Owing to their nature, the operational plans and projects reflected the theory

concerning the defense of territorial integrity, while the alliance treaties came into effect only in the event of unprovoked aggression, which reveals the defensive nature of the ties Romania promoted with its allies and with the other states in the area.[47]

This was outlined by Grigore Gafancu, a former foreign minister, who emphasized: "We do not take anything that does not belong to us, yet we do defend and strengthen everything that it ours—this is the mainstay of our foreign policy. We have proved that we understand how to work for peace through deeds, endeavoring to make the natural ties among nations closer, on real grounds. We have also proved that we are resolved to defend, arms in hand, our boundaries and liberty. We shall fight whenever those precious assets are violated."[48]

CHAPTER 7

THE ANTI-FASCIST AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST REVOLUTION FOR SOCIAL AND NATIONAL LIBERATION OF AUGUST 1944: A COROLLARY OF ROMANIAN MILITARY THINKING AND PRACTICE

The Romanian Resistance to Hitlerite-Horthyist Occupation and Romania's Withdrawal from the Anti-Soviet War

In the critical international circumstances of 1940, when our country found itself politically isolated and when the Hitlerities controlled almost all of continental Europe, Romania had imposed on it (30 August 1940) the Axis powers' Vienna *diktat* by which northern Transylvania was torn from the country and given to Horthy's Hungary. This unlawful act, "one of the most loathsome shifts of territorial sovereignty ever recorded in the evolution of international relations" provoked the prompt and resolute reaction of the entire people, whose national feelings had been deeply injured.[1]

Following the hateful *diktat*, as well as other territorial annexations in the summer of 1940, Romania found herself in a really drastic position and without any support from abroad, a prey for Hitler's plundering and expansion. On 6 September 1940, General Ion Antonescu installed himself as the Conducător ("leader") of the country, on 14 September, under sure from Berlin, he formed a new government with substantial participation by the Iron Guard. On 12 October 1940, German troops entered

Romania as a "military mission" for training the Romanian army; but, in reality, they were occupation troops intended for, in the future, aggressive actions scheduled by the Wehrmacht.

The Third Reich's control over Romania and the Hitlerite exploitation and fascist terror reached their climax with Antonescu and his clique's pushing the country, at Berlin's orders, into the Hitlerite war against the will of the Romanian people. The unleashing of the Hitlerite aggression, on 22 June 1941, against the Soviet Union subordinated our country evermore to Nazi Germany and deepened its economic, political, and military enslavement. Romania's joining in the war and the exploitation of its resources by German imperialism brought our country to the threshold of national disaster.

Under these internal and international conditions, a strong resistance movement was created and developed in Romania's against Antonescu's dictatorship and the Hitlerite forces supporting him. From the very beginning, this movement had a deeply national character, joining, at the same time, the heroic struggle of the European peoples occupied by Nazi Germany and its acolytes. "The Romanian resistance movement was carried out under the banner of regaining Romania's national independence and sovereignty, for overthrowing the internal dictatorial regime and the reinstatement of democracy, for Romania's getting out of the war led against the Soviet Union and joining the United Nations—her natural allies; the Romanian resistance movement [was] integrated into this political and social phenomenon characteristic of the whole of Europe held by fascism."[2]

Upon learning of the Vienna *diktat*, many political circles and democratic and patriotic organizations—among which the Romanian Communist party took the most steadfast position—rose against the *diktat*, organized large popular manifestations in different towns of the country and demanded the armed defense of the motherland's integrity and sovereignty. The news about what had happened in Vienna traveled at lightning speed throughout the country, outraging all citizens. The broad masses—workers in factories and plants, peasants, intellectuals, in fact the whole Romanian people—expressed, in ad hoc meetings, their firm resolution to defend the homeland's independence and territorial integrity.

Reflecting the state of mind of the Romanian people, the army reacted against the *diktat* and took concrete action for defending Romania's borders and her territorial integrity. It is worth mentioning that officers

belonging to the high command also joined the masses and demonstrated alongside the leading participants. The Romanian troops' withdrawal, on orders, from the territory stolen by the *diktat* was not easily accomplished; it was done after repeated orders and insistence by higher echelons. Some officers delayed the orders for both immediate demobilization of the troops and leaving the combat positions. In some places, many soldiers, defying orders, opened fire on Horthyist troops penetrating Romania's territory. Eventually, the Romanian soldiers were forced to retreat, full of anger and sorrow, from their stolen territory; but they were firmly determined to turn back and fight to liberate this territory.

A regime of terror was set up in Romania under the Nazi troops and it mainly aimed at the democratic and anti-fascist forces. On the night of 26-27 November 1940, for example, at orders given by the leaders of the Iron Guard, sixty-four prisoners (former high officials and civil servants) who were to be tried for their anti-Guard activity during Carol II's reign were massacred on the premises of the Jilava Penitentiary. The climax of the Iron Guard's atrocities and arbitrary actions against the masses and the army was the rebellion of 21-23 January 1941.

After removing the Iron Guard from the leadership of the country and after neutralizing its activity, a new government made up of military men and functionaries only and led by General Ion Antonescu, was formed. This regime continued to oppress the masses and the workers' movement, to maintain terror against Communists and to increase the economic, political, and military servitude of the country to Nazi Germany. During his wartime rule, Antonescu relied on oppressive bodies and anti-popular elements of the central and local administrative institutions, as well as on the Hitlerite troops—his main support.

As the Romanian resistance movement grew, in January 1944, the RCP addressed a call to the army to turn its weapons against the Hitlerites: "Officers and soldiers, do not obey Hitler and Antonescu's orders any longer, do not sacrifice your lives for defending the German invaders. Your duty is to unite with the people and to turn [your] arms against the German invaders and traitors in the leadership of the country."[4] The next month, the working people's party issued a document called "Urgent Tasks," in which it mapped out how to put into practice a body of political and organizational measures for Romania's getting out of the Hitlerite war. This document contained multiple tasks, such as: full attention to be

paid to sabotage of transport; information on the transport and deployment of the Hitlerite troops in Romania, at the front line or in the rear; possibilities for establishing ties with Romanian units, and carrying out revolutionary and patriotic activity among them; finding out German plans regarding the capital's evacuation; and finding Gestapo, police, and political police agents, etc. All these tasks were mainly subordinated to undermining, by all means, the Hitlerite war machine.

The entire people's struggle against Antonescu's regime and the Hitlerite troops reached the decisive stage in the first half of 1944. Aggravation of the social and political situation of the country, economic and financial chaos, worsening of living conditions, ever-increasing air raids, the dark perspective of turning the country into a ravaged war theater—all these caused the rapid development of revolutionary effervescence and hatred by the broad masses toward Antonescu's regime and Nazi Germany and against the war.

While the domestic and external situation of Romania grew worse, the historical process of achieving the unity of action by all democratic and anti-Fascist political forces involved in saving the country from disaster widened and spread. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the contacts established, between 1942 and 1943, among representatives of patriotically oriented anti-Hitlerite political forces. In the summer of 1943, on the basis of the platform of action proposed by the Romanian Communist party, the Anti-Hitlerite Patriotic Front was set up, which included a significant number of democratic parties and organizations.

The united fighting front of the Romanian people could only be achieved in strong collaboration with the working classes' unity of action. The contacts that the leaders of the Romanian Communist party and the Social Democratic party established in the autumn of 1941 multiplied during 1942 and 1943, and would climax in the second half of April 1944, when the Workers' United Front was created. Setting up the Workers' United Front represented a historic victory by the Romanian resistance because it meant the political unity of the leading social force in the national resistance—the working class. Pointing out the great importance of achieving the working class's unity of action, the president of Romania noted that "it represented the essential factor in the fight for overthrowing the military-fascist dictatorship, for taking Romania out of the war against the Soviet Union, for joining the anti-Hitlerite coalition, and passing to the democratic development and social change of the country."[5]

Achieving the unity of action of the working class allowed for the implementation of a wide system of political alliances characterizing the national united front of the Romanian people. By the end of May 1944, the National Democratic Coalition was set up. Concomitantly, the ties that had been established since August 1943 with the royal palace would reach their final form by mid-June 1944, when King Michael accepted the plan of action proposed by the RCP which called for the forcible overthrow of the Antonescu regime.

In setting up the entire nation's united front, great attention was given to winning the army to the side of this broad national coalition. During the years 1941-1944, the democratic forces, led by the Communists, carried on a significant activity in the army and multiplied the ties with generals and high officers in commands and large and small units, both in the country and abroad, winning many of them for preparing the scheduled military and political change.

Practically all social strata and categories and almost the entire political array of the country, from democratic organizations to bourgeois parties, and the monarchy and military leadership were gradually drawn to the liberation activity. By its content, structure, and methods, this system of political alliances was unique, and represented a significant experience of national and worldwide importance. "The political activity carried out by the Communist party in order to set up the National United Front for saving the country represents a genuine approach to solving a complex historical situation, a typically Romanian solution of unity all vital forces of the nation in the fight for democracy, independence and national sovereignty."[6]

Strengthening the people's resistance deepened the Antonescu regime's crisis and steadily worsened the dissensions among its leaders, which entailed new changes and regrouping within the exploting classes but favored wide political alliances of the domestic anti-Fascist forces. Internally undermined by the struggle of the masses, Antonescu's regime was also facing an ever-increasingly difficult military situation because of the blows dealt to the fascist armies by the armed forces of the anti-Hitlerite coalition and by the Soviet army, which waged the fiercest fights against the Hitlerite troops.

Although the domestic and international military and political situation of Germany continually worsened, the Nazi leaders planned to maintain,

by all means, their established positions until a possible improvement in the situation favoring the fascist states; then, at the proper moment, they hoped to take again the initiative, changing the course of war in their favor. In these plens, Romania was given an important role.

In the summer of 1944, the crisis of Antonescu's regime became severe. Against this background, the Romanian patriotic and anti-Fascist forces fully grasped that the only way to overthrow the regime was by use of force, with the participation of the armed masses and the military establishment as a whole. In the given historical circumstances, an armed national insurrection was the only way to successfully and radically solve the main problems the Romanian people faced. The doctrinal concept of organizing the entire people's armed fight for achieving the great desiderata of the given historical period was to become the support of an eruption of revolutionary forces to subsequently ensure the defense, consolidation, and development of all achievements made in the anti-Fascist fight.

In the military preparations for the historic act of 23 August 1944, as well as in the subsequent historical development, full attention was given to setting up people's armed detachments—i.e., patriotic fighting formations—intended as nuclei around which all forces willing to fight against Antonescu's regime and the Hitlerite troops were to be grouped. Setting up these armed formations was a crucial step in arming the people for the future fight for defending the homeland; under the new conditions, the national doctrinal traditions had to be resumed. Guerilla detachments and groups were also organized. Some were organized on Soviet territory and they were made up especially of anti-Fascist emigrants and Romanian war prisoners.

The internal and external conditions in the second half of August 1944 had become favorable for triggering the insurrection. Internally, the effervescence of the broad masses of people—of all social classes and strata and aware of the crucial moments the country had to face—had reached its climax. The working class unity of action had been achieved; patriotic fighting detachments had been organized; the military units were ready to take part, from the very first moments, in the insurrection; the unity of patriotic forces had become a system of wide political alliances while Antonescu's regime had entered a deep military and political crisis; and at the same time, the army manifested total hostility to continuing the war against the United Nations. All conditions were therefore created for the entire army to participate in the insurrection.

From a military viewpoint, a crucial moment in preparing the insurrection was the 13-14 June 1944 meeting of the representatives of the Communist party, of the royal palace, and some central command officers. The meeting adopted the military plan of the insurrection, proposed by the Romanian Communist party. In parallel with elaborating operational plans, orders, and dispositions for patriotic fighting detachments and units, which had to start action at once, the army was being prepared to take part in the insurrection.

The Popular Character of the August 1944 Liberation Battles

Taking advantage of the internal and external conditions, the national patriotic forces of Romania, whose nucleus was the Romanian Communist part, in the afternoon of 23 August 1944, set off the armed anti-Fascist national insurrection by arresting the leaders of the dictatorship and overthrowing Antonescu's regime. This led to Romania's immediate getting out of the Hitlerite war and joining the Soviet Union and other Allied countries in military operations against Nazi Germany.

"The accomplishment of the August 23, 1944 armed insurrection was," as the president of Socialist Romania pointed out, "the beginning of the anti-Fascist and anti-imperialist revolution of social and national liberation [that] put an end to Romania's participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany and led to the entire Romanian army's joining the fight against Hitlerism, for the full liberation of the country and defeat of fascism."[7]

In order to accomplish, rapidly and integrally, the goals of the insurrection, it was absolutely necessary for the Romanian people and army to take resolute action, especially so when the confrontation with Hitlerite forces became unavoidable. In the public declaration made in the newspaper *România liberă* of 24 August 1944, it was stated that: "In the unavoidable confrontation with Hitler's forces, the Romanian Communist party calls the workers, peasants, intellectuals, and all Romania's citizens to mercilessly fight, by every means, against the deadly enemy of the Romanian peoples in order to secure the latter's future."[8] The same kind of calling to arms was reflected in the broadcast "Proclamation to the Country" by King Michael I: "Our people are determined to be the single master of their own destiny. . . . Anybody who opposes

our freely made decision, which doesn't infringe upon anybody's rights, is our nation's enemy. Order out the army, and I call upon the people to fight, by all means and by all sacrifices, against [the enemy]."[9]

The popular character of the insurrection was expressed, among others, by the full participation of the army—sons of workers, peasants, and intellectuals, and therefore the most specific representatives of the Romanian nation. Such a wise uprising in arms was an unprecedented phenomenon in national history; practically, it was a popular war with its character imprinted on the insurrectional fights by the participation of the civil population in direct and voluntary support of the Romanian army's operations, both armed (patriotic fighting detachments, paramilitary units, or groups of spontaneously armed people) and by other means.[10]

The size of the military efforts made by Romania immediately after 23 August 1944 are illustrated by its commitment to battles against Hitlerite troops of forces amounting to thirty-seven divisions and other units, subunits, and formations totalling over 500,000 soldiers. Romanian troops and patriotic fighting detachments, largely supported by the population, excelled in initiative and speed in their execution of orders, and carried out large-scale offensive operations that led to the destruction or removal of enemy forces in the whol area of the insurrection. During the insurrection, Romanian troops, supported by the patriotic fighting detachments, liberated the entire territory which, at that time, was controlled by the Romanian state authority (about 150,000 square kilometers), that is, the southern, central, and western parts of Romania, an area that, up to then, had been of vital importance for Nazi war machine.[11] In the actions during the insurrection, the Wemacht suffered casualties equivalent to six divisions (over 61,000 soldiers, of which 56,000 were prisoners, including fifteen generals and 1,241 officers), and lost a great amount of equipment and materiel to Romanian forces.

A careful and impartial analysis of historical data and facts shows that the victory of the August 1944 Romanian revolution and Romania's joining the anti-Fascist war were of paramount importance—politically, militarily, economically, and diplomatically—for crushing the Third Reich. Undoubtedly it is true that, except for the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain, no other state of the United Nations coalition had, by its military operations, such an adverse effect on Hitler's war in Europe as had Romania.

The revolutionary act carried out by Romania had immediate strategic effects, of continental-wide value, on the development of the world war: (1) the collapse of German defensive system on the southern wing of the Soviet-German flank; (2) the breaking down of the defensive line organized by the Wehrmacht in the Balkan Peninsula; (3) the opening and maintaining by Romania of a new front against Hitlerite and Horthyist forces in Transylvania and the Banat; (4) a sudden change, in favor of the United Nations coalition, in the military balance of the two fighting camps; and (5) the cessation of supplying the Hitlerite war machine with goods from Romania.

In addition to strategic effects, the victory of the August 1944 Romanian insurrection also had great political consequences, as it engendered a real earthquake in that part of Europe, whose shock was quickly spread, causing or accelerating political crises in the states in Berlin's orbit: Hungary, Bulgaria, and Croatia. Although very far from Romania, Finland too felt the impact of the insurrection. By its strategical, economic and political consequences, the national armed insurrection of Romania represented one of the great events of World War II.[12]

So important in speeding the victory against Nazi Germany, it enjoyed wide and favorable reverberations all over the world. The *Daily Express* of 24 August 1944 showed that Romania's "volte-face means that the war has finally been lost for Germany . . . . The war through the Danube Valley is opened into the heart of the Reich"; the *New York Times* of 25 August 1944 wrote that "history may record Romania's deed as one of the most decisive events of the whole war."

During the August 1944 insurrection, the people-army relation acquired new strength, ans was significantly enhanced. During the battles against the Hitlerite forces, which had caused so much suffering to the Romanian people, the army and the broad masses, strongly united and animated by the same ideals, fought and won. In those fierce days of the insurrection, the viability of the Romanian traditional doctrinal concept of the entire people's fight for liberating the homeland and for the development and progress of the entire country was again tested in practice, on a nationwide scale.

The Romanian Participation in the Anti-Hitlerite War Waged by Romania Within the United Nations Coalition

Simultaneously with the historical act of 23 August 1944, Romania entered the anti-Hitlerite war, joining the United Nations up to the final victory in May 1945. The Romanian army—realizing its responsibility, in those times, to the people and the country and operating according to the requirements of the national military doctrine—firmly continued the fight begun in August 1944 for liberating the homeland's soil, alongside the Soviet army, up to the total victory against Nazi Germany.[13]

During the clashes of 1 September-25 October 1944, the Romanian forces, grouped in two big operational strategic units, amounting to twenty-seven infantry, cavalry, and mountain divisions, as well as other units and formations, with a total of about 265,000 soldiers, in cooperation with large Soviet units within the second Ukrainian Front, marked their combat itineraries with numberless bold deeds, heroism, and sacrifices. During this period, 49,744 sons of the country died on the battlefield. The enemy's bullets and shells, rains, muddy land, destroyed bridges, and mined roads could not stop the offensive arbor of the Romanian soldiers. 25 October 1944, the day when the last Romanian land was freed, became the symbol of the rebirth of the national army—the Day of the Socialist Republic of Romania Army. Alongside Romanian soldiers, Soviet soldiers also fought for liberating the northwest of Romania. "The cooperation in battle by Romanian and Soviet soldiers reached the highest peaks of efficiency; it was an important factor in shaping the victory."[14]

After the liberation of the entire national territory from fascist domination, the Romanian soldiers, shoulder-to-shoulder with Soviet soldiers, continued to fight their way onto Hungarian territory, in order to liberate this beighboring state.

The Romanian army took part in the military operations on Hungary territory with seventeen infantry, cavalry, and mountain divisions, one air corps, two air defense artillery and one railway brigade, and many other units and formations, amounting to 210,000 soldiers. Romanian forces disrupted fortified communications, forced wide rivers, repelled counterattacks, and liberated 1,237 localities, of which were fourteen big towns. The Romanian air corps, operating successfully in support of ground forces or independently, carried out 612 combat missions, with

805 sorties per aircraft, which totaled 1,335 flight hours. In the battles on our neighbor's territory, the blood sacrifices of our army amounted to 42,700 soldiers. Appreciating the Romanian people's contribution in the fight for liberating Hungary, the Hungarian political leaders János Kádár, Ferenc Münnich, and István Dobi stated, in a telegram addressed in April 1959 to the Party and state leadership of Romania, that "our people will never forget that, for its freedom, the heroic sons of the Romanian brother people also shed their blood, alongside the valiant Soviet army, and highly esteem the friendship and brotherly collaboration between the Hungarian and Romanian peoples."[15]

After Hungary's liberation, the Romanian army, and the Soviet army ceaselessly operated on Czechoslovakia's territory until 12 May 1945. In those engagements, the Romanian army took part with seventeen infantry, cavalry, mountain, and air defense divisions, one air corps, one railway brigade, one armored regiment, and many other units and formations, amounting to about 25,000 soldiers. The Romanian army penetrated 400 kilometeres into enemy areas, forced four big watercourses, crossed four main mountain chains, and liberated 1,722 localities, of which were thirty-one towns, causing great human and materiel losses to the enemy. The sacrifices of the Romanian army in liberating the Czechoslovak people amounted to over 66,000 soldiers.[16]

Referring to Romania's contribution in liberating Czechoslovakia, Ludvik Svoboda, former president of that country, stated in 1960: "The Romanian units, together with the Soviet units, liberated the cradle of the national Slovak rebellion, Banská Bystrica . . . for a period of five months, and the two Romanian armies . . . ceaselessly fought for liberating Czechoslovakia."[17]

On 9 May 1945, the main forces of the Romanian army were operating on the Prague axis. It was only on 12 May that they reached the end of their campaign itinerary, a moment in which they were about eighty kilometers from Czechoslovakia's capital.

The Romanian army took part in the fight on Austria's territory with one armored regiment and one combat group of the Romanian railway brigade. In support of Soviet big units, the Romanian regiment deeply penetrated Austrian territory on 9 April 1945 and operated in an area important to the Wehrmacht, because of the Zistersdorf oil refinery. By fierce, tenacious, beroic, and skillful fighting, the Romanian tankmen

caused heavy material and human losses to the enemy, thus making their contribution to Austria's liberation. Between April and June 1945, subunits of the combat group belonging to the Romanian railway brigade worked hard on Austrian land in support of Soviet operational forces, and made their contribution in reconstructioning and opening railways, achieving a volume of work equivalent to 24,056 man-days.

In attaining the historic victory of 9 May 1945, about 540,000 Romanian soldiers fought on the anti-Hitlerite front. Operating continally, for 263 days, our troops forced twelve big rivers, crossed twenty mountain chaisn, freed 3,831 localities (including fifty-three towns), took about 180,000 prisoners, and caused great human and material losses to Hitlerite and Horthyist forces.[18] The road convered by the Romanian army was full of sacrifice. The human losses recorded by our country amounted to about 170,000 soldiers, NCOs, and officers (killed, wounded, missing). Of them, 58,000 Romanian soldiers were recorded as casualties during actions on Romania's territory (about 34 percent), over 42,000 in Hungary (about 24 percent), over 66,000 in Czechoslovakia (about 38 percent), and the rest in Austria.*19*

The heroic deeds of the Romanian forces on the anti-Hitlerite front were mentioned by the Soviet supreme command in seven orders of the day, twenty-one war comminquês, and many other orders issued by the second Ukrainian Front command or other Soviet commands with which Romanian units cooperated. Over 30,000 Romanian soldiers were decorated with Romanian, Soviet and Czechoslovak orders and medals.

Romania made a significant contribution not only militarily but also economically in attaining the brilliant victory achieved by the United Nations against the forces dominated by Nazi Germany.[20] In order to mobilize resources and means to support the war and to provide the army with everything necessary during the entire campaign, the Romanian Communist party, which took part in the governing activity, launched the call, "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" The broad masses made huge efforts, matching the spirit of heroism and sacrifice of the soldiers who had faced the enemy. In this respect, the revolutionary and patriotic feelings of the working people were at their highest. For the needs required by the anti-Hitlerite front, almost all the engines and wagons available at that moment (52,614 wagons and 3,277 egines) and the entire railway network, with a length of 7,986 kilometers was used.

In order to support the war effort, Romania also used about 92 percent of the capacity of its river and sea flotilla, all harbors and harbor facilities, its shipyards, and civil and military airfields. The wire and telegraph network of the country, was also put into the service of the anti-Hitlerite front.

Workers in all industrial branches and, alongside them, the working peasantry made all efforts to increase industrial and agricultural productivity to provide for the soldiers on the front and for domestic consumption. Miners doubled coal extraction, oil industry workers enhanced crude oil extraction, in textiles and leather works increased the production of fabrics, clothes, leather goods, and footwear. The peasants, in their turn, provided the anti-Hitlerite war with over 220,000 tons of food and 142,000 tons of fodders. It is worth mentioning that, all through Romania's participation in the anti-Hitlerite war, the food stocks of our army was exclusively based on the economy of the country.

From 23 August 1944 until the summer of 1945, when the troops returned home Romania's economic contribution to the war amounted to one billion dollars, in 1938 currency, a sum equivalent to over four times the budget of the country in the 1937/1938 fiscal year.[22]

In summing up Romania's military and economic effort during the anti-Hitlerite war, the president of Socialist Romania said that: "For about nine months, the Romanian army, with a strength of over half a million soldiers, fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the glorious Red Army, making heavy blood sacrifices for liberating both the rest of Romania's territory occupied by the Fascist-Horthyist forces, and the territory of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and part of Austria's, up to the total victory over Hitlerite Germany. This fight was supported by the efforts made by the entire people, who immediately answered to the call addressed by our Communist party: 'Everything for the front, everything for victory!'"[23]

The role of Romania's participation in the war was highly and well-deservedly esteemed by wide public opinion. Romania—as many important personalities of the United Nations coalition and participants in the Paris Peace Conference pointed out—ranked forth among the countries that contributed to the defeat of Germany, after the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain. In this regard, "Comparisons with indicators

achieved by other states of the anti-Hitlerite coalition in the operations clearly point out the important contribution the Romanian army made during the war against Nazi Germany and Horthyist Hungary."[23]

CHAPTER 8

THE PROBLEM OF THE ENTIRE PEOPLE'S WAR IN ROMANIAN MILITARY THOUGHT DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIALIST ERA (1945-1965)

The 1945-1947 Military Doctrinal Activity in the Process of Remodeling Romanian Military Institutions

The development of the socialist era opened a new period in the history of modern Romanian society, radically changing the face of the country in all domains of economic, sociopolitical, and cultural-scientific development, national defense included. The political framework set up during the socialist revolution and construction, the whole evolution of our society on the road of progress and civilization, and the vital interest of the Romanian people in safeguarding national independence and sovereignty and victory of peace and friendship among people created the prerequisites for a new approach to solving the problem of the entire people's war for defending the homeland.

The main goal of this doctrinal activity was to remodel national military institutions in accordance with the new changes and the imperatives of socialist development, and on the basis of the political orientations of the Romanian Communist party—the leading political force of the Romanian society which, in this capacity, elaborated its own outlook. It had reached the conclusion that a disintegration of the Romanian army would

prove inadequate, even wrong, and that, in this concretely historical situation, it was necessary to preserve the being and the cohesion of the military institutions of the country; it was also entirely possible to change it in accordance with the imperatives of the revolution. This approach viewed the problem of setting up the military arm of the new social and political order as a constructive process, taking into account that the Romanian army had always served the supreme interests of the homeland with devotion and sacrifice.

The organic integration of the army into the revolutionary process, opened by the great rising to arms of the Romanian people in August 1944, was partly determined by its social composition. "Consisting in its full majority of peasants and workers, the army objectively reflected the state of mind of the social environment it came from, the working people's hopes and aspirations for freedom and independence, and their highly anti-Fascist and anti-Hitlerite inclinations."[1]

During the years of socialist revolution and construction, the popular character of the Romanian army's social basis deepened and spread. The troops came almost entirely from the working people in villages and towns, and the majority of the officers, those of the superior ranks included, were recruited from the people. Coming from the broad masses of people, soldiers, NCOs, officers, and generals could only be as one with their parents and brothers, workers, peasants, handicraftsmen, and intellectuals, close to the people, receptive and really identifying themselves with their aspirations in their struggle for new and revolutionary changes. Emphasizing the popular character of the social basis of the army, one of the calls of the unitary democratic forces in the National Democratic Front, addressed to the army in 1945, said: "Officers, NCOs and soldiers! You are the sons of this people and you cannot but stand by this people . . . . You must not and you cannot be on the side of the landlords and [be] their tools."[2]

This unity of interest and aspiration of the people and its sons in the army increased the Romanian army's potential for organically integrating itself into the revolutionary process and of joining the masses in their fight for social liberation and for the revival of the Romanian society. This process influenced the social and political framework in which the remodeling of the national military institutions and the development of Romanian military thinking and doctrinal activity regarding the entire people's war for defending the homeland took place.

The Romanian Communist party considered that the transformation of the old army could be achieved by gradual but radical changes, without breaking its organizational frame. Such an approach was based on a careful study of the Romanian army's nature, on the realities of the Romanian society, and on a clear understanding of the evolution of the revolutionary process as a whole in Romania; it proved to be in full accordance with the Romanian people's interests. "In the wide revolutionary process which took place after August 23," the president of Socialist Romania emphasized, "in the great social struggles for gaining political and econimic power and for achieving the impressive goals of socialist revolution and construction, the Party paid great attention to democratizing, reorganizing and strengthening our armed forces. Thus, our army became a tool for the people's power, for defending its revolutionary achievements, and a reliable shield for our country's freedom, independence and integrity."[3]

The sociopolitical background against which the process of building up the new tupe of army in Romania started and developed simultaneously encouraged two main ways of influencing the military. The first was the political-ideologic influence on the army's personnel by promoting among them durable beliefs for actively integrating themselves into the dynamics imposed by democratic, revolutionary forces on Romanian society. This activity, which had started with the establishment of the Party, was emphasized during the preparation and development of the August 1944 revolution and was greatly expanded during the period in which the army was won to the side of the people's revolutionary struggle. The democratic forces of the country carried out intensive political and educational work among soldiers both in the country and those on the front, explaining the goals that the Romanian people had to seek in their struggle for genuine democracy, social justice, and economic restoration. Parallel with this, full attention was paid to popularizing immediate and long-term factors specific to the army. In this respect, it was important for the military to understand the resolute fight waged by the democratic forces for land expropriation and appropriation and for having soldiers, as well as the widows and orphans of those who had died in the fight against Hitlerite and Horthyist aggressors, receive priority in the agrarian reform. Eliminating all practices that jeopardized military dignity, setting up statutory relations between officers and soldiers, i.e., commanders and

subordinates, and granting political rights to all grades as an essential condition for the democratization of the army were included among the specific factors.

The second way of influencing the army was the use of state powers in order to gradually extend the Party's authority over military institutions. This practice was used with the beginning of the August 1944 revolution when the Party started to take an active part in governing the country. Antonescu's laws and orders regarding recruiting, corporal punishment, etc. were therefore abolished, a fact that strengthened the process of army democratization.

The common efforts by political-educational mass work on the military, on the one side, and by the use of state powers on the other caused important changes in the political structure of the army, as well as its integration into the revolutionary struggle of the basses. The full expression of these changes was represented by the open and substantial support given by the army to the democratic and revolutionary forces in their struggle for power. Setting up the workers and peasants' revolutionary government on 6 March 1945 created a new political framework that offered wide possibilities for speeding up the process of remodeling the army and allowed for achieving extraordinary successes in a short while. "One of the main tasks of the Romanian people and of the present government," the then prime minister said, "is the democratization of the army . . . . The army comes from the people and is for the people, for defending the interests of this people and of the homeland."[4]

The deep changes that took place in the army during that period were fully confirmed by the massive vote given by the army, in November 1946, to the democratic parties bloc led by the Romanian Communist party in an enthusiastic and hearty adherence to the revolutionary change of the regime, in December 1947, when the monarchy was abolished and Romania was proclaimed a people's republic.

The new political order built from August 1944 to December 1947 and the organic integration of the army into the new evolution of Romanian society favored both structural and organizational changes. During this period, commands and large units were reorganized and the "territorial mobilization system" was established, which better corresponded to the principles of action in concept of the entire people's fight for defence. Also, service training centers were reestablished and the general staff set

up "a study on the organization of units and big units in the future," which was to offer solutions for "achieving greater flexibility by introducing vehicles, improving firepower, ensuring anti-aircraft and anti-tank defenses, and improving information means."[5]

The provisions of the Law for Army Organization (No 206/1947) answered certain restrictions stipulated by the recent peace treaty; at the same time, they tried to deal with current requirements resulting from our country's specific situation (needs, possibilities, domestic and international situation, military traditions, etc.). According to the norms of that period, the military duty period was set to thirty years (from twenty to fifty years of age), out of which eighteen months were to be under arms, (three years and six months in completion), fifteen years in the reserves, and ten years in the militia, with the exception of young doctors, border guards, and police, armored troops and navy sailors had to serve for three years. Such distribution expressed one of the traditional aspects of Romanian military doctrine, namely the wide participation of both the army and the masses in the fight for defending the homeland.[6]

The intensification of the process of remodeling military institutions, and the realistic outlook of the progressive political forces led by the Romanian Communist party in this domain accelerated the doctrinal activity in the period 1945-1947 toward developing the theory and practice of the entire people's fight. within the international political and military context of the postwar period, characterized by the beginnings of the "cold war." This realistic and deeply patriotic outlook was clearly expressed by Romanian military authorities of the time, showing that "the wide war experience of most of our officers, the lessons resulting from four years of war waged by our Army on different theatres and in very different conditions, and their impact with the Soviet and the German armies, all represent many sources of documentation, so rich that it would be completely wrong to apply the old method of creating a Romanian military doctrine by simply copying or taking over the regulations of other armies."[7]

By generalizing this rich experience the general staff or experts working in other military education departments and institutions set up different works and studies. Among the most important ones were the internal-use-only "Guidelines on the Army's Training" (20 May 1946) and the study "Orientations for a New Doctrine" (1947). The main doctrinal

ideas contained in these official materials and in the specific literature relied on the conclusions and lessons resulting from analyzing the international situation in regard to strengthening Romania's defense capacity in the new postwar conditions, They considered that "the possibility of a future war was not definitely granted"; the small countries, our country included, would have "to completely avoid future engagements in armed conflicts," but they could be forced to enter the sphere of influence of the great powers, which "would polarize small nations around them," according to different circumstances. Emphasizing traditional war principles of the Romanins, these main doctrinal ideas showed that "the Romanian people, preserver of the traditional policy of peaceful relations with all neighbors, will never engage in an aggressive action with the view of territorial conquest or peoples' subjugation. Loving peace, it will never agree to the idea of war except as forced by circumstances, and only in order to defend its independence, freedom, rights, wealth and borders, if directly attacked or if called to take part in a common cause for sageguarding peace."[8]

Under the circumstances, the main concern was to create a national military doctrine on which the process of remodeling the Romanian military was to be based. Starting from this objective necessity, it was mentioned that "the new Romanian army, organized according to developing political factors, will have its own doctrine and will be based on a new organization and training."[9]

Strongly influenced by the social changes and by the Party's outlook on reorganizing the army in new basis, military theorists and specialists scientifically founded the idea of creating a national military doctrine based on an analysis of Romania's domestic and international realities of that period. According to them, the new military doctrine was to be influenced by "the typical possibilities and conditions of our country, people and army," and it had to take into account "the experience of the former war, the social changes, the improvements brought to military equipment and the latest technical developments in the new armies."[10] Also, the necessity of knowing the development of the Romanian army's doctrine was stressed, in order "to be able to understand the specific Romanian elements in the present and the future."[11] Great importance was placed on the need to study the military doctrines of other states, especially neighboring ones, in order to see what "can be adaptable and useful to our doctrine."

According to the Romanian doctrine experts, the concept of the "armed nation" materialized in two basic ways: (1) preparing the whole nation for the war for defending the homeland and (2) setting up a modern, operational army. Thus, it was stressed that "a nation completely prepared for war must be able to maintain, but its whole activity, its war potential, and to defend, in case of need, its territory, and to complete and support the fighting units."[12] According to these doctrinal orientations, the functions of defending the state required a much larger framework, beyond the classical military institution's structure and function. By widening the mass character of the Romanian armed forces, it planned to place all citizens able to fight "in a situation to understand and accept the huge requirements of a defensive war, thus training and educating themselves in order to bear and win these objectives; to engage in the activity of those bodies and formations which strengthen the potential and defend the territory; to cooperate, whenever necessary, with the fighting units."[13]

A valuable doctrinal idea of that period, meant to develop the Romanian concept of the armed nation was the conclusion regarding the entire people's fight for defense as a basic orientation of the new Romanian military doctrine. Thus, a document set out at the end of December 1947 showed that "planning [i.e., planning the general staff's activity] must be extended to preparing the entire people for defence."[14] By elaborating this concept, the groundwork for a basic orientation of the Romanian military doctrine was laid, which was to be officially legalized because, as the same document mentioned, "the broad activity for generally preparing the people belongs to the government which, by its planning, is meant to educate citizens, to give to the Army citizens prepared from all points of view (morally, physically, intellectually, technically etc.)."[15] According to this, the entire people's training was based on the valuable doctrinal idea that "each citizen, irrespective of age or sex, and every material or machine must have his/its well-defined place and role in making the armed nation work from the first moments of mobilization."[16] Therefore, the ideas regarding the need to prepare the entire population for war were, at that time, an important step in establishing a national military doctrine.

The doctrinal activity that materialized during the 1945-1947 period promoted valuable ideas on the correlation between economic and technical

development of the country and strengthening its defensive capability. The technical and material development of the country's defensive capacity was imposed by the nature and requirements of a potential future war and by the contents and structure of the national defensive system and by the army's role and structure. "The Army's new structure undoubtedly requires," the Romanian military doctrine experts said, "more modern equipment (vehicles, heavy weapons, communications)."[17]

The doctrinal provisions of those times indicated and studied realistic conclusions on the role, structure, and features of the country's national defense system. Starting from the experience of August 1944, it planned for "difficult moments when the whole population would be transformed into a huge camp in which men, and even women, old people and children are being trained and prepared for a potential conflict."[18] The extremely wide social framework, for those times, of this national system for training the population was to be structured and diversified so that "all people able to fight and capable of acting in a certain direction be previously trained for. . . the activity of those bodies and formations which improve the potential" for defending the country.[19]

Three categories of formations, special units, and bodies were planned for the organizational structure of the people's fighting forces. The first category was made up of formations that included "all working people able to have a direct influence, by their work, on maintaining the war potential, and, at the same time, to defend their own institution."[20] The second category was made up of "special units having the task of defending the territory at the rear of the operational army."[21] Finally, the third category included "formations for maintaining and repairing damaged facilities [as] trained reserves centers."[22]

Much importance was given to the doctrinal ideas concerning "the Army's role and task in the new developing Romanian society," as mentioned in a document issued by the general staff in August 1945. It also stated that the evolution of the Romanian state during that period "implies a new army, based on the Romanian people's main virtues and representing a real armed force because of the lessons learnt from the war and in accordance with the future requirements."[23]

Starting from such an advanced point of view, deeply anchored in reality, the defensive, unaggressive nature of the state's external function was mentioned because "the Romanian people will never use the Army

except for defending its borders and, at the same time, its independence freedom and its democratic rights."[24]

Considerations on the Doctrine of the Entire People's War During the Socialist Revolution and Construction in Romania (1948-1965)

During the years of socialist revolution and construction, the problem of defending the homeland—an integral, inseparable part of the revolutionary process—acquired a new content, resulting from the thorough changes that took place in all domains in Romania. Achievment of full power by the working class, in alliance with the working peasantry and other categories of the working people, and the passing to the stage of socialist construction earmarked the implementation of thorough structural and conceptual changes in the military and posed new and complex problems to the Party and state leadership in the domain of military politics and practices.[25] According to view of the Romanian Communist party, the military problems of the country were completely and variously analyzed, and took into account not only on area of the army or another, but the problem of defending the country as a whole.

Keeping in step with the socialist change in the country, the military was to be placed on more solid economic, social, political and ideological bases. Its structure, contents, and activity had to become more responsive to the new realities of socialist construction. That is why the general guidelines for developing the army in accordance with its role in Romanian society was made a central point in the Party's activity. In this request, in 1948, the Sixth Congress of the Romanian Communist party stated that "for our deeply pacifist country and for its people, the army, being in the service of strengthening the People's Republic, is the defender of the democratic achievements of our people and the defender of our independence and sovereignty . . . . No sacrifice is too great for us when referring to the army or its needs. We want to see it well-equipped, well-dressed, well-fed, and perfectly trained . . . . A shield for the interests of the people and of the People's Republic of Romania, a school for the people—this is how we see the task of the army in the People's Republic of Romania."[26]

In the Party's outlook, the new changes that were to be made in the military institutions of the country had to be carried out within the

existing army. The socialist type changes in the army were not to halt, under any circumstances, the continuity in the Romanian army's activity and life. By carrying out these transformations, the valuable military ideas accumulated in the Romanian people's long existence were to be maintained but they acquired a new content, being developed on a scientific basis.

As the leading force of the country and the struggle for creating a new society, the Party also exerted its leading role in the complex process of socialist remodeling the army. The new stage in army problems of great theoretical and practical importance and their solution implied the need to ensure and strengthen the entire army's leadership by the Party and to establish management forms and methods in accordance with the new political and social framework of Romania. This was the reason for the institution of a proper organizational system by turning the General Inspectorate of the Army for Education into the Army Higher Political Department (AHPD)—the central body for conducting political and party activity in the army, led by the Central Committee of the Party.

In order to ensure the Party's direct control over the army, many Party activists with important responsibilities in the Central Committee, were appointed to key positions in the military hierarchy. In this respect, one of the most important moments was the appointment, in 1950, of the present president of Socialist Romania—then then distinguished activist of the Party—to the function of deputy minister of the armed forces and chief of the Army Higher Superior Political Department as a general, in which positions he functioned until 1954. This was of great importance for developing and strengthening the Romanian army.

The chief of the AHPD of that period made his contribution in developing the military doctrine for defending the homeland by the entire people's war and in materializing the concept of the army's sociopolitical role and functions in the period of socialist revolution and construction. By this, the main function of the army was to defend the working people's achievements and Romania's national independence and sovereignty, as well as contributing to the building of the new society, fullfilling the cultural revolution, and developing education and science. "The army," the president of Romania later said, "took an active party not in general, but concretely, in villages, enterprises and quarters as well, in the whole activity of revolutionary changes of the society and thus it blended with

our nation's general interests and represents a powerful force in the development of socialism in defending the revolutionary achievements, independence and sovereignty of the country."[27]

Great stress was placed on the ideas and conclusions that referred to the unity between the army and the people in strengthening the defense capacity of the country. In the view of the AHPD's chief, the main source of the army's strength was "its unshakable relation with the people, its firm belief in the people."[28]

A major coordinate for the 1948-1965 military doctrine was the orientation and activity for developing the military system of the country. Within this system, the army had the decisive role, so it was modernized and equipped with ever-sufficient products of modern technology. The complete motorization of the army was completed. The new equipment critically influenced organizational structure of the army. Important changes were made in unit organization, and proportions between various services were revised. The new doctrinal orientations of the armed forces' structure resulted in the following: the army, aeronautics, the navy, border guards, and the Internal Ministry forces, as well as an organization based on military regions, territorial centers, and garrison command.[29]

In the years of building the socialist society, the doctrinal orientation of preparing the population for defending the homeland was given a great importance by the Party and state. In 1956, therefore, the Central Committee and the government decided to reestablish the workers' guards as "combat units to ensure self-defense of entreprises, as well as helping the state bodies in defending order against the counterrevoltionary elements which would try to jeopardize the working people's achievements."[30] Along with their domestic function, the workers' guards were to make their contribution in strengthening the defense capacity of the homeland. As such, the organization and training of the workers guards were coordinated with that of the army, being centrally led. Between 1956 and 1961, the workers' guards had an important role in combat and specialty training, strengthening the defense capacity of the homeland. Starting in 1961, they temporarily ceased their activity, and were later established on new principles and bases.

During the years of socialist revolution and construction, the problem of creating and training officers was solved, selecting the bringing to the army many Party and mass organizations activists. These were people

highly trained and experienced from the political point of view, good leaders, able to learn how to fight. The solution was also achieved by promoting many NCOs—who answered all conditions for and deserved such a promotion, by military education of massive proportions for officers coming from the working people, and by reeducating those officers of the old regime how showed attachment to the new order, people, and homeland. Thus, a socially and politically homogeneous body of officers was created, unitary with the mass of soldiers.

The period in which changes took place was also marked by shortcomings and errors, some of them inherent to development, others due to the lack of sufficient experience, but some of them had a wider social and historical background. For an important period of time, the progressive experience and traditions of our people and country had not been taken into account; forms and methods had been mechanically copied from other countries and had not corresponded to typical and concrete conditions of our country. The state military force, for example, was represented almost exclusively by the regular army; attempts to enlarge it with workers' guards, local defense formations, and so on had been limited to a few stages. No indigenous basis for the logistic support of the armed forces had been developed; imports were predominated. There were inadequate studies of a typical pattern for a defensive war on which to train Romania's armed forces. Debates at different levels from 1945 to 1947, and even after that, concerning national military doctrine had been neither thoroughly studied nor made concrete.

In spite of such shortcomings and difficulties, qualitative change of the Romanian army was ensured, as well as its organization on a socialist basis, its organic connection to the people and its supreme interests, and its training and education on millenary fighting traditions of the Romanian people for defending the ancient territory and the homeland's territorial independence and sovereignty. Parallel with this, the modernization of logistics and improvement of the organizational structure continued according to the requirements of modern war techniques and needs, in order to ensure greater flexibility, striking power and to strengthen the forces against enemy capabilities. Referring to the fullfillment of the main goal of Romanian military though and practice, the president of Socialist Romania said: "In the years of socialist construction, the Party and the State created and educated a new type of army, which has no other

interests except devotedly serving the nation, an army boundlessly attached to the cause of socialism and peace—an unshakable shield for the motherland's independence and sovereignty."[31]

CHAPTER 9

THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY—AN EPOCH-MAKING EVENT IN ROMANIAN MILITARY THINKING AND PRACTICE CONCERNING THE HOMELAND'S DEFENSE

The Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party— An Event of Historic Significance for the Strenthening of the Country's Independence and Sovereignty

The Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist party, a turning point of deep significance in the life of the Romanian people, provided for a new mode of theoretically approaching and practically resolving the fundamental problems of the country's socioeconomic development. The creative sociopolitical thinking and action promoted in Romania after 1965 relied on thorough knowledge of contemporary Romanian realities, on a constant adaptation of envisaged solutions to the specific conditions in the country, and on a realistic assessment of the Romanian nation's resources, potential aspirations, and its historical past.

From the very beginning, the development of the Romanian state along the lines traced by the Ninth Party Congress was characterized by new principles of socioeconomic organization and management, noteworthy among which is our Party and state's inalienable right to self-reliantly decide upon its own political line. A constant assertion of this principle meant not only a huge stride forward in Romanian political

thinking, but also a substantial contribution to world political theory and practice. Contemporary political practice has proved the inalienable and unimpeachable rights of each Communist party to independently decide all the problems related to societal progress and to be the main source of energy that imparts a viable and realistic character to any social development program. It is here that the truth concerning the incontestable primacy of social practice, the source of any theory, as well as its ultimate factor that either confirms or denies it, resides. "The way each party fulfills its tasks," our Party and state leader showed, "cannot be a disputed issue; it is each party's exclusive right to self-reliantly work out its political line and forms and methods of activity, to set its own targets. . . ."[1]

After the congress, the principle of national independence has always been in the focus of our Party and state's entire activity. The country's constitution, adopted in August 1965, stipulates that the Socialist Republic of Romania is a sovereign, independent, and unitary state, whose territory is inalienable and indivisible.

This scientific, deeply realistic outlook, that has been asserted ever since the year years of the new historic era, is a permanent feature of the history of the Romanian people, who has always been its own master and firmly rejected any interference in its own life. The strength of this theoretical and practical openness was imparted by a number of factors, noteworthy among which are: the capacity of socialist Romania's Party and state leadership to approach complex historical situations in an original, creative manner; the imperative need to set the Romanian people's historical tradition on corresponding foundations; the imperative of fully capitalizing on national resources and our people's creative power, in keeping with its own choices so that, in a relatively short historical period, the economic gap with the advanced states may be bridged; and the Romanian people's unflinching will to secure socialist Romania's independent and sovereign development and to preserve the unity of its ancient hearth.

In line with this fundamental political choice, our Party and state initiated a comprehensive program for economic and social development, administrative-territorial reorganization, establishment of scientific bases to underlie production and work, and the application of new criteria to assess economic efficiency. As an outcome of this strategy, which was clearly formulated by the Ninth Party Congress and then further developed and improved by the congresses that followed it, Romania has

turned into an industrial-agrarian country boasting a well-developed, modern industry and an advanced agriculture. It was this extensive effort that gave Romania its own production capacity that eliminates possible pressures from the outside, which might have negative implications for its independence. Furthermore, the strong industrial production base built after 1965 enables the Romanian state to take comprehensive actions to weaken the influence of the negative factors at work in the world market that repeatedly diminished its possibilities of fully asserting its independence in the past.

It is socialist Romania's view that the remarkable achievements in the implementation of the program for the country's socioeconomic development are the foremost guarantee of consolidated national independence and of the homeland's greater defense capacity. Today, Romania's economy is a solid entity, firmly committed to the revolution in science and technology, which offers certain development prospects to national defense production. "We must be fully aware that by implementing the program for our homeland's socioeconomic development we strengthen the people's combat force and capacity and offer it conditions to fight in defense of its independence, to reject any act of imperialist aggression and fulfill its commitments in all circumstances," President Nicolae Ceaușescu said.[2]

The measures taken after the Ninth Party Congress for the improvement of social relations and the strengthening of the unity of will and action of the whole nation, of all working people, irrespective of their nationality, were of paramount importance for the constant assertion of national independence and sovereignty and for the continuous strengthening of the homeland's defense capacity. The full equality of rights guaranteed to all the country's citizens, the improvement of the democratic framework that provides for the working people's participation in running the society, the permanent dialogue between the Party and state leadership and the masses of working people, and the extensive social debates on major normative acts and of all the problems related to home and foreign policy bespeak the strength of the contemporary Romanian society and are the pillars that will halt any attempt against socialist Romania's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

The process of consolidating the Romanian state's independence necessarily covered problems related to national defense. The command of the

armed forces and of people's defense formations by the country's constitutional bodies, which the people elected, is a palpable expression of national independence and sovereignty. Other fundamental problems concerning national defense, such as those referring to the state's military doctrine, the level and deployment of the armed forces in the territory, the structure of the army, the system of training and educating the troops, weapons and combat technique, cooperation with the other socialist countries, and the fulfillment of military commitments are the themes of decisions made by higher Party and state forums.

The Romanian state's foreign policy, which is closely correlated with its home policy, aims at ensuring an external framework to favor the accomplishment of the Romanian people's constructive work and to warrant the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Socialist Republic of Romania. It is the Romanian state's view that the nation's advance on the road of progress and prosperity calls for the full assertion of its rights to exercise all its sovereign attributes and to control all the country's riches and freely decide upon their use.

Setting its foreign relations and entire international political activity on the principles of the full equality of rights, respect for national independence and sovereignty, noninterference in domestic affairs, and renunciation of the use and threat of force, socialist Romania has always carried on a many-sided, sustained international activity, which, from the very beginning, has been aimed at ensuring a productive collaboration among nations in a climate of peace and security.

A keen analysis of the changes wrought in the world and an understanding of world trends have enabled socialist Romania to work out its own strategy of political action in the international arena, which envisages ways and means that are indispensable to the insurance of every people's independent and peaceful development. Owing to the initiatives and solutions set forth after the Ninth Party Congress, Romania has become an active factor in international life and its constructive stance has been fully acknowledged and appreciated. In the last twenty years, our country has advanced and backed solutions to secure peace, put an end to the arms race (the nuclear arms race first), achieved a passage to firm disarmament measures, and cut back on foreign troops and military bases in the territories of other states. Firmly declaring for negotiations and for the elimination of dicates from international life, Romania considers that the peaceful

settlement of international differences is the sole acceptable and rational conduct which favors the resolution of conflicts. "A lasting collaboration among peoples," the president of socialist Romania pointed out, "calls more than ever before for the complete renunciation of the policy of force, of interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Today, issues can no longer be solved through the use and threat of force. All governments and peoples ought to understand that their freedom and happiness depend on respect for the others' freedom, independence and happiness."[3]

In light of the principles of its policy of friendship and collaboration with the socialist states, with the developing countries, and with all the states of the world, irrespective of their social systems, Romania has repeatedly set forth its stand on military issues, national defense, and military coalitions. It is our state's view that the dissolution of military blocs would go down as a decisive step toward disarmament and peace. Romania considers the concommitant dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as an act that will open numerous prospects for real and durable peace for mankind. Furthermore, Romania believes that, as long as conditions are not in place for the dissolution of military blocs, it should concern itself with strengthening its defense capacity and cooperate with the Warsaw Treaty countries in the military area, placing emphasis on the observance of the principles of full equality of rights, independence and sovereignty, equitable mutual assistance, and mutual advantage. In the years since the Ninth Party Congress, Romania has constantly asserted its sovereignty and independence in the field of national defense. The development of collaboration among the armies participating in the Warsaw Treaty should, according to Romania's view, proceed according to the principles underlying the links among the socialist countries and in line with the treaties in force.

With the aforesaid targets and principles as a guide, socialist Romania does not confine its military collaboration to its relatons with the partner states in the Warsaw Treaty, but promotes a policy aimed at expanding its links with the countries that state and work for the observance of the principles of all peoples' independence and sovereignty and in defense of world peace.

The consolidation and safeguarding of the country's independence, one of the major goals that was set by the Ninth Congress and further developed by the resolutions endorsed by subsequent congresses, are lawlike

prerequisities for our homeland's progress and civilization and for its growing defense capacity.

A New Outlook on the Country's Socioeconomic Development—A Decisive Factor in Originally Approaching and Solving National Defense Problems

The Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist party, a crucial event in Romania's contemporary history that opened further prospects to the Romanian people's advance on the road of progress and civilization, ushered in a new historical stage characterized by social renewal in all parts of Romanian society and in military thinking and practice too. The complex activity the Party and state leadership initiated and carried out in this stage, with a view to continuously strengthening the homeland's defense capacity, resulted in a growing national defense potential so that the Romanian people boasts today all the necessary forces and means to defend the homeland's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.

The Romanian people's millenary history proves that there has always been a close interdependence between the fight for safeguarding the homeland's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and the struggle for a renewing transformation of society. The dialectics of contemporary social progress in Romania fully confirmed the correctness of the Romanian Communist party's outlook on the intensive, many-sided development of the Romanian society, as the Romanian people's outstanding achievements on the road of building the multilaterally developed socialist society are a direct outcome of the impetuous growth of the production forces. Their current level and complexity, in full accord with the norms of the world revolution in science and technology, are the fruit of a process-like evolution that is competently organized and managed.

The victorious anti-Fascist and anti-imperialist revolution of social and national liberation of August 1944 opened a new era in Romania's contemporary history, spanning a relatively short historical interval, when our country has covered several strategic stages of socioeconomic development, turning from a poorly developed agrarian-industrial society into a multifacted, developed socialist society.

In this process, the Ninth Party Congress changed the outlook on development, set new, highly promising guidelines for the homeland's many-sided

progress, and opened the way to the assertion of militant spirit, creative thinking, and action. A new manner of approaching and solving the fundamental problems of national defense was initiated in close collaboration with developments in science and technology.

The highly complex character of the tactical and strategic targets set by the Party leadership in the new historical stage imperatively called for the country's continuous industrialization and the development of all industrial branches on the bais of the latest gains in science and technology. This deeply realistic, fundamental option of economic policy, which stemmed from thorough knowledge of the laws of social development and of specific historical, domestic, and international conditions, provided for an unparalled expansion of the country's economic strength. Over the 1966-1985 period, industrial production increased more than six times, being 100 times larger at present than in 1944; and farm output rose roughly two-and-a-half times, seven times more than in 1944. In the same period, the national income grew more than fourfold to be thirty-two times higher now than in 1944. These results were made possible by the policy of stepped-up development of the technical and material base. The promotion of a sustained investment rate—from 330.8 thousand million lei in the five-year plan period spanning 1961-1965 to 1,200 thousand million lei over 1981-1985—led to the commissioning of more than 8,500 new industrial units in the 1965-1985 interval, which also meant millions of new jobs. Demonstrating the current strength of the Romanian industry is the fact that 90 to 95 percent of the requirements for machinery, equipment, and installations to serve investments are met from home production.

The process of industrialization was expanded on the basis of a high, rationally sized rate of accumulation. Applying this strategy, along with the gains in science and technology, in the last twenty years, the Romanian state has allotted more than one-third of the national income to accumulation, which resulted in the creation of a modern national economy that boasts a strong technical and production potential, the surmounting of the serious difficulties entailed by the world economic crisis, and in the unswerving implementation of the program for the building of the developed socialist society.

The proportional distribution of the forces of production in all counties and localities, according to socioeconomic, political, and military criteria

related to the requirements for building a harmoniously developed, modern economic complex, has made a direct contribution to the strengthening of the homeland's defense potential. As an outcome of the development of industry, agriculture, and other branches of material production by territorial units, at present every county turns out a per capita output worth at least 70,000 lei. With this as a basis, all localities boast a strong production potential and ever better living conditions for all working people; and requirements are made for every citizen's direct participation in both the effort for socialist construction and the safeguarding of national independence and sovereignty, within the unitary construction-defense process.

At the end of the process of socialist transformation of agriculture, a unitary socialist economy was built in Romania. Agriculture—the second most important branch of the national economy—is undergoing an intense process of modernization on the basis of the latest gains in science and technology, and produces at present roughly seven times more than it did in 1945, which bespeaks the industrial-agrarian strength of the Romanian economy.

In consideration of the masses' decisive role in social development, the Party substantiated and has been promoting a unitary, comprehensive outlook on the need for the people's purposeful, organized participation in the vast work of building the new type of society on highly democratic bases. By virtue of socialist democracy, society is run by a people that is a free master of its destiny. This fundamental principle also led to the creation in Romania of an organizational framework that harmoniously blends direct with representative democracy and the exigencies of centralized scientific management with those of the masses' direct involvement in the making, adoption, and application of decisions concerning the implementation of the Romanian state's domestic and foreign policy. Placed at the core of this democratic system are the principles of worker self-management, its material support, and economic and financial self-administration. All this allows the working people to take an active part in discussing and making decisions, in appropriately administering the part of the national wealth that has been entrusted to them, in continuously improving the economic and social life as a whole, and in boosting the country's defense potential.

In the new historical stage, the role of the socialist state as a major instrument in the unitary planning, organization, and management of all

socioeconomic activities, according to the national plan, has been enhanced. The Romanian state has turned into one of revolutionary worker democracy, which tellingly expresses the essence of political power in society. The relationship between the state and the other components of the country's political system has improved, and its role has increased in fulfilling the targets related to the homeland's many-sided progress on the road of socialism.

In the process of revolutionarily changing the Romanian society, more particularly after the Ninth Congress, a political, social, and economic foundation was laid for the assertion and full guarantee of democratic rights and freedoms and for the true realization of equality of all working people, irrespective of their nationality. Following the eradication of the country's economic, social, and cultural backwardness, the national question was solved in Romania on how to provide, *de jure* and *de facto*, for full equality of rights of all the country's citizens and to offer equal opportunities for the assertion of their personality, for the strengthening of the whole people's political and moral cohesion.

Consistent with the political choices made more than two decades ago, the Thirteenth Congress of the Romanian Communist party, held in November 1984, marked Romania's passage to the third stage of the program for building the multilaterally developed socialist society in this country and its advance to communism. The attainment of the strategic target set for this stage calls for an intensive development of the forces of production, the further improvement of production and social relations, and the rise in the quality of work and life in all economic and social areas.

The Romanian people's entire activity in the five-year plan period spanning the period 1986-1990 and beyond, until the year 2000, focuses on the consolidation of the achievements that have been scored, the strengthening of Romania's position as a moderately developed country, and the passage to a new, higher stage in its socioeconomic development as prerequisites for the consolidation of the homeland's defense capacity. By the year 2000, Romania will have turned into a developed socialist society in industry, agriculture, education, science and culture, and the people's general living and civilizations standards.

Profound Changes in Romanian Military Thinking and Practice

In line with the structural changes wrought in Romania in the last two decades and in the process of building the developed socialist society, Romanian military thinking and practice have shown unparalled dynamism. National military power was deeply restructured as a result of the application of a package of correlated and coordinated measures that imparted further dimensions to the country's defense capacity. In synthesis, these measures refer to the creation of a legislative framework for the organization of national defense, the setting-up of the national defense system, the rise in the level and quality of the armament and combat equipment of all the forces within the national defense system (of which most are produced by the national industry), the betterment of the organizational structures of the army, the improvement in the content and methodology of the process of training and educating the troops, and the expansion of cooperation between the army and the other components of the national defense system and their joint training.

A highly important guideline, integrated into the complex process of building the new system, was the reshaping of the country's military body and the creation of a people's army set on the new principles of social organization and management. A new socially and ideologically homogeneous body of cadres was created, and the foundations were laid for a modern system of troop education and training.

The constant, creative capitalizing on the Romanian people's glorious traditions of fighting for freedom and independence in the process of organizing and preparing national defense—an orientation set by our Party and state leader—was of outstanding significance for the progress of Romanian military thinking and practice after 1965. The supreme commander of the armed forces showed that, for a long time, little account had been taken in the military area and in the activities aimed at increasing the homeland's defense capacity of our forefathers' advanced experience and traditions of combat. Forms and methods originating in other countries, which met neither local realities and the specifics of the people's historical development nor its requirments, had been mechancially copied.

In this context, which implied all the areas of socialist revolution and construction, military thinking and practice were broken off from their

true sources of strength and vitality, a rich experience validated by a millenium-old past that spelled out theoretical and practical teachings of great value for the strengthening of the homeland's defense capacity in the contemporary era. The mechanical espousal and application of foreign doctrinal and strategic outlooks, which often disagreed with socialist Romania's and international realities and dwarfed the development prospects of its military power in the new historical stage diminished the creativity of national military thinking.

The new historical age ushered in after 1965 offered sociopolitical, economic, and ideological requisites for an original approach to and resolution of the fundamental problems of national defense. In this framework, the essential role devolved on the sociopolitical outlook promoted by the Romanian state leader, who determined a qualitative stride in the national military heritage owing to the orientations and solutions he had set forth in this area.

The Romanian head of state's definitive contribution to the development of national military theory and practice, which materialized in the national military doctrine, guides the optimal resolution of the problems related to the strengthening of the homeland's defense capacity, in line with the requirements of the dynamics of contemporary domestic and international realities. The current Romanian military doctrine incorporates, in a unitary outlook, the aims, targets, modalities, organizational instruments, means, and solutions referring to the safeguarding of the homeland's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

The originality of the national military doctrine finds support in the promotion of such fundamental principles as: (1) the indissoluble unity between the work of building the new system and the strengthening of the homeland's defense capacity; (2) the social character of the homeland's defense function; (3) the organization, training, equipment, and command of the national defense system in keeping with the Romanian people's fundamental interests; (4) the inalienable rights of the country's constitutional bodies to make decisions on the employment of Romania's armed forces, and to run the whole national defense system; and (5) military collaboration, on an equal footing, with all the socialist countries and with other states, irrespective of their social system.

The unity of the construction-defense work includes the correlation between the socioeconomic development level of the Romanian society

as a whole and the strengthening of the country's military power. This relationship leads to the conclusion that the homeland's defense is an integral part of the process of building the multilaterally developed socialist society, a true cause and work of the whole people. Underscoring the coherence of that process, Romania's president said, "the more numerous the successes in the building of the multilaterally developed socialist society on the economic, social, cultural and political planes and in the development of democracy, the firmer our whole people's determination to defend everything it has achieved, the homeland, its independence."[4]

By virtue of this principle, the homeland's defense capacity is a result of all the country's material, technical, scientific, demographic, moral, and other potentialities that can be mobilized to safeguard its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, science, and the capacity to prepare them in time of peace and to capitalize on them at high efficiency levels in a state of conflict. Our state's constant concern for the maintenance of a high defense capacity is objectively determined by the current stage of the world system, the dynamics of relations, and the expansion of contradictions within that system. Socialist construction takes place in complex international circumstances, when the policy of force, military conflicts, wars, and the threat of a world war are being maintained. "In like conditions," the country's president pointed out, "socialist Romania has the duty to take every measure to boost its defense capacity, organize, train, and equip the army, so that in all circumstances it may be able to fulfill its sacred duty to the people, to defend its revolutionary gains, its independence and sovereignty."[5]

This doctrinal orientation evinces the need to continuously follow and analyze international political and military developments and changes in military methods in use throughout the world, especially those that might be employed against the Socialist Republic of Romania. It is also necessary to rapidly grasp the modifications incurred in this area on an international plane so as to develop modalities for counteracting everything that might be used against our country and efficient solutions, according to our own interests, needs, and possibilities, for shaping the content and methodology of the training of troops and of the people's defense formations.

The dynamism of Romania's socioeconomic complex and its capability to maintain its growth at relatively constant levels—despite the influence of the numerous negative and crisis phenomena that confront the world

economy—provided for the implementation, in the last twenty years, of a comprehensive program to increas the contribution of the national industry to equipping the armed forces and the people's defense formations with weapons and other materiel. All this has diminished the hard currency effort needed to purchase defense means and has enhanced our self-sufficiency in this area of vital importance for the whole people's capacity to give an armed riposte to a possible act of aggression.

One of the basic principles that underlies the problems related to national defense is that the fight against an act of imperialistic aggression and the safeguarding of revolutionary gains and the country's independence can only be the work of the whole Romanian people that, if need be, must rise as a single body to defend its revolutionary achievements and independence and its right to a free life. The whole people's participation in the homeland's defense is not confined to its quantitative determination alone; it also implies numerous qualitative conditions. All this reflects on the changes that occurred and will occur in the country's socioeconomic development, in the population's socioprofessional structures, in societal organization, in the molding of the new man (a builder and defender of the homeland), in the assertin of the nation's creative potential, and in the continuous strengthening of its unity and cohesion.

The new manner of approaching and solving the problems of national defense, which was promoted after the Ninth Party Congress, took to a higher plane the knowledge of and capitalization on the Romanian people's advanced traditions in the fight for social and national liberation and the process of revitalizing the Romanian nation's self-consciousness, which is called for on a broader plane. A retrospect of the last two decades points to the cardinal importance of the orientations referring to the critical analysis of the authentic assets in our people's combatant past and their integration into the content of the current Romanian military thinking and practice. According to the outlook on the content, motive power, and coodinates of national military history, the process of turning the Romanian people's traditions of fight to advantage has developed powerfully.

The Romanian outlook on the homeland's defense places the concerns for this essential goal in direct relationship with the conclusions drawn from a realistic assessment of the implications of the revolution in science and technology for the country's defense potential and with the evolution

of the contemporary military phenomenon. This process also calls for knowledge of the latest gains in science and technology, in world military thinking and experience, as well as for their utilization.

The approach to and the clarification of the complex problems of national defense, in close correlation with sociopolitical and economic realities in socialist Romania and international developments, with the essence and features of the contemporary military phenomenon, guarantee the full assertion of the innovative spirit and confer on the Romanian outlook on national defense a strong anticipatory power, the capacity to foresee the evolution of military processes and phenomena, and to make choices and promote realistic, highly efficient solutions for the strengthening of the homeland's defense capacity.

Just as in all areas of activity, the Ninth Party Congress was a landmark in the field of defense too, as it meant a definitive break with the immobilism of the previous stages and the start of a period of effervescence and original creation in Romanian military thinking and practice.

CHAPTER 10

THE CURRENT ROMANIAN DOCTRINAL OUTLOOK ON NATIONAL DEFENSE

Content, Aspects and Particular Features of the National Military Doctrine

To defend the ancient land, its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity has always been a fundamental and priceless virtue of the Romanians. Since the time of the first centralized and independent Dacian state and, then, for more than two millenia, the Romanian people had waged fierce fights against numerous foreign invaders. The idea of independence and sovereignty has always been the most salient feature of the Romanian past and present, which are intertwined in an indestructible continuity.[1]

Romanian history shows that the people have never been warlike, on the contrary, they were peaceful, boasting a highly constructive vocation in the economic, political, and spiritual realms. With good reason and vested pride, Nicolae Bălcescu said, "The Romanians have never been for wars of expansion . . . and most of their wars, though offensive, were politically defensive."[2]

Finally capitalizing on the major teachings of national and world history and considering the specific realities in socialist Romania, as well as the conclusions from a many-sided analysis of the international situation, after the Ninth Party Congress, our Party and state leader worked out a

novel, unitary view on the country's defense and came up with a national military doctrine.

Socialist Romania's military doctrine is a harmonious package of ideas, theses, and principles that our socialist state has adopted; it includes the totality of its options on the organization, equipment, training and management of the forces and means intended for defense of the homeland.

The ideas and guidelines of the present Romanian military doctrine are contained in the Romanian Communist party's program, the Romanian president's theoretical work, and the documents of Party congresses and national conferences and are also enshrined in the country's constitution, the Law for National Defense Organization in the Socialist Republic of Romania, the supreme commander's directives concerning the military and political training of the army, and the resolutions of the Defense Council and other normative acts.

The military theory thought out by our Party and state leader creatively integrates past and present gains, and traces new lines of action for the development of the national defense system in keeping with the Romanian people's fundamental aspirations, with its psychological and moral traits and its experience of millenary combat as it relates to the requirements of modern military art. The Romanian president's work, rooted in contemporary Romanian and world realities, contains a coherent whole of reflections and conclusions on questions of national defense, such as: the general and particular features of wars in the contemporary age and ways of preventing them; the legal character of the just wars of national and social liberation and of rejection of foreign aggression; the illicit nature of the wars of aggression, spoliation, and invasion of other states and peoples and the illegal character of the results of such aactions; the objective necessity of strengthening the homeland's defense capacity; the economic, political, legal and moral content of the outlook on the homeland's defense; and the deciding role of economic and material factors in enhancing the defense potential.

It also considers the evolution of the human-technology relationship in light of the contemporary revolution in science and technology and its impact on weapons and other combat equipment; the growing role of the subjective, conscious factor in combat; the organization principles and the role and missions of the armed forces; the structure of the national defense system and the ways of improving its operation; the inalienable

right of the country's constitutional bodies to make decisions conerning the training and employment of Romania's armed forces; and the principles underlying military collaboration with Warsaw Treaty countries and with other states, irrespective of their social system.

The Romanian president's political and military views as a whole and each of the theses attest to the originality of the Romanian view on questions related to national defense. The ways and means to put them into practice prove that to guarantee the Romanian people's peaceful work and the homeland's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity are fundamental goals.[3]

At the Tenth Congress of the Romanian Communist party, our leader formulated the concept of the whole people's war in defense of the homeland. In this way, the salient features of a possible war imposed on Romania were defined. According to this concept, which finds its roots in the national past, everything our country does in line of defense is oriented, structured, and substantiated. The decision in such a war will not be made conventionally, on the battlefield where regular armies fight each other; the Romanian people will win by placing all its resources in the service of national defense. "We believe," President Ceauşescu pointed out, "that an anti-imperialist war, a war of defense, can only be a people's war, and that victory will be won not only on the battlefield, but also through a general fight waged by the people as a whole."[4]

The major target of the doctrine concerning the whole people's struggle —national defense—is expressed by the fact that Romania does not and will never pursue aggressive goals against any state. In all circumstances, ". . . our homeland [and] the Romanian people will fight only to defend its independence and sovereignty, against any attempt at domination and oppression."[5]

To this end, instruments were created to legally sanction the actions a state of war implies. In the spirit of our constitution, the National Defense Law states that our country can be involved in a war only "in case of an act of armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Romania or against another state in which Romania is committed under international mutual defense treaties, or a situation has occurred in which the obligation to declare a state of war applies."[6]

An important place in our military doctrine is held by problems related to technical and material equipment. As an outcome of considerable development and diversification of the country's production forces, and of the

growing potential of the national economy, more modern weapons and other combat equipment are supplied to the national defense system from home production on a larger scale. The change wrought in this area is an expression of the postulate of the independence, and sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Romania and also has positive financial and hard currency effects, in line with those in the national economy as a whole.

The fundamental outlook of the homeland guides the resolution of the problems posed by the preparation of the national economy and of the territory for defense. In case of an act of aggression, the forces of production, which are primarily for peaceful purposes, should be able to quickly adapt themselves to the requirements of war. Romania's highest leadership sees to it that the economic investment channeled toward military purposes and defense spending should be kept within reasonable limits so that the country's socioeconomic development effort might not be affected.

In our military doctrine, essential importance is attached to the political and moral support granted to the people's defense-oriented training. To strengthen the fighters' political and ideological training, the home and foreign policy promoted by our Party and state should be espoused and firmly put to practice, and a sense of responsibility for the assets in the Romanian society and advanced military virtues should be cultivated. The moral and political training of the fighters should focus on patriotic education and knowledge of the Romanian people's millenium-old history as well as its fight for the assertion of its own being, social and national freedom, and independence and unity.

Romania's military doctrine is based on the fundamental principle that command of the armed forces cannot be exercised from outside; it is the sovereign attribution of our Party and state. This cardinal principle also guides the resolution of all the problems implied by national defense—by the organization, equipment, training, employment, and administration of its forces and means. No one knows the needs and best ways of organizing and ensuring our homeland's defense better than the Romanian people and the highest bodies of our Party and state. According to the principle that the Party and government are the sole leaders of the armed forces, the national supreme command and the Romanian army will unswervingly take the principles and provisions of the national military doctrine as their guide, no matter the circumstances in which they are called upon to act.

In its content and problems, the national military doctrine includes guidelines concerning Romania's military ties with all the socialist countries and with the developing countries, as well as with other states. The current Romanian doctrinal framework has provided for a great openness in the military area. So, for instance, the Romanian army's links with the armies of other countries, regardless of their system—developing, nonaligned, or capitalist—were resumed and have been developing, as an efficient way of lessening asperities and suspicions and of restoring a better international climate. The national military doctrine distinguishes itself because of its unitary character in its ideological and political grounds and aims. It is an open, dynamic system that includes in its content everything that is new in national and world political and military thinking and practice.

The Whole People's War for the Homeland's Defense in the Current Romanian Military Doctrine

The fundamental aim of the Romanian state's military power organically determines the kind of counterstroke to a possible act of imperialist aggression. The current Romanian military doctrine sanctions a fundamental principle by which Romania will oppose any act of foreign aggression by making an overall military effort, employing its entire material and human potential at the highest levels of efficiency. This principle shows that socialist Romania will safeguard its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity through a war of defense to be waged by the people as a whole. The whole people's war will be an expression of the Romanian people's determination to live in freedom, to fully master its destiny, and to build its present and future according to its freely expressed wishes and aspirations.

The legitimate political and ethical character of the whole people's participation in the country's defense is fully substantiated in our military doctrine and finds solid grounds in the Romanian people's millennium-old history. "Both at the time of the centralized Dacian state founded by Burebista in the first century before our era and in the flourishing epoch of Decebalus' Dacian society and then for two millennia," Romania's president said, "our people had to wage fierce fights for the formation and safeguarding of its own being, its national entity."[7]

Specific geographic and geostrategic conditions fostered the Romanians' concerns for original solutions to narrow the gap between their own and any, forces and materiel. "The Romanians," said Nicolae Bălcescu, "waged defensive war, seen as a part of the strategy or the policy of war, with the greatest perfection."[8] From time immemorial, the science of the war of defense with the Romanians made for an efficient form of resistance. It was against the background of this permanent political and strategic outlook that the struggle was fought to defend the Romanians' national being, starting with the great kings Burebista and Decebalus and continuing with those fought by the great Romanian princes in the following ages. Although concepts and practical solutions fluctuated, they developed markedly in the period of revolutionary effevescence of 1848 and had positive effects on the independence war of 1877-1878, as well as on the war waged over 1916 through 1918 for the accomplishment of national unity.

In the interwar period, more particularly in the years prior to World War II, discussions were resumed on the principle of the armed nation, and a number of modalities were developed to extensively involve the population in the preparation and unfolding of defensive actions. A series of legal regulations sanctioned activities aimed at the youth's training prior to their military service, the creation of nonpermanent units, including inhabitants of the area at the western border and women's growing participation in military activities. Owing to the social and political conditions of the time, these measures were applied timidly and many of them remained mere designs.

Highly original features were added to the outlook on defense through the whole people's participation by the working class and socialist movement in Romania for which the people's general arming was the most democratic form of defense. The position of the socialist movement was consolidated by the Romanian Communist party, founded in 1921, which, from the very beginning, developed a truly national military thinking to favor the attainment of the Romanian people's lofty aspirations to social justice and national independence. Communists documents spelled out the need to guarantee the homeland's defense by arming the people as a whole. In their outlook, the national military power had to include permanent and nonpermanent forces to jointly make real the principle of armed nation.[9]

At present, the core of the ideas in our national military doctrine is the concept of the whole people's war, which is seen as the only viable solution for Romania to be able to successfully defend itself. The whole people's war, to which our country would resort in case of an act of aggression of any kind, outlines pattern of "the aggressor's army against the whole people which, organized in permanent military structures and armed groups of the population, defends itself." This model shows that, from the very beginning, the aggressor's armed forces will come up against the whole people, organized in specific defensive forms. In Romanian doctrinal outlook, the whole people's war is defined as a military, political, ideological, economic, and diplomatic riposte against any aggressor to defend Romania.

The right to self-defense, which the Romanian people have asserted since time immemorial and which is internationally acknowledged and sanctioned by the UN Charter acquires further dimensions today from contemporary Romanian and world realities.[10] The economic, social, and political changes wrought in Romania foster goals that are qualitatively superior to those of the past and make of the defensive war waged by the whole people the most just form of counterattack in the Romanian people's history.

CHAPTER 11

THE CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF ROMANIA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE SYSTEM

The Structure of the National Defense System

Socialist Romania's national defense is a complex process that functionally integrates many elements that either manage or are managed, as well as forces and means with a specific organization and specific purposes. To a large extent, its efficiency depends on the structure of these elements, the level of their operational capacity, their nature and quantitative and qualitative value, the ratios between military and nonmilitary elements, and between permanent and nonpermanent elements. Furthermore, it heavily depends on the flexibility of the structure and its capacity to adapt to the changes wrought in the country's socioeconomic development, to the transformations entailed by the world revolution in science and technology, as well as by the continuous improvement of the training of combat forces in line with the geoclimatic particularities of the national territory.

The need to find an optimal solution to the question of the country's defense against any act of aggression, which is a major concern of our Party and state leadership, led to the establishment of the national defense system—an instrument to put into practice the Romanian state's fundamental outlook and political, military, and economic principles for safeguarding socialist Romania's independence and sovereignty. This system—

an expression of a modern outlook on the preparation and waging of the defense fight—also reflects a traditional Romanian view of the homeland's defense by the whole people.

Ideas on the need for a defense system boasting a marked national character and serving the Romanian people's interests and aspirations were set forth in the past as well. Naturally, the significance of the contemporary Romanian doctrine cannot be ascribed to the notions of past systems. However, the fact is that the military system conceived of and institutionalized in various stages in our national history was highly comprehensive and envisaged the involvement in defenses of the people's human, material, and territorial resources as a whole. "Once their principality was established," Nicolae Bălcescu wrote, "the Romanians felt the need any state feels to set up a permanent army, an army to be always ready to reject the enemy, no matter where it might come from. They also understood that such an army could only be a vanguard of the people and that the basis of the *military system* had to be a large national reserve; that is why, from the very beginning, they organized an army, the militia and the . . . masses, and, every since his birth, every Romanian has cherished the duty to be a soldier and defend the state in times of need, and when an enemy invaded the Romanian land, all the country had to rise to armed combat."[1]

The structuring of military power, according to the fundamental principle of the whole people's participation, acquired further theoretical and practical dimensions in the second half of the nineteenth century, after the 1859 union of the Romanian principalities. The modernization of the national armed forces was the theme of numerous debates in legislative forums, of specialized journalism, and of the press of that time. Referring to the content of the law of the reorganization of the country's military power of February 1864, Mihail Kogălniceanu showed that, through the new law, it formed an altogether special system "organized the way the nation had it in the past and wanted it, namely, the army, the militias and the rising of the people."[2]

The generalization of the military experience acquired in World War I was reflected in a 1924 law that stipulated that "all Romanians are part of one of the elements of the armed military power: the active army with its permanent cadres, its reserve and the militias." This law, which was subsequently amended, was applied until World War II.[3]

The ideas on a national defense system crystallized further after the victorious anti-fascist and anti-imperialist revolution of social and national liberation of August 1944, as the experience acquired during the revolution contributed to the creation of the national military doctrine in the postwar years and especially after 1965, wherein first place was given to the definition of the structure and missions of the national defense system.

According to its provisions, socialist Romania's national defense system is made up of all the military, economic, administrative and public bodies, organizations and institutions, forces, and means that take part in the country's defense and are linked to one another within a complex network of relationships. Led by the higher Party and state bodies and operationally subordinated to the national supreme command alone, it exercises its functions with a wide range of political, diplomatic, economic, social, cultural, and military activities specific to the whole people's war within the national territory.

At the level of military practice, the original model of restructuring the national defense system, in line with specific conditions in Romania, expresses the major idea of capitalizing on the country's entire human and economic potential and subordinating it, if necessary, to the defensive effort. Within the national defense system, they are grouped in specific organizational structures, including human forces and material means, organizations and institutions, and resources and services, which are prepared for the country's defense in time of peace and, in conditions of war, take diverse, coordinated, and convergent actions to that end.

Romania's national defense system is made up of two subsystems: (1) a performing subsystem (which is directed), including the armed forces, the defense, and logistical formations, and (2) a directing subsystem, made up of political-military steering bodies. The functional model of this system includes: defense forces and means, the economic and logistical support of defense, the territorial infrastructure, and the national defense command.

Benefiting from such a structure, the national defense system provides for participation in the defensive effort through a thorough preparation of the national economic and territorial structure as a whole for the mobilization of all material and financial resources. At the same time, the Romanian defense system relies on the full employment of the demographic potential by generally arming and training the whole people for

the fight—the deciding factor in the attainment of the fundamental strategic goal, namely the country's defense. Pursuing this goal, the system boasts a permanent operational capcity able rapidly to become operational and to give a firm counterblow to the aggressor from the very beginning. It is in a position to carry out a wide gamut of ground, air, and naval operations throughout the country's territory, employing the most diverse combat forms and methods under any weather conditions and in all seasons. It can easily pass from defense to decisive offensive actions; it can put up firm resistance in certain areas and along certain lines; and, according to conditions, it can opt for an elastic defense combined with surprise and counterattacks. Its mobility provides for the execution on a strategic, operative, and tactical plane of fire, force, and maneuvers along directions and lines and in zones of operations, both horizontally and vertically.

The national defense system is highly viable and can operate uninterruptedly from the outbreak of a possible act of aggression until the aggressor is either defeated or driven away and victory is won. To this end, peacetime measures are set and applied to train the population for defense, to prepare the territory and the national economy, so that the combat forces may carry out efficient and long-term actions, no matter how difficult situations might be, and annihilate the aggressor's air strikes, his attacks with incendiary and chemical means, as well as the operations undertaken by airborne mobile troops, airborne and imphibious troops, and units. By legal provisions, all state, cooperative, and public bodies are duty bound to adopt "peacetime measures in every area of activity to mobilize the economy and the territory to meet defense requirements and provide for a smooth running of economic, political and social activities in time of war."[4]

Combat forces—a basic component of the national defense system—are so organized, sized, and trained that they may successfully counter the actions carried out by invasion forces. Combat elements may be grouped in two distinct, complementary (sub)systems: (1) the (permanent) armed forces, which essentially represent the country's military system, and (2) the forces and means of territorial defense, which are semi (partially) permanent and paramilitary, and take party in the nation's defensive effort in a great diversity of forms and methods of action.

The territorial, mass component of the combat forces, which, owing to their disposition, virtually cover the entire national territory, offer

favorable conditions for the deployment of military forces along axes of maximum danger, provide for their freedom of action in maneuver, allow the combat forces as a whole to rapidly become operational, and make feasible military actions to be fought in the territory that might be temporarily occupied. Even in the initial phase of its act of aggression, irrespective of time, directions, and areas of operation, the enemy faces a resistance put up by forces that are able to engage it in prolonged actions and prevent it from attaining decisive goals in a short time. The major component of national defense, the organization that assures stability and capacity for resistance and counterattack, and is the backbone of the power of the whole system is the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

According to the country's laws, they are made up of (1) the army (units, commands, institutions, troops, and formations subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense) and (2) commands, troops, and military types of formations subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior.

The Army of the Socialist Republic of Romania— A Basic Component of the National Defense System

Benefitting from corresponding, highly flexible structures and material bases, the army is the mahor strike forces, the key body for strategic and tactical maneuver able to fulfil missions, irrespective of terrain and weather conditions. It boasts elements that can permanently study and practically apply the most efficient methods of organization, command, preparation, and waging of war. That attests to its role of integrating all combat forces.

Owing to its structure, armament, and equipment, socialist Romania's army boasts all the characteristics of a modern military body. The weight of various forces—ground, antiaircraft, air, and naval—in the total composition is decided upon according to the requirements for national defense and is in line with the country's national military doctrine.[5]

In the army structure, ground troops represent the basic forces, who meant to carry out large-scale operations in all geoclimatic conditions, according to the demands of the whol people's war for the homeland's defense. Their salient abilities are: remarkable firepower, great mobility, capability for rapid movement and action on all kinds of terrain and in any weather conditions, and impressive capacity for maneuver. These

outfits include mechanized, tank, motorized infantry, airborne, border guard, missile, engineer, chemical-weapon, and signal troops.

The antiaircraft unts are to ensure the security of national air space and defend political and administrative, economic, and military centers, forces in the national defense system, the population, communication lines, and other targets in the country's territory from enemy air strikes and surveys.

A major component of the Romanian army is the air force, which boasts a long fighting tradition. Its aim is to provide combat support to ground troops and other forces and, in cooperation with the antiaircraft units, contribute to the fight against enemy air forces. The air force includes: fighters, fighter-bombers, reconaissance and transport planes, as well as signal and engineer units and formations that give material support and technical and medical assistance.

The naval forces, in close cooperation with the other armed forces and people's defense groups, have the major mission of repelling a possible act of aggression from the Black Sea or the rivers and defending the country's water communication lines, port facilities, and other economic and social units on the sea's littoral or the Danube. They are organized and equipped for the destruction of enemy ships at sea; support for ground troops in defending the littoral; protection of the flank of the ground forces that fight actions along the littoral, disorganization of the aggressor's water transport, and insurance of water communications. To fulfil their missions, they boast units of ships of various classes for various purposes, which are specialized in both combat and other specific actions at sea and on rivers. The naval forces also include signal, engineer, and hydrographic units, as well as formations that give material, technical, and medical support.

The security, public order, and fire-fighting troops, which are subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior as a component of the armed forces, play an important role in the national defense system. These troops, which are organized, led, and trained according to military principles and norms, make their contribution, through specific forms, methods, and means, to the strenthening of the homeland's defense capacity.

Owing to their great mobility, organization, equipment, and training, these troops can contribute to a smooth running of activities in large political and administrative centers, in economic and military units,

neutralize and destroy enemy terrorist-diversionist groups, take part in limiting the effects of enemy attacks of all kinds, and perform other special missions entrusted to them by national supreme command.

Territorial Defense—A New Mobility for the Whole People's Participation in the Country's Defense

In line with long-standing, glorious traditions and with the objective requirements resulting from the overall character of modern conflicts, a territorial component with a well-defined role in the (sub)system of combat forces, i.e., territorial defense, was introduced into the national defense system. Both from the demographic, social and spatial point of view and in light of the broad spectrum of tasks and missions it performs in time of peace and in time of war, territorial defense proves to be a highly comprehensive element that provides for the population's mass participation in fighting and other actions to protect the country.

Worldwide military experience has proved that operations in modern wars are no longer exclusively concentrated in areas and directions where military units confront each other. Owing to the use of special forces (airborne troops, commandos, and diversionist-terrorist formations) and actions in which modern means (weapons of mass destruction included) are employed, any part of a country's territory may virtually become a "battlefield." Consequently, the state subjected to an act of aggression will emerge victorious only to the extent to which it has seen to preparations so that it is ready to face an overall front through a total counterstroke.

An important role in strengthening this country's defense potential is played by the socioeconomic development of territorial units on the basis of application of the new economic mechanism. "Seen in a broader framework," the president of the republic pointed out, "self-management and self-sufficiency by territorial units are important factors in the strengthening of the country's defense capcity, for the provision of conditions so that the problems related to supply and a proper administration and management of all localities may by solved in all circumstances."[6]

According to this new outlook, the application of the principles of the new economic mechanism imparts to national defense greater efficiency by territorial units and broad operational and logistic autonomy and

capacity for self-regulation. It is into this context that the thesis of the role of localities in the national defense system also falls. According to socialist Romania's military doctrine, each locality, enterprise, and farming units—each socioeconomic unit in general—should turn into a stronghold and a powerful citadel to provide for both smooth running of production and waging the fight for safeguarding the country's independence.

Territorial defense gives the national defense system a more marked internal coherence, more organically blends its components, and offers possibilities to more efficiently coordinate the actions of the army with those undertaken by territorial combat and civil defense formations. The major forces of territorial defense are patriotic guards, formations for youth military training, and civil defense formations.

The patriotic guards are armed combat formations of the working people in towns and villages that have the mission to take active party, alongside the armed forces, in defending the people's peaceful work, the homeland's independence, sovereignty, towns and communes, socialist enterprises, institutions, and organizations. Organized in time of peace, the guards provide for the training of all working people so that they may pose a counter to anyone attempting to trespass the homeland's borders.

The guards are organized according to the territorial and workplace principle. This reflects in their structure, which is that of the administrative territorial units—counties, municipalities, towns, and communes (and administrative districts in Bucharest). Following the application of the workplace principle, patriotic guards were set up in all enterprises, institutions, and state and cooperative economic organizations.

The formations for youth military training are intended to work together with the army units, patriotic guards, and the other defense formations. The young people in these formations can work to fulfill the missions that have been assigned to them either in groups or in detachments, in keeping with respective organizational structures. In all circumstances, youth formations are to be used together with the other forces to which they are subordinate in carrying out missions with limited goals in the vicinity of their home location. In keeping with their combat skills, this yough may perform missions such as support of combat actions, strengthening the guard on key targets, protecting industrial construction, storehouses, works of art, telecommunication centers and routes, performance of engineer work on defense lines in the territory, support of measures

taken for civil defense, and destruction of isolated enemy resistance points behind their own forward subunits. Under favorable circumstances, they may also perform minor combat missions.

Civil defense formations have the mission of protecting the population and material assets and to see to the smooth running of the economic, political, and social life in case of war of peacetime natural disasters. Civil defense training is a mass activity in Romania, involving civil defense formations, specialty commissions and staff, patriotic guards, youth detachments, regular firemen's formations, voluntary medical formations, working personnel in socialist units, students, pupils, and other categories of citizens, as well as the personnel in military units and the formations of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior.[7]

Just like the other territorial elements, civil defense formations are created according to the territorial and workplace principle. The chief missions assigned to them are protection of the country's citizens against the effects of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms; adequate protection of goods of all kinds and cultural assets, warning the population through notifications and alarm against air raids, limitation of air raids and eradication of their consequences, and participation in reestablishing the production capacity of industrial units, as well as locating and removing the consequences of natural disasters.

The wartime actions of territorial defense may be carried out in inland zones, areas of operations, and regions temporarily invaded by the aggressor. In inland zones, territorial defense forces are to fight independently, in cooperation with military units or subordinate to them.

The Economic Support and the Logistics of the National Defense System

The national defense system benefits from a broad social base and, at the same time, is sized in strict concordance with the country's economic, demographic, and spatial potential. The continual growth of the country's economic strength provides increasing possibilities for the quantitative and qualitative growth of the means necessary for strengthening its defense.

Its existing modern industry, which boasts branches of decisive importance for the country's socioeconomic progress, offers a powerful

material base to equip the army and other components of the national defense system with everything for their thorough training.

The rational distribution of the forces of production in the territory is of major importance for the insurance of economic support to the national defense system. The development of the economic potential of all countries, which is one of the most important options of economic policy of the Romanian state, also increases possibilities of defense in war conditions.

In consideration of the decisive role of the economic potential in supporting the effort implicit in the whole people's war for the homeland's defense, the country's economy is undergoing a peacetime process of corresponding preparation. According to the Law for National Defense Organization, the preparation of the national economy for defense implies an aggregate of measures, which should be taken in time of peace, aimed at capitalizing on the country's entire economic potential. This is a highly complex, long-term activity that calls for specific steps in all the branches and sectors of the national economy. In this way, the economy as a whole is ready, in case of war, to supply the necessary material means and perform the necessary services for national defense. Essentially, the measures for the preparation of the national economy for defense refer to (1) the elaboration of a plan of economic mobilization; (2) the insurance of the country's own production of weapons and combat means; (3) the creation of mobilization capacities and reserves; (4) manpower supply to economic units; (5) the preparation of conditions for a rapid changeover of the economy from a state of peace to the state of war; and (6) the provision of material and organizational conditions for an optimal operation of economic management in time of war.[8] The transfer of economic resources from suppliers to endusers in the defense field is performed through a dense network of channels and instruments, which form a highly developed logistical system.

The logistical system of Romania's national defense is made up of a number of central of local state bodies (both civilian and military), public organs, material means and human forces, as well as activities that are carried out according to well-defined norms and rules, and aim at ensuring the technical, material, financial, medical, transport, servicing, and other bases needed to repel any act of armed aggression. The basic task of logistical bodies is to supply the armed forces and the people's

defense formations with everything needed to wage the war in corresponding amounts, on time, and in the necessary places. First place is given to the supply of the forces within the national defense system with combat names. The perfect fulfillment of this function, which is the very essence of logisitics, provides for the supply to the forces in the national system with everything necessary to perform their missions and is a *sine qua non* for the success of the whole people's war for the safeguarding of the homeland's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

The National Territory—A Factor that Enhances the Homeland's Defense Capacity

The Romanian people's millenium-old historical experience proves that, throughout the centuries, our people have masterfully used the natural characteristics of the Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic space for growth and existence. In conditions of the whole people's war for the homeland's defense, the national territory and its characteristics play a major role. They exercise a strong influence on both the organization and equipment of the national defense system and on action in time of war. These factors are highlighted by geographic location, size, and natural and socioeconomic features of the country, which enhance its defense capacity.

With its 237,500 square kilometers, Romania is a medium-sized country. It has a great variety of relief features: mountains make up 31 percent; hills and plateaus 39 percent; plains 30 percent. The concentric disposition of the major features of relief has unquestionable advantages for defense and long-lived resistance in case of aggression.

In its military doctrine, socialist Romania attaches great importance to the analysis of the way in which the natural characteristics of the national territory influence the structure of the forces for defense and the process of equipping them with armament and materiel, as well as their forms and methods of action. The system of forces participating in national defense—the army in first—have categories of forces, types of weapons, and units whose specialization and equipment allow them to better meet geospatial conditions specific to the national territory. Furthermore, the proportion of the categories of armed forces is relevant for the natural conditions of the territory. The natural, as well as socioeconomic, features of the national territory, which favor national defense, are continuously

capitalized upon and adapted to the requirements of the whole people's war.

According to the National Defense Law, the preparation of the country for defense implies a group of measures aimed at meeting the operational and strategic requirements of the forces intended to fight defensive actions, ensuring the continuity of socioeconomic life, and protecting, in time of war, the population and material and cultural assets from weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms. In this framework, aims and guidelines are set, along with the tasks to be performed, by central and local bodies of state administration. The measures and decisions adopted, which are included in the national plan for economic and social development, are compulsory and have the force of law. Everything that makes the theme of the territory's preparation for defense is included in the territorial infrastructure, a (sub)system that is closely correlated with other components of the national defense system. The territorial infrastructure incorporates all construction, works, units, and facilities that, owing to their nature, can be permanently used in case of war. It can be adapted to serve such purposes by expanding the advantages and properties offered by natural geographic factors and by contributing to the capitalization on the combat capacity of all forces at the highest levels of efficiency and to the maintenance of the viability and reliability of the national defense system. The infrastructure includes both units of direct military use (strongholds, obstacles, control centers, storehouses, shelters for the population and for material assets) and units of dual socioeconomic and military importance (roads, railway, air and naval communication lines, pipelines, telecommunications). In the second category are the components of the infrastructure that, in time of peace, serve exclusively socioeconomic purposes but which, through wartime conversion, can be used in combat operations by the forces of the national defense system: construction in enterprises and socioeconomic units, irrigation systems, river water control works, dams and large storage lakes, and mines and other underground facilities.

That the territorial infrastructure belongs to the national defense system is a necessity also deriving from its role in and influence upon the actions to be fought by the armed forces, as well as from the substantial contribution some of its components make to the preservation of the viability and reliability of the system. In this respect, of special importance

are the contribution of territorial elements to insure a well-developed system of entrenchments and obstacles, the provision of necessary conditions for maneuvers and logistical activities that depend especially on the density and traffic capacity of the communications network, shelter facilities to maintain the armed forces' combat capabilities, protection of the population and troops, and the insurance of the national defense command.

Forms and Modalities of Waging the Whole People's War for the Homeland's Defense

Romania's defense system boasts great dynamism, a qualitative indicator of utmost importance on which political and military decision makers constantly focus their attention.

The process of optimizing the functionality of this system covers both quantitative and, especially, qualitative facets. In this respect, the most competent decision making bodies periodically analyze the way in which this system meets the complex situations created by its operation, as well as the reshapings needed to increase its ability to cope with any act of aggression against our country.

It is well known that acts of aggression and hostility against a state are carried on not only directly, by way of arms, but also through more or less covert actions. There are confrontations on multiple planes (political, economic, ideological, psychological, cultural) which, if ignored, may affect in one way or another the people's legitimate interests and rights and the country's independence and sovereignty. This reality of our times calls on the national defense system to be always operational.

The functioning of the national defense system has specific features, in line with the nature, scope, and evolution of factors of danger. In the international situation, in general, there are factors that disturb peace and security; they fall somewhere between the two extreme states of peace and war. Between these two, intermediary stages may occur: tension and imminent threat, which, for the behavior of our national defense system, are "cause states." Each "cause state" in society shows through certain political, economic, social, military, or other events vis-à-vis which the system adopts certain responses, or "effect states." They can be found in: (1) a state of alert (the course of the training process, interventions in special situations); (2) a gradual rise in combat capacity; (3) a state of

necessity; (4) a partial or total mobilization; (5) entering the fight and combat operations; (6) finalization and peace prospects.

Taking account of these, the behavior of the national defense system should be regarded according to its various states: peace, tension, imminent threat, aggression, and war. Of these, the ones that have serious effects on the behavior of the defense system are those that may originate in a deterioration of international existence.

The emergence of a state of tension in international relations may lead to measures aimed at gradually upgrading combat capacity and at taking the operational training of defense forces to a higher level. From this point of view, the defense system must be in a position to ensure, at all times, the mobilization and opportune concentration of the armed forces and defense formations in the areas of vital importance to the Romanian state.

In the case of imminent threat of an act of aggression, of special significance is the maintenance of diplomatic initiative to politically solve the conflict and unveil the danger of aggression. If the threat grows, a state of necessity may be declared, which, according to the situation, may be followed by partial or general mobilization. A command for force mobilization, as well as the organization of providing for the national defense system's going from the state of peace to war, ensure the country's on-time, complete preparedness for defense. Moreover, conditions are created for the opportune action by the forces intended for an organized mobilization and the annihilation of an aggressor's terrorist-diversionist troops, which might act in the national territory.

When a state of war is instituted, intense political and diplomatic activities would be carried out, along with military preparations, to inform international bodies and world public opinion of the scope of military actions and the aggressor's intentions, to discouraging and halting the aggressor, and to preventing the attainment of the invader's aim through a "short-term war" policy and a policy of the "accomplished fact." When hostilities start, every measure would be taken to mobilize the whole people for defense. Special concern would be shown in this period for fighting the aggressor's attempts at breaking down Romania's foreign relations.

While counter actions, specific to the whole people's war are under way, the national supreme command would promptly operate all the

restructurings, regroupings, and maneuvers imperatively needed for the concentration and distribution of the priority efforts of the armed forces and defense formations to achieve the fundamental strategic aim—safeguarding Romanian independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity—all while operationally steering military and resistance actions in keeping with the specifics of the developing situations.

From the outbreak of the war and throughout its duration, the national defense system, as a whole, and each of its components would have the capacity to rapidly adapt themselves to the situations that may occur by surprise.

Peacetime preparation for national defense in every respect, so that it may successfully cope with possible aggression, is a prerequisite for victory. The whole people's participation in this is an expression of all the working people's strong will to fight with all their force against any aggressor.

CHAPTER 12

THE ROMANIAN DOCTRINAL OUTLOOK ON NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMAND

Doctrinal Principles of National Defense Command

Romania's current military doctrine gives special attention to the improvement of national defense command in principles, requirements, structures, and the way of exercising attributions and powers.

The principles of national defense command form a closely interrelated organic system, which distinguishes itself by the principle of command exclusive to the country's constitutional bodies. This reflects the independent, sovereign, and unitary character of the Romanian state, as well as the responsibility of the country's constitutional leadership for the homeland's many-sided development and for the safeguarding and continuous strengthening of its independence and sovereignty.

In the doctrinal outlook of the Romanian state, national independence and sovereignty are primordial, inalienable, and undeniable rights—prerequisites for the existence and action of all the other conditions needed for the assertion of the Romanian nation's dignity and freedom. "The winning of national independence and sovereignty," President Ceaușescu stated, "is an objective law of social development, a necessity for the advance of human civilization, and a fundamental imperative of history. There can be no question of rights when the fundamental right to be a

master in your own country and of your destiny is not real."[1] Independence and sovereignty are attributes that provide for the exercise of national competence in all areas, the field of defense command included. In line with this principle, national defense is managed in Romania by the constitutional bodies that were democratically elected to run our socialist society. These bodies alone have the duty and capability to know the real situation in the ocuntry and its requirements for progress, and they alone have the necessary competence to mobilize all available resources for the attainment of socioeconomic development goals for the strengthening of the national defense potential.

"The right to decide on questions related to the defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania," the National Defense Law shows, "is a sovereign attribution of the Romanian state. To take every measure for the country's defense is a fundamental duty of all state bodies and of the other organizations. . . ."[2]

Characterized by such essential objective featùres, the principle of national defense command by the Party and state has been consistently asserted by the country's president: "The sole leader of our armed forces is the Party, the government and the national supreme command. They alone can give orders to our army, and only these orders can be executed in the Socialist Republic of Romania."[3] This doctrinal principle found an expression in a number of legislative and organizational measures. The constitution o the Socialist Republic of Romania and, with that as a basis, the National Defense Law offer an adequate institutional framework for the full observance of this principle, stipulating in detail the attributions of state power and administration bodies and of other economic and social institutions and organizations, so that the whole range of problems related to national defense are under the exclusive authority of national command bodies.

The Romanian state firmly applies the principle of national defense command solely by national decision making bodies also in its foreign military relations. According to the provisions of the Romanian state's fundamental law, "a state of war can be declared only in case of armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Romania or against another state to which the Socialist Republic of Romania is committed under mutual defense international treaties if the situation has occurred for which the duty to declare a state of war is stipulated."[4] In fulfilling these

duties, the national army will act under national command alone and only upon the order of and under a decision by the national supreme commander. This principle doe snot run counter to the requirements of military collaboration with other states to strengthen the country's defense or jointly reject a possible act of aggression, in line with the pledges Romania has taken for mutual assistance with other states.

The Romanian stance on questions related to the command of national defense does not reflect an attitude that has to do with circumstances; rather, it is a permanent goal of the Romanian state leadership and a dominant feature of its military policy. It is the natural expression of the legitimate rights that Romania constantly asserts, in full accord with its efforts for the development of its links of friendship and peaceful coexistence with all states, irrespective of their social system.

Another doctrinal principle refers to the centralized unity command of national defense. In light of this principle, the country's defense command is an objective need originating in the unity of the process of running our society, the specificity of war in general, and the particularities of the armed struggle by the whole people in defense of its homeland. Furthermore, it derives from the complex and diversified structure of the national defense system, which was created in keeping with the Romanian state's fundamental doctrinal choices. In the current Romanian military doctrinal outlook, this necessarily implies coordination, according to a unitary conception, of all the components involved in preparing and, if need be, supporting the whole people's fight for the homeland's defense. The centralized, unitary command of all the components is of vital importance for their integration into a well-knit body with great flexibility and adaptability, as well as the capacity to organize a multivalent riposte to any aggressor.

The principle of unitary and centralized command of the national defense system is underlain by the new social, economic, and political realities in Romania, which make it both possible and necessary that the homeland's defense be not only the major function of the state, but also a work of the whole people. The system is also the result of the unitary manner in which the Romanian state conceives of and carries out the process of building and defending the new society, the complexity of the whole people's war for defense, the new-type of relations that develop in such a society among the various components of the social system as well

as between these and the army. Moreover, there are the relations that are regulated by central command bodies and the comprehensive nature of the national defense system, of which there are numerous forms and means whose preparation and active have to be constantly harmonized.

The fundamental principle that orders and coordinates the operation of the Romanian state system and that shows in the field of national defense is democratic centralism. Centralized command, performed by the supreme bodies of state power and central bodies of state administration, blends harmoniously with the duties and responsibilities incumbent upon the local bodies of state power and administration as far as initiatives and palpable actions within their competence are concerned. Within the national defense command, the democratic facet shows itself more markedly, and the framework for the assertion of initiative by lower command bodies and the masses improves. "The supreme bodies of state power and the central bodies of state administration and the people's councils and their executive committees, as well as the other socialist organizations," the Law of National Defense Organization says, "have the duty to take all the necessary measures in time of peace for the strengthening of the country's defense capacity."[5]

The operational and efficient character of the national defense system command is organically linked to the correlation between the principle of centralized and unitary command and that of joint command. Romanian socioeconomic and political realities turned the state's military function into a public function through the whole people's participation in the defense effort and the harmonious integration of defense activities into societal activity as a whole. The socialization of the defense function means a broad participation by all members of society not only in implementing defense-related decisions, but also in making them and in setting the necessary steps for their fulfillment. On a social plane, this participation means that the Romanian people are making their own history. Under these circumstances, the responsibility of every society member for providing means to solve defense-related problems grows and so does the involvement in the implementation of these means.

The promotion of the principle of collective command in the field of national defense finds expression in the measures to improve organizatinal structures within the highly democratic framework of the present-day Romanian society, which provides for the whole people's participation

in the process of building and defending its homeland. In this context, the Defense Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the local defense councils, bodies that have been created fro the particular purpose of running national defense affairs on a general plane and in administrative–territorial units, operate according to the principle of joint work and command.[6] In the armed forces, this principle has materialized in the creation and operation of joint command bodies within the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior, the military councils of operative echelons, professorial councils in officers' training schools, scientific councils in the army's scientific research units, the working people's councils, and general meetings in the army's production units.

The features of continuity, firmness, and efficiency that characterize the riposte to be given to the aggressor in time and space, as well as its command–both at the central and local levels–call for a package of measures, taken in time of peace, to allow decision making bodies to exert full and permanent control over the actions of all the components of the national defense system. This implies organization and equipment of command centers in step with the growing requirements of the combat command; a certain, stable operation of transmission systems and automated control complexes; insurance of the continuity of command at all levels and echelons; supply of pertinent information to each command body; protection of command bodies from the actions by the aggressor; and preparation and, if necessary, normal operation of the reserve command bodies and apparatus.

The fundamental doctrinal principles of the Romanian state's defense command imply an organizational structure with well-defined functions and a clear outline. This requirement has been realized in the creation of an adequate system for the political and military command of the country's defense.

The Structure of the System for the Political and Military Command of National Defense

The organizational structures created and continually improved on the basis of normative acts referring to national defense command, make up a unitary system that provides for an efficient command.

The unified, comprehensive, and indivisible management of all areas of social activity and, implicitly, the command of national defense are performed by the Romanian Communist party. This derives objectively from the political character of the function of a national defense system that aims at safeguarding the fundamental assets of the overall social system. Along these major coordinates, the problems related to national defense represent the convergent interests of all social classes and segments in the Socialist Republic of Romania. In this respect, defense command is highly political in character and, consequently, can be exercised only by the bodies that the Romanians have unanimously invested with the powers of supreme management of the Romanian society.

The need to assert national defense command also derives from the complexity of the homeland's defense in conditions of a war waged by the whole people. The huge mobilization of human and material resources, with a view to waging a war of defense against any act of aggression, objectively calls for the engagement of the major levers of political management of society. Consequently, none of the aspects of this effort, which is aimed at stimulating all the fields of social activity involved in the preparation and, if necessary, waging of the whole people's war, can remain outside the theoretical and practical activity of political management.

The specifics of organization, according to the current Romanian military doctrine, is reflected in the way that the national defense command is structured. It is performed through a complex system that includes supreme Party and state bodies, as well as management bodies in all the areas—military, political, diplomatic, economic, ideological, and cultural—involved in the fulfillment of defense-related tasks.

According to their nature, defense command groups fall into political or public bodies, state bodies and dual Party and state bodies. They include: the bodies and organizations of the Romanian Communist party, and the bodies of the Union of Communist Youth. According to legal provisions, performers in this field are also mass organizations—the Young Pioneers' Organization, cooperative organizations, the Society of the Red Cross, etc.[7] State bodies may be classified according to their legal nature as bodies of state power (the Grand National Assembly, the State Council, the president of the republic, as supreme instances, and the people's councils, as local bodies of state power) and organizations of state administration (the Council of Ministers, the ministries, and other central or local state institutions performing in the field of defense).

Dual Party and state bodies are an original component of the political system of the Romanian state. They were set up to provide for efficient management of all the major segments of the Romanian society. For the national defense command, Party and state bodies such as the Defense Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania and local defense councils were established. At the same time, the Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development fulfills a number of functions in the management of activities aimed at supporting defense from an economic point of view.

According to their position, the bodies involved in national defense command may be grouped as those included in the structure of the national defense system or, more precisely, in its command subsystem, and command bodies outside that system. All the bodies that are chiefly intended for the command of armed combat and of assimilated or complementary actions (civil defense and logistical support) are integrated into the command subsystem. The command bodies outside the system may, in their turn, be superordinated bodies, which contribute to steering the national defense system as a whole, and bodies that cooperate in organizing and steering defense actions in other areas (economic, political, diplomatic, etc.). These are the bodies included in the general political management of society (supreme Party and state power bodies) that, by virtue of their competence, coordinate all the social compartments involved in defense, the specialized system included.

According to their competence, command bodies may be classified as those with general competence and with specialized competence. The bodies boasting general competence are the supreme Party, state organs and the Council of Ministers. On the local level, the people's councils and their executive committees (bureaus) are invested with general competence.

The competence of these command bodies refers to their ability to steer all the activities related to national defense rather than only those with a directly military character. Falling in this category are the Defense Council and the local defense councils. The other command groups within the system are specialized ones that direct the armed fight and civil defense actions or the logistical support.

The primary place held by the Romanian Communist party in the general leadership of defense is defined by the fact that, according to constitutional provisions, its central body has the competence of law-making initiative, ensures the debate of and gives direction to the enforcement

of major measures related to the strengthening of defense capacity, and directly leads the country's foreign policy and the political-ideological and educative activities, important contributions to discharging defense duties.

The Grand National Assembly, in its capacity as supreme body of state power and the only law-making forum of the Socialist Republic of Romania, gives power of law to the main measures regarding the strengthening of the homeland's defense and the organization of the national defense system,[8] establishes the general foreign policy line, ratifies or denounces international treaties that imply amendment of laws, and controls the activity of the other state bodies.[9] In the interests of the country's defense, it proclaims the state of necessity, partial or general mobilization, or a state of war. In the interval between the sessions of the Grand National Assembly, the State Council endorses norms with power of law to extend the legal framework of defense, being equally competent to declare partial and general mobilization or a state of war. Likewise, the Grand National Assembly and the State Council are the only bodies entitled to endorse the conducting of negotiations for the conclusion of a general or local truce, the cessation of the state of war, or the negotiations of a peace treaty.

The president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, a function held by the general secretary of the Romanian Communist party, is at the same time chairman of the defense council and supreme commander of the armed forces. He has important national defense related duties on an internal and international level. The president presides over the State Council, appoints and recalls ministers and heads of the other central bodies of the state administration, grants ranks to senior officers (generals and marshals), concludes international treaties on behalf of the republic, accredits and recalls the diplomatic representatives of the country, proclaims the state of necessity in cases of emergency, and, in his capacity as chairman of the defense council, coordinates the whole activity of this body.

The Council of Ministers is responsible for the enforcement of the decisions of the Defense Council regarding the strengthening of the national defense capacity.[10] To this end, the Council of Ministers runs the activity of the central and local state administration bodies for the fulfillment of the tasks incumbent upon them in national defense, works out the draft

plan of mobilization of the national economy and the draft state budget for the first year of war, takes steps to secure the financial means and the material reserves needed in wartime, and takes care of the general organization of the armed forces.

The general political leadership of the defense by territorial units is performed through the agency of the county, municipal, town, and commune Party committees, people's councils, and their executive committees (bureaus). They coordinate, at their respective levels, the preparation of the economy and territory for defense according to the resolutions of the Party's Central Committee, Grand National Assembly, State Council, and Defense Council, referring to the preparation and sustaining of the effort for defense if necessary.

The highest level of the national defense system is represented by the Defense Council, a body invested with running national defense as a whole.[11] It is accountable only to the Party's Central Committee, the Grand National Assembly, and the State Council. The Defense Council is made up the prime minister and the ministers of national defense, the interior, and foreign affairs, the chairman of the State Planning Committee, other members appointed under a State Council decree, and the chief of staff—who is also secretary of the Defense Council.[12]

Performing the role of supreme national command, the Defense Council articulates the fundamental conception of deployment of the defense efforts, endorses and controls the fulfillment of the plans of securing the material means required, endorses the chief measures for the preparation of the territory, settles the most important issues of organization and supply of civil defense. Likewise, the Defense Council approves the plan for mobilization of the national economy and the state budget of a war year, as well as plans for the population's dispersal and evacuation.

In its capacity as the supreme leading body of the national defense system, the Defense Council oversees the measures for the organization, equipment, and training of the armed forces and people's defense formations for permanently strengthening their combat capacity, as well as the plans for mobilization and employment of all these forces in war. In case of a threat to national independence and sovereignty, the Defense Council proposes to the supreme state power bodies the proclamation of a state of emergency, of partial or general mobilization, and of a state of war; in case of a surprise attack on Romania, it organizes all the actions needed

to repel it. During the whole people's war for the homeland's defense, the Defense Council directly leads the operations of the national defense system and the entire activity for mobilizing the country's material and human potential for the success in the war.

In order to discharge such complex and important functions, the Defense Council approves resolutions that are compulsory for all the bodies they refer to, including the Council of Ministers; these resolutions appear in the orders and directives of the supreme commander and in other documents specific to the defense strategic leadership.[13]

For a unified management of all local defense activities, county, municipal, town, and commune defense councils, deliberative organs (hierarchically subordinate to the Defense Council, the supreme commander, and the people's council at their level) were set up. Local defense councils make up an efficient managment network, based on the country's territorial-administrative structure. It entirely covers the nation and ensures the unified and opportune defense management by territory, in peace and war alike, in strict accordance with defense laws and orders and regulations of the supreme commander. The local management activity of defense councils appears first of all in the organization for preparation of socio-economic units and territories for defense and in the mobilization of the resources in all zones of the country. These councils are responsible for the preparation and equipment of patriotic guards, youth detachments, civil defense formations, and medical and volunteer fireman teams. They also support the proper unfolding of preparations for mobilization and military records, recruiting and drafting activities, and the enforcement of the law on requisitioning. At the start of the whole people's war for the homeland's defense, local defense councils would direct the activities of putting the respective territorial-administrative units on a war footing, coordinate the actions of civil defense and public order, and direct combat by defense formations.

The direct leadership of the forces of the national defense system is achieved by means of specialized structures. The National Defense Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior play the principal roles, according to the law, in the implementation of the military policy of our Party and state defense, public order, and state security—each in its domain of activity.[14] They all take part alongside other ministries and central organs of the state administration, executive committees of people's councils, and other socialist organizations.

The National Defense Ministry surveys the defense needs of the country and proposes to the Defense Council the measures for the strengthening of the national potential, supports the activity of other state organs that take part in the fulfillment of the tasks in this domain, secures the leadership of civil defense, and cooperates with patriotic guards and youth formations for the improvement of their military training. The ministry performs all functions pertaining to military leadership; organization and mobilization, operations, research, combat training, politico-educative activity, education, selection and promotion of cadres, etc.

Romanian policy on the defense of the country's internal security and order is implemented by the Ministry of the Interior, which enforces the laws and decrees, the orders of the supreme commander, and the resolutions of the Defense Council and of the Council of Ministers.

The patriotic guards are led by a system of territorial organs, organized in keeping with the role and missions of armed combat units of the working people. They are coordinated with the system of other organs competent in defense at the level of the territorial-administrative units they belong to, being subordinate to local defense councils.

The general leadership of the patriotic guards is exercised through the patriotic guards general staff, which ensures the coordination of all problems related to the training and equipment of patriotic guards formations and units.[15] In counties, municipalities, towns, and communes, the commanders of patriotic guards are the first secretaries of Party committees in the respective territorial administrative units, who also function as chairmen of local defense councils.

The leadership of the training of the youth for defense devolves on the Union of Communist Youth and the Young Pioneers' Organization, and is achieved with the support of the patriotic guards general staff, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and other state and public central bodies.[16] The general command of Youth Training for National Defense carries out its activity at the national level, and local commands work under county, municipal, town, and commune committees. The commanders of the centers for youth military training and the commanders of formations (detachments and groups) are hierarchically subordinated to their respective commands.

The leadership of civil defense is exercised on the basis of the Defense Council resolutions and the directives and orders of the supreme commander

with the participation of the central and local organs of the state administration, local defense councils, managing bodies of socioeconomic units, and specialized structures. The organization and leadership of nationwide civil defense is entrusted to the National Defense Ministry, the defense minister also discharging the function of head of civil defense for the republic.[17] The civil defense command is part of this ministry and coordinates the enforcement of the technically-organizational and military measures across the country. Subordinated to the command are the civil defense general staffs of counties, Bucharest city and its sectors, some municipalities, and the civil defense military units. In the central organs of the state administration, in territorial-administrative units, and in institutions and socioeconomic organizations, the civil defense heads are the ministers, the chairmen of executive committees (bureaus) of people's councils, and the heads of the respective socialist units. They run civil defense activities with the help of general staffs and of civil defense commissions. Civil defense general staffs are constituted at state administration central organs, in counties, municipalities, towns, communes, and in socialist units with over 100 working people. Civil defense commissions are organized by specialities in counties, municipalities, and towns with over 20,000 inhabitants and in socioeconomic units with over 3,000 working people; they are to study and enforce civil defense measures according to their specialization.[18]

The leadership of the national defense logistic subsystem has a complex structure, determined by its functional dependence on defense requirements and the objective necessity of coordinating the national economy through which the economic aspects of defense are ultimately solved. Contributing to the unitary management of the logistic activities are supreme organs of state power and administration, part of the leading organs integrated in the structure of the defense system and other state or public organs with tasks in the defense field. Besides that of the supreme organs of state power, an important role in directing the logistic process is played by the Supreme Council of Socioeconomic Development, which works out the prognoses and the five-year and one-year plans for socioeconomic development, and, in accordance with these, the plans for supplying the national defense.

The State Planning Committee, in its capacity as the central synthesizing organ, carries out its activities under the Council of Ministers. It functions

in planning, coordinating, and control in all sectors of social activity, among which are the combat means and the preparations of the territory and the economy for defense. For the fulfillment of the defense tasks, the State Planning Committee has in its structure a specialty organ that takes care of the logistic problems.

Economic ministers, managing organs of industrial departments, enterprises, institutions or public organizations, and local organs of state power and administration contribute to the organization and implementation of the military production, coordinate the preparation for mobilization of the units under their control, and run the activities for the development of the territorial defense infrastructure.[19]

Its constituent function being that of directing and coordinating actions on various levels for attainment of the political aim of national defense and the military targets deriving from this, the defense leadership of socialist Romania is thus organized and structured to work according to the principles of current Romanian military doctrine. It is to meet the imperative of efficient preparation and, if need be, to wage a whole people's war, as well as to provide the necessary conditions for the Romanian people to be able, at any time, to successfully defend the revolutionary gains, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of its ancient homeland.

CHAPTER 13

DOCTRINAL COORDINATION OF EQUIPPING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE SYSTEM

The Growing Socioeconomic Development of the Country—A Decisive Factor in Strengthening the Homeland's Defense Capacity by All the People

A major choice in current Romanian military thinking and practice, and of the national military doctrine, is the creation and development of an indigenous industry for the production of arms and technical equipment for all the forces of national defense.. The fundamental orientation in this domain is based on our Party's idea, which says that the strengthening of national independence and sovereignty necessarily requires that our state provide most of its own defense means, in accordance with the essentials of military policy and with the geoclimatic peculiarities of the country, taking into account the results obtained in this field worldwide. In this respect, Romania's president stated that "in the conditions of the contemporary technical-scientific revolution, modern arms and combat techniques play an outstanding role in securing the defense capacity of each state; in consideration of this requirement . . . the government of our country is permanently concerned with equipping of the army with sophisticated technical means and with the development and modernization of the national arms production."[1]

The lessons of national and world history reveal that the people's struggle for the homeland's defense can be efficiently waged when a powerful economic base, able to meet the requirements of a defense efforts nationwide, is secured, and when the national economy is able to produce sufficient quantities of materiel for armed confrontation in a people's war. The past or present historic experience has demonstrated that a state that cannot secure most the material means for a war effort and has to rely on massive imports, objectively limits its national independence and sovereignty, and places in question its very defense in times of foreign aggression, endangering the chances of success in repelling it.[2]

A significant expression of the nonaggressive character of the national military donctrine and of socialist Romania's resolve to ensure its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity is in the measures taken by the higher Party and state leadership at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist party in April 1968 for the creation of national defense industry. Debating the problem of equipping the army with arms and military technology, "measures to produce in our own country most of the defense means, and importing that combat technology, in particular, whose production in the country is not justified economically or cannot be satisfactorily manufactured" were set.[3]

The building of a national defense industry is—in the Romanian state's view—directly linked to the country's socioeconomic development, as it is known that only a unified, developed, and balanced economy, organized and led on scientific bases, with a diversified structure, and able to move quickly from peace to war production can meet promptly the needs of the modern warfare.

Starting in 1965, a policy of industrial, scientific, and technological development has been worked out based on new principles of organization and on criteria of efficiency among which are: increasing the capacity for assimilating and putting into production the most valuable and efficient achievements of the contemporary technical-scientific revolution; the growing contribution of research and engineering to the fulfilment of social and economic tasks; competitiveness in key branches promoting technological progress; reduction of product imports and broadening the country's export possibilities for dynamic participation to the world trading system.

In the subsequent period, Party and state leadership consistently pursued the policy of development and modernization of the national economy, an increase in the efficiency of all socio-economic activities, and marked growth in national income.

In the elaboration of its policy on defense and the development of a national base of production of the needed goods, the Romanian state has always taken into account the unified and coordinated action of several objective and subjective factors that determine the dimensions, structure, and modalities of homeland's defense capacity. The special importance of the economic factor in the defense potential derives from the fact that, on the quantitative and qualitative development level of the economy, and of industry first of all, are based the potential for supplying top technologies, modern arms and ammunition, and other materials needed by the armed forces and the people's defense formations. Likewise, economic development helps provide the fuel, lubricants, energy materials, transport, telecommunications, and food for defense and mobilization.

With the general progress of the economy, science, and technology as a basis, over the 1968-1985 period, national defense production grew steadily, it showed in the quantity and quality of Romanian military products for the armed forces and other components of the national defense system. While, in 1965, the means produced by the Romanian industry accounted for only 30 percent of the army's equipment, in 1985 they stood at over 70 percent.

With details on the significance of these achievements, it is obvious that the contribution of the national defense industry by sectors and types of technology is as follows: infantry arms and ammunition, about 95 percent, tank and auto technology, about 98 percent, engineering, over 94 percent, naval technology, over 67 percent, aircraft technology, about 64 percent, transmission technology, over 75 percent, antiaircraft technology, under 10 percent. in value, it can be said that, over the years 1981-1985, national industry provided 65 percent or so of the total equipment of the army and other elements of the national defense system, as compared to only 30 percent in the 1961-1965 period and 50 percent in the 1966-1970 interval.[5]

The state's socioeconomic development and the modernization of industry on the basis of the decisions of the Thirteenth Party Congress

shall be achieved, in 1986 through 1990, by the further modernization of the production structures, a continual rise in performance and the quality of products, growing labor productivity, more marked specialization and integration in production, highly efficient utilization of units, and higher economic efficiency in all industrial branches. In this context, the strategic orientation regarding the intensive development of industry is based on the more marked intensification of research and technological development and the introduction of the newest gains of the technical-scientific revolution.

The unitary and proportional development of the country's technical-material base requires that the industrialization process be paralleled by an equally strong development of agriculture and the other branches of the national economy. In this respect, the single socioeconomic development plan for 1986-1990 stipulates that agriculture—a basic branch of the national economy—should make a growing contribution to the formation of national income and to the general progress of the Romanian society. Thus, the growth of labor productivity, the complete mechanization of farm operations, fertilizing programs, chemicalization, and irrigation will provide conditions for big, sure, and stable production, able to meet industry's needs for raw materials, the population's consumption needs, and the formation of state reserves and creation of products for export. Thus, the logistic needs of the national defense system in food, equipment, quarters, transport, etc. will be fully met to boost the country's defense capacity.

A fundamental characteristic of Romania's socioeconomic development over 1986-1990 is the growth of the role of science and technology to solve technical and technological problems raised by current and long-term needs of the national economy and, implicitly, of defense.

The implementation of the provisions in this master program, the continuation and deepening of the process of rational territorial distribution of the production forces, and the application of the principles of self-management, self-supply, and self-financing in each territorial-administrative unit will provide conditions for the strengthening defense. Starting in 1982, each county, municipality, town, and commune is directly responsible for adequately supplying the population, with the necessary means and material base to be developed further in the following years. Consistent application of the principles of the new economic-financial

mechanism in all territorial-administrative units gives a certain operational and logistic autonomy to national defense at the local level and a more functional self-adjustment capacity in a campaign.

The package of measures on the thorough training of the work force, twelve years of education for the youth, and a higher level of professional, technical, scientific, and cultural knowledge in the whole population shall bear positively on the instructive-educative process, helping youth acquire the knowledge and the habits of a good combatant. The increase in working population, of which 73 percent is in industry and other non-agricultural sectors, the growing urbanization and homogenization of our socialist society on many levels, and the cohesion of the Romanian nation are behind the continuous rise in the combat capacity of the national defense system.

Principles of Equipping the National Defense System

The doctrinal provisions for equipping the national defense system are based on principles that guide the activity in this domain. Their definition pertains to the multiple and complex implications of the contemporary technical-scientific revolution in the development and improvement of armament and technique, the positive experience in equipping modern armies in general, and national socioeconomic and geospatial peculairities. In consideration of the Romanian state's domestic and foreign policy, the organization of the defense industry and the equipping of the armed forces and other elements of the system are solely aimed at strengthening the defense capacity.

Of high theoretical and practical importance is the principle of equipment in relation to the combat pattern, organizational structure, and missions of each category of forces. The necessity of this principle derives from the fact that the structure of the national defense system gathers categories of forces and people's formations diverse in organization and missions they can fulfil. The armed forces are composed of land troops, antiaircraft units, the air force, and the navy, and each includes many specialties and types of arms. All these forces should be equipped with armament and other technical means in accordance with their structure, role, combat missions, and organizational patternsn in order to operate at full capacity. This is based on a major requirement of modern combat,

namely the capacity to execute fast and diversified maneuvers and retain mobility. In keeping with this requisite, each category of forces is equipped with transport adequate to the environment (land, air, water) of its mission. These means, with proper technical-tactical features, meet the needs of each category of forces and of each type of arm in the fulfilment of missions.

Modern combat, with its new structural and functional characteristics, requires that arms like infantry, mechanized troops and tank units, the air force, artillery, and antiaircraft units, etc. should acquire an even greater fire and striking capacity, and that they should be equipped in keeping with their specific missions, place and role they may have in the homeland's defense war.

Another principle of the Romania state's military doctrine refers to the equipment of the national defense system in accordance with the terrain and climate characteristics of our country. The structure of Romania's terrain is very proportional in geomorphological forms, so that the forces and means of the defense system should be able to act promptly and efficiently to move and obtain the expected results in any terrain. This principle requires the harmonious equipping of all the forces with technology and armament that can be equally used on the plains, in the hills, mountains, delta, and littoral. The supplying of the army, as the specialized element in military actions (and of the other forces and people's formations integrated in the national defense system) with light arms and combat equipment with high fire power and efficiency and a high maneuver capacity helps the defense forces intervene in directions and formations that are favorable for defense and surprise actions and for dealing powerful blows, with few forces, to a more numerous and better equipped enemy, but one less capable of acting in such regions. The complex urban planning programs, the modern industrial and industrial-agrarian areas, the big irrigation and waterworks systems, communication means, and other multipurpose works give the national territory new characteristics of military functionality that are rigorously taken into account when projecting and manufacturing combat goods.

The climate, temperature, and rainfall specific to the temperate zone where Romania is located do not raise special problems for the operation of arms and techniques, but it is taken into consideration in setting the parameters of the combat means.

Of special importance is the principle of economical equipment. As economic efficiency is a constant aim of the unique programs for the development of the national defense industry; measures have been adopted for cutting material expenditures in the process of producing and operating armament and military goods. Standardization of equipment in the armed forces first, and then in people's defense formations, is one of the measures of utmost importance in the application of this principle. Constantly applied in the manufacture of new items, it has favorable consequences, eliminating the diversity of calibers, ammunition, and spare parts and also facilitating supply and technical support. This also helps the technical-material base of the defense industry, eliminating the diversity of needed production means and technological lines, which allows for the manufacture of serial production, and the growth of labor productivity and product quality.

Another modality of realizing this principle is the growth of integration of military products through the priority use of domestic resources of raw and subsidiary materials and energy to help cut imports and hard currency expenditure. In order to cut fuel consumption, concomitantly with the highest training of troops for combat, constructive solutions were adopted to preserve the tactical and technical characteristics of machines with lower specific consumption. Simulators, small shooting ranges, and other instruction devices are more and more used to train experts continuously.

The application of this orientation has resulted in a growing efficiency of the defense industry. Currently, the productive units of the army assimilate, manufacture, and update more than 450 types of arms and combat technology, self-equipment products, instruction devices, and other aggregates. Manufacture has risen from 40 percent in 1981 to 60 percent in 1985 in all production units.

The recovery, reconditioning, and reuse of a larger number of items and spare parts are also part of the measures based on the principle of economical equipping. For the repair of some 3,000 types of arms and military goods, army production units assimilated and manufactured about 35 percent of needed spare parts, accessories, and subassemblies, i.e., 40,000 subassemblies and spare parts to mend equipment.[7] The use of all these helps increase the economic efficiency of internal defense production and equip the forces of the national defense system with

highly economical and technical-tactical armament, saves the society important expenses, hard currency included, with the respective funds being used for the country's socioeconomic development.

In the specific conditions of the whole people's war for the homeland's defense, of great importance is the principle of the autonomy of equipment. It showed in the development of the defense industry, capable of providing all the means needed for combat by all the forces in the system. This strategic choice in Romania's military policy requires strenuous efforts but the results are remarkable for the increase of the homeland's defense capacity. Free decision-making is thus insured as to the quantity, quality, and types of armament and of their technical-tactical characteristics in full accord with the needs of national defense.

Doctrinal Orientations on the Creation of the National Defense Industry

The creation and development of the national defense industry is based on the results gained in the increase of the industrial, technical, and technological potential and of the steady implementation of the socioeconomic development policy pursued by socialist Romania.

In this view and in consideration of the mahor characteristics that give viability to the national defense system, the rise in the performance and quality of the technical-material equipment was and is in close relation to the dynamics of other factors such as organizational structure, a mobilization system, strategy and tactics, principles of the process of instruction and education of troops, etc.

Current Romanian military doctrine considers that the whole people's war for the homeland's defense will be an armed confrontation of dynamism and fierceness because of the entire nation's resolve to defeat the aggressor, waged with modern combat procedures and means. Hence, a strong aggressor, equipped with quality armament and technology should be met by very well trained combatants equipped with high-technology combat means. Thus, the army and the whole national defense system should be supplied with armament designed and produced in accordance with the requirements of modern warfare and the geoclimatic conditions of our country. Considering all these elements specific to defense, a complex of measures has been worked out—organizational and technical-economic—for the creation of a national defense industry. The permanent

development and improvement of this industry is organically integrated into the strategy of the development of the Romanian contemporary society, in full agreement with the fundamental objectives and principles of domestic and foreign policy, and with the orientation of socialist Romania's doctrinal orientations.

The indissoluble correlation between the socioeconomic development level of the country and its defense capacity does not merely pertain to the technical equipment of the army and other forces of the national defense system. The role of the economy, as a decisive factor in defense, shows actively and fully in all the structural and functional elements that define this potential, as well as in what involves its conversation into effective military power in the event of a defensive war waged by the whole Romanian people against any aggression.

CHAPTER 14

FORMS AND PROCEDURES OF MILITARY ACTION IN THE ENTIRE PEOPLE'S WAR

Theoretical and Methodological Requisites of Forms and Procedures of Military Action in the Whole People's War

The concepts and principles of socialist Romania's military doctrine guide the complex process of the organization and fulfilment of its defense of independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

According to the state's outlook, the continual concern for the improvement of its defense is an objective necessity under current conditions. The fact is that forms and procedures for military action in the homeland's defense depend on how their content is substantiated from a doctrinal point of view. The existence of a thoroughly articulated military doctrine, based on national reality and always receptive to the evolution of the international situation, allowed the Romanian state to solve in an original way the requirements of the whole people's war for the homeland's defense and to come up with forms and procedures of high operational efficiency. According to the conception and principles of the people's fight and its highly complex and dynamic character, a multitude of most diverse forms and means of combat must be used to win such a war. As shown by the Romanian people's long experience of war, they had had to find the most efficacious ways to defeat enemies of great military

strength; they had to get maximum results with minimal energy, and loss.[1] In accordance with Romanian doctrinal concepts, forms and procedures for waging defusive war express the war in which the forces and means at our disposal are to be used to attain this fundamental strategic goal.[2]

The Romanian contemporary theoretical and doctrinal framework also provides an important methodology. It includes and develops fundamental elements that are part of a diversity of procedures and forms of military action that is the result of historical experience and the evolution of modern military science. Considering that there are no immutable procedures to be rigidly applied and that, in each historical period and military conflict, new procedures of action emerge to fit the specificity of the battlefield, national military doctrine will have new characteristics, specific content, and forces engaged in sustaining the defense effort to counteract the aggressor and take advantage of the factors for success in a defensive war.

The complex process of substantiating and testing contemporary Romanian military capability—strategic, operational, and tactical—is based on a thorough, multilevel analysis of the contemporary political-military context and on general conclusions about the material and psychological factors that, in current conditions, may prove successful in a confrontation with a possible aggressor. Of utmost importance in determining the range of the forms and procedures of military action, with major implications for functionability of the national defense system, is the elaboration of "prognostic scenarious of possible aggression" that provide as exact as possible a survey of the spatial and temporal parameters and dimensions of an aggressor's probable military actions. In approaching these problems, national military thinking makes use of a multifactorial analysis for determining, first, the main political and military characteristics of a possible aggression and, second, developing the elements of an armed or unarmed riposte that our state can use successfully against the aggressor.

The prognostic image of aggression against Romania, if not averted by political and diplomatic channels, comes from the results of a complex process of synthesis and generalization drawn from analysis of the unfolding of military conflicts, postwar ones in particular, in various parts of the world and the evolution of the international thought on the

physiognomy of modern warfare and modern technology. In consideration of these elements, several probably characteristics of a scenario of a possible aggression can be defined as follows: (1) declaration of war by surprise—from the very first moments of the war, the invader uses many troops and technical means to achieve quantitative superiority over the forces of our defense system; (2) the landing troops of the aggressor comprise a large number of armored vehicles, organized in units directly supporting motorized infantry and also in independent formations to make in-depth penetrations of the dispositions of our troops; (3) massive use of aircraft to hit the major defense forces, the second echelons or operative and strategic resources, communications, economic and social-administrative centers; (4) massive use of paratroopers and airborne troops to occupy and maintain, for as long as possible, important sectors and zones deep in the national territory; and (5) putting to work numerous diversion and subversion detachments, as well as a broad intelligence network. The enemy is also likely—and the possibility cannot be overlooked—to go to using mass means of destruction especially if he cannot attain his strategic aims in a short time.

The study of the probably characteristics of an aggressor's actions, based on rigorous criteria, shows the active attitude of the Romanian military in the prognosis of forms and procedures of action able to counterbalance the quantitative superiority of the aggressor's forces. It also helps Romanian military science to look for origjnal solutions in the application of the known forms and procedures of combat to discover and experiment with, in the instructive-educative process of the forces of the national defense system, new and specific forms of the people's war. On the strength of this, confrontation with an aggressor appears to be characterized by the utilization and blending of forms and procedures of conventional with unconventional warfare, typical of popular and underground formations, the adoption of solutions to political and military retaliation that should use to advantage all the factors of power of the Romanian socialist social system.

Because of the decisive role of all elements in defending socialist Romania, the military doctrine established and legally sanctioned a new "model" of armed retaliation at a national level. Unlike conventional wars where the aggressor's armed forces work against the armed forces of the victim state, if such an action is directed against Romania, the

invading forces will face, from the very first moment, the fierce and resolute resistance of the whole Romanian people. The need for such military actions—with our relatively few forces and means, and using forms and procedures of utmost efficiency—means techniques ranging from the sophisticated to the improvised and generated by adverse conditions, making use of intiative and skill, and results from the fact that the defense forces would have to always strike the enemy from all sides, systematically reducing its combat capacity, delay its actions, and make it unable to turn to account its military superiority.[3]

Analysis requires the pinpointing of the concordance of the aims pursued and the means for their attainment. It is in keeping with the national doctrinal conception that "our strategic objective is the homeland's defense, and we do not set to ourselves to overstep the frontiers."[4] This is the corollary of the unitary and converging action of the national defense system. The process of reaching it passes from attainment of partial aims in a series—operational and tactical—through the armed conflict, and is realized in the destruction of the principal formations of the invading forces, the route of the aggressor beyond the national frontiers, the reestablishment of the country's territorial integrity, and the insurance of the constitutional leadership over the whole territory. In keeping with the principles of our military doctrine, depending on how the political-military situation evolves all through the conflict, these aims can be attained simultaneously (when the armed conflict would develop favorably for us from the very beginning) or successively. in both cases, the process leading to their attainment requires the complex blending of operations, battles, and actions that should each end with the attainment of one of these aims. Hence, it means that the evolution of an armed conflict has a powerful influence both on how the attainment of the aims is phased out and on all the forms and procedures of waging military actions.

The military prognosis studies worked out in our country analyze all the possible situations the forces of the national defense system could face. However, in order to ensure high training and a permanent operational capability, the military doctrine of socialist Romania envisages the unfolding of a defense war in complex conditions that take into consideration, first of all, a political-military framework that creates disadvantageous circumstances for our own forces. This alternative raises

problems of great difficulty for all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—in terms of conception of the combat actions and forms and procedures.

In contemporary military thinking, many military theoreticians have advanced ideas on the definition of a people's war.[5] In generalizing such conclusions on the development of a people's war, one may say that its evolution can go through several stages in the dynamics of events and mutations that may occur in the balance of the belligerents' forces. Drawing conclusions from various opinions, this definition could be the following: in the first stage, with the quantitative superiority of the aggressor's forces, forces that oppose the invasion are compelled to adopt, as a general posture, a strategic defense; in the second stage, following fierce defensive actions, a strategic balance is reached between the aggressor forces and the defenders; in the third stage, the balance of forces changes from a strategic point of view, and the country under aggression takes the initiative and begins the strategic offensive to liberate the national territory.

Starting from these general considerations, our military doctrine appreciates that defense could go through one or several specific stages: the national, generalized effort to defend the country from the very first moments of the aggression, a resolute counterblow by the whole people (starting in the frontier zone) to neutralize and repel the aggressor forces; to halt offensive actions along all main axes; to take the strategic initiative and provide conditions to eventually liberate the national territory; to go on to the strategic offensive along the main axes; and to destroy the forces of the aggressor.[6]

Seeing armed retaliation against an aggressor as a national generalized effort, the Romanian state's military doctrine places special emphasis on militarily covering each zone of the national territory, including areas where there are no regular armed forces because of the evolution of the operational situation. This doctrinal requisite appears in the thesis according to which "all localities—towns, communes, villages, and enterprises and other socioeconomic units should turn into real work, fight, and defense cities."[7] Conditions are thus in place to confront the aggressor with the active resistance by the masses and their armed formation everywhere. Armed resistance, in various forms and modalities and opposed to enemy troops through the whole people's fight, may provide for the achievement of a superiority of forces and means in certain moments and

zones, through favorable modifications in the balance of forces and, with the concerted actions of all the forces of the national defense system, may help take the strategic initiative along certain directions. The unified leadership in the action of our armed forces and of the other elements of the national defense system would pursue chiefly, in this stage, the adaptation of combat procedures throughout the national territory to the specifics of situations to counter efficiently any military and nonmilitary action by an aggressor.

In favorable conditions, the outcome of measures undertaken by the state leadership on all planes—politic, military, economic, diplomatic, and moral—which would prevent the aggressor from reaching its political aims and under conditions in which the conflict lasted much longer than the invader had foreseen (a situation detrimental to the aggressor) it would be possible to end the war through a political settlement. This would necessarily be accompanied by the withdrawal of the foreign troops and the reestablishment of the Romanian state's sovereignty over its entire territory. In our doctrinal conception, surrender or acceptance of such are illegal actions; any agreement concluded in this sense would be null and void in the terms of the Romanian constitution and the Law of National Defense of socialist Romania.[8]

According to our state leadership's outlook and fundamental provisions of the Romanian military doctrine, anu conflict has its own causes, general and specific. Hence, the probably image of the process of the whole people's war cannot be seen as absolute; historical experience, no matter how recent, does not provide absolute guarantees and variants. In our state's outlook, the decision on the actions to be taken in a possible military conflict forced on the Romanian state and on the procedures and forms of military and other actions to safeguard the fundamental values of our people devolves exclusively on the constitutional leadership of Romania. This fundamental principle reveals one of the essential precepts of modern military art, namely that, although at a conceptual level forms and procedures of fight are universal, they are applied and work in particular conditions specific to each country. In the Romanian state, these will have their own dynamics generated by the geoclimatic conditions of the national territory and the psychology and specific political-moral traits of the Romanian people.

The Content of Forms of Military Action in the Whole People's War

The probable outline of a possible general effort by the whole people in defense of the homeland generated the need to study and delineate, on the basis of a general doctrinal conception, those factors that may enhance the operational capacity of our forces and diminish those of the aggressor. On a strategic plane, a series of modalities of action have been articulated to render the aggressor incapable of attaining its political and military goals by means of a blitzkrieg, and to turn the conflict into a long-term one in which the factors of success that the aggressor counted on initially lose their decisive character.

According to our state's analysis, the definition of the whole peopl's war as an anti-imperialist defense war and the defensive orientation of this country's military doctrine refer to political aims and not in the least to forms and procedures of action to be used against the aggressor. In order to defeat enemy forces, socialist Romania's military strategy envisions the unfolding of dynamic actions, with emphasis on the offensive, radically different from the passive means that were predominant in theory of classic defense. It thus appears that our military strategy works from criteria for the selection of the forms of action and the attainment of the fundamental strategic aims that are based on the outstanding dissociation between the military and political meanings of notions of offense and defense.

At the same time, at a strategic level, the option for certain forms of action is dependent on "the correct evaluation of the balance of forces, the on-time grasping of the enemy's intentions, forecasts on the evolution of events, permanent initiative—both defensive and offensive, and maintenance of combat capacity in any circumstances."[9] The choice of the form of action requires that the national supreme command should permanently analyze the balance of forces, by category, in the army and in arms such as aviation, armor, paratroops, airborne units, etc., according to their share and importance in various moments of military actions, the quantitative and qualitative technical equipment of the troops, and their morale. In strategic defense, those procedures should be chosen that allow for gaining the necessary time for a change in the balance of forces and providing conditions for passage to the offensive.

The strategic offensive should employ procedures able to make the most of any success obtained, before the enemy could even out of change the balance of forces to their advantage.

Strategic defense is defined as an aggregate of military, political, economic, psychological, and other actions, carried out by the national defense system and the entire people across the nation to halt and repel the strategic offensive of quantitatively superior aggressor armed forces, to wear then out, and to change the balance of forces and provide conditions to pass to the strategic offensive for the liberation of the national territory.[10]

The specific procedure of such action should be the "strategic defense and operational-tactical offense" that defines the active conduct of our own forces. Through numerous and strong local and zonal offensive actions, the forces of the national defense system would make the aggressor limit the scope of its offensive actions. At a tactical and operational level, the armed forces should organize and execute powerful counterattacks and continual harassment of the aggressor forces, using to advantage the favorable terrain conditions and promptly taking advantage of the delays and slowing down of the rhythm of the invading forces' offensive.[11]

Unlike classic war, in the people's defense war, the success of the strategic defense cannot be secured in one or several large-scale battles, but through a wide variety of strategic and tactical operations—procedures and forms of action aimed at continually wearing out the enemy. In this context, the strategic defense, organized and carried out according to a well-devised plan, would prove to be a form of military action able to counter the aggressor's strategic initiative and to replace it with strategic initiative by the defense on a general plane, which turns to better account space and time, as well as the social and political conditions of the armed conflict. This idea is present and more and more conspicuous in military scientific works. The offensive defense based on high mobility provides for a powerful and fast retaliation and economy of forces, it eventually secures the success of the confrontation with a powerful aggressor.[12]

During defense operations it is possible that along the enemy may introduce strong forces and repel the defensive forces, forcing them to fall back to another alignment. Certainly, the withdrawal of forces from the aggressor's heavy blows and their transfer to another alignment favoring

the furtherance of the defense would not endanger the aim of the operation. Being a circumstantial measure, taken as a rule in a certain direction, it differs from the classic action of this kind in that the mission of the forces that fall back is taken over, in broad terms, by other formations, including resistance units.

The Romanian state's military doctrine pays special importance to the strategic cover—a wide-range action integrated into strategic defense operations to thwart the attainment of the aggressor's strategic aims when it has started aggression by surprise. This form of military action is proper to the initial period of the war and is aimed at providing conditions for the mobilization of the armed forces, their movement, and the setting of the strategic defense disposition. The cover is done so that when an aggression starts, the troops and the other elements of the national defense system intended for this aim be in combat disposition and able to act in an organized manner, skillfully taking advantage of the terrain, bodies of water, and the economic units and settlements in the frontier zone.

The strategic offensive, as a principle form of military action in the whole people's war, defines a whole stage of the homeland's defense war and is characteristic of the entire front—or a sector of it—or a strategic direction. It includes an aggregate of military, political, economic, psychological and other actions, carried out by the whole people (the temporarily invaded territory included), which pursues the destruction of the main groups of the aggressor' armed forces, conquest of the strategically important objectives, and the fulfillment of the political and military aims of the defense war.[13] Just like the strategic defense, its political-military aims are attained in one or several strategic offensive operations conducted simultaneoulsy or successively. The strategic offensive operation represents a group of military actions, performed by the armed forces in cooperation with the people's formations, resistance units, and the combatant population in the occupied zones; it is based on a unitary conception for the annihilation (capture) of important groups of the aggressive forces, the conquest of objectives of strategic importance, and the taking up of an alignament that assures the entire liberation of the national territory.[14]

Offensive actions conducted by cooperation of the regular forces, defense formations, and resistance units give a distinct image to the strategic offensive operation through an ascending passage from local offensive actions of limited scope to unitary decisive changes. This is the

offensive started from different points and along different directions. Thus, making use of the free and distinct zones and of all favorable sectors, the offensive should be conducted simultaneously or successively in several directions. With the cumulative effect of partial successes and the liberation of portions of occupied territory, conditions would be created for a change in the balance of forces. In this way, the strategic offensive operation will no longer have the "classic" aspect of action in strictly delimited areas, with precise unfolding in time and space, but will be the sum of actions along several axes, differently oriented and in various depths. The final aim of the offensive operation would be attained with the successive fulfillment of the missions set for the groups of forces along each axis.

A characteristic feature of the strategic offensive in the entire people's war is that, besides military objectives, it pursues political objectives such as (1) higher, more active participation by the population in the defense war and the rise of new categories of combatants with liberation of national territory; (2) removal of the administration set up by the aggressor; (3) restoration and consolidation of political structures in liberated areas; and (4) consolidation of the morale of the population and army, of the links between army and the people, etc.

All offensive actions carried out by the armed forces and other people's formations will be characterized by staunchness, alertness, and inventiveness so as to take the enemy by surprise and annihilate its principal forces with as little possible human and material losses.

A decisive contribution to the success of the strategic offensive would be made by resistance formations. Acting on the basis of a single plan under the leadership of the natinal supreme command, and while the offensive is being prepared, these formations would intensify their actions and work to destabilize the situation in occupied territory, disorganize the command, supply, and operational capacity of the aggressor's units. The coordinated actions of the armed forces, patriotic guards, resistance detachments, and even insurrection by the population would turn the strategic offensive into an aggregate of most varied actions directed against the enemy's front, flanks, and rear. Simultaneously started, these actions would put the enemy into a difficult situation that could get out of his control and could lead to the rapid collapse of his strategic disposition.

Procedures of Military Action in the Whole People's War

In the whole people's war, the physiognomy of combat presents a multitude of novel aspects. As military actions are not uniform, the participating forces are diverse and have wide possibilities. The probable course of action by an aggressor and the peculiarities of the national territory cannot be compatible with defining combat by universally repeatable patterns and oversimple schemes.

The probable scenario of the homeland's defense war shows that the main stress should fall on procedures that help coordinated actions of the regular forces and people's formations, actions at the front with actions at the rear of the enemy (resistance combat, free and distinct zones), and strategic defense with vigorous offensive actions at a tactical and operational level. The specific procedures for conducting military actions, resulting from the type of war our state prepares for in case of aggression, are correlated to political aims, which determine the adoption and application of certain procedures of action. It should be emphasized that, in the whole people's war for the homeland's defense, political aims are distinct from combat forms and procedures.

Our military doctrine promotes an orientation toward the study, assimilation, and utilization—in keeping with concrete conditions—of the entire range of combat forms and procedures (defensive, offensive, and complementary alike), of actions conducted under special conditions, stable fronts and in spaces with discontinuous fronts, and isolated zones. It also upholds the utilization of traditional combat procedures—according to rules and norms defined by historic experience—and of unconventional ones.

The organization and conduct of combat actions characteristic of the whole people's war in our country's conditions require new and varied tactical elements, a rich research activity based on a growing receptivity to new ideas, and improvement in combat training. In a defensive war, with the active participation of the entire people, one of the chief factors for victory belongs to the complex domain of the diversification of tactics and techniques and of the ability to change them fast when the need arises, in keeping with the situation at the front. Combat tactics are most diverse; their improvement and elaboration are major requirements.

The quantitative and qualitative gap between our forces and an aggressor's calls for other military action schemes than the classic ones. The invading forces should be allowed no respite and should be confronted with "panel" and "maneuver" tactics, as it is known that the faster and stronger the retaliation by surprise, the less the aggressor's chances to make use of its tactical and technical-material capabilities, and the easier it is to get at its vulnerable parts.

Given the specific conditions of an armed confrontation the novel situation emerging in the whole people's war for the homeland's defense, the tactics of our forces shall have to be subtle and creative. Under current conditions, "more attention should be given to the problems of elaborating tactics for different combat plans, thus improving troops', units' and subunits' combat capacities," as comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu, supreme commander of our armed forces pointed out.[15]

The system of complex actions specific to the entire people's war cannot be put into preset schemes, as original solutions, unexpected by the aggressor, make an important contribution to success. The current trends in the development of combat procedures give priority to these characteristics. In consideration of the orientations of our military doctrine, this process is continually restructured and improved in keeping with the evolution of national and world military thinking.

The corpus of principles, theses, and orientations of our state's military doctrine provides a most flexible framework for the improvement of theory and practice in tactics, thus stimulating the creativity and inventive spirit of the military and of all the defeners of Socialist Romania.

CHAPTER 15

THE DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES ROMANIA PROMOTES IN ITS MILITARY COLLABORATION WITH OTHER STATES

The Dialectical Correlation Between Romania's Foreign Policy and the Principles of Its Military Collaboration with other States

Implementing a wide-ranging social development program for building a modern economic and social system—keeping pace with the contemporary revolution in science and technology—as well as a steady rise in the development potential of science and culture, Romania is greatly interested in the establishment of a climate of peace in international relations, with détente and security prevailing over tension and the mounting threat of a conflict. Accordingly, the strategic goals of Romania's international policy are: (1) the promotion of a climate of understanding, mutual confidence, and cooperation; (2) the lessening of tension in the relations between states and groups of states; (3) the extinction of sources of conflict; (4) the cessation of the arms race and the aversion of a nuclear confrontation with its catastrophic effects on a planetary scale; and (5) the identification of constructive, negotiated solutions to the major issues of the contemporary world.

In substantiating its foreign policy, Romania starts from the need to secure sovereignty and full equality among all states so that their complex

relations on a political, economic, military, cultural, and social plane should guarantee each state the unhampered exercise of its fundamental rights to: (1) existence, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity; (2) to freely develp the sociopolitical system it has chosen without any outside interference; and (3) to freely define and conduct its relations with other states.

The guidelines of this country's foreign policy stem from an accurate analysis and study of the current evolution of international relationships. Our party and state leadership reckons that, with the major changes wrought in international life, "ours is a particularly complex stage in international life."[1] The evolution of international relations proves, as President Nicolae Ceaușescu figured, that we live "in a time of resettlement of the balance of forces, when a new world balance is achieved between various states and groups of states. It can be said that the new balance will be set on a greater diversity of the centers of power, [and] it will allow for a greater role of the Third World, the small and medium-sized countries, the developing and nonaligned countries."[2]

The facts of contemporary international life confirm the assessments made by Romania's Party and state leadership regarding the great tension that has cropped up in the world, which has increased the threats of new military conflicts, including that posed by the outbreak of a world war with devastating consequences for mankind.

Present-day international life is characterized by the confrontation between two radically opposed political tendencies—one of which is based on force and the threat of force, on the maintenance and division of spheres of influence and domination, and on a stepping up of the arms race, while the other one is geared to a new policy, which should put an end to the use and threat of force, spheres of influence, and the arms race, and should guarantee peoples' independent development and their collaboration, based on the principles of equality, respect for national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in domestic affairs.

Although world public opinion has stepped up its actions and demonstrations in favor of peace, of checking the dangerous course of events toward confrontation and war, and of disarmament—nuclear first and foremost, and although, of late, negotiations and talks are conducted at various levels on the broad issue of détente and peace, our state believes that major progress has not yet been made. Under the circumstances, "détente

will really begin only when an end is put to nuclear tests, when the nuclear and conventional arms race ceases and when a passage is made to a real reduction of troops, arms and military spending."[3]

In this context, President Nicolae Ceaușescu has recently proposed that a series of states, socialist ones included, should proceed to a unilateral reduction in their arms, troops, and military spending. The Romanian president pointed out that "Romania is ready to make a five percent reduction in its arms, troops and military spending before year's end."[4] The new Romanian proposal amounts to taking a tangible step toward halting the arms race and it opens a new line of action in the field—that of unilateral initiatives, which could have only beneficial effects on international life. "Such a measure poses not threat at all to any state's security! On the contrary," President Ceaușescu said, "it will pave the way to serious negotiations, it will demonstrate the European states' willingness to work for disarmament and peace."[5]

Romania's international activity, as a whole, is based on the belief that only the observance of each state's national independence and sovereignty can guarantee an optimal operation of the world system, international peace, and security. In this context, the active foreign policy this country promotes is directly linked to the Romanian state's legitimate concern for the homeland's defense.

Romania believes that, as long as the danger posed by the use and threat of force has not been effectively eliminated from international relations, the achievement of one's own national defense fully accords with international law and with the provisions of the UN Charter regarding individual and collective self-defense.

Our military doctrine, the national defense organization, and the means taken into consideration to repel a possible aggression against the Romanian state are in full concordance with the constructive goals of domestic policy and fully harmonize with our basic foreign policy. The measures and initiatives Romania has adopted on an international plane on the cardinal issues of disarmament, security, and détente act to secure a favorable external framework for the development of the country and the guarantee of Romania's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

As an integral part of our social system, socialist Romania's army has the primary mission of defending the sovereign state and its supreme political values against any hostile military action, from wherever it might

come from. It does so by operating within the framework of the national defense system, together with the entire people. Conceived in this fashion, the army's mission does not infringe on our basic international policy, which is under the sign of peace, cooperation, and good neighborliness with all the world's nations. Moreover, it enables a considerable increase in the army's role in foreign relations, as this social institution is called upon to make its contribution to the attainment of Romania's cardinal foreign policy goals, by means and in conditions that are specific to it. Being part of Romania's foreign policy system, the army's cooperative actions are naturally found on the same principles that guide the country's international relations as a whole: full equality of rights, respect for national independence and sovereignty, noninterference in domestic affairs, mutual advantage, no recourse to force or the threat of force.

Similarly, the lines of military collaboration follow the Party's and state's general policy. The Romanian army expands its ties with other states' armies, in keeping with the bi- and multilateral international treaties, accords, and conventions which Romania is a party to, and that include military clauses, as well as in keeping with mutual understandings and pledges for cooperation and collaboration in the event of regular training activities.[6] In this context, cooperation with the armies of the socialist states holds a significant place.

Romanian military doctrine takes in consideration that collaboration should contribute to stepping up each country's progress and to utilizing each one's resources and possibilities. This in no way, should lead to inequalities or inequities among partners, nor should it be associated with interference in another state's internal affairs, or with any other acts that could prejudice national sovereignty. The whole sphere of collaboration is governed by a set of principles that lay out its general framework and express the fundamental political choices of the Romanian state.

Accordingly, a distinct doctrinal principle establishes the aim of collaboration with socialist countries, i.e., the strengthening of each state's defense capability, which actually asserts the predominance of one's own defense interests over any other interests. Cooperation cannot be an end in itself, just as it cannot be subordinated to any viewpoint other than that deriving from the state's sovereign right to decide on the means necessary for its security, as well as on the ways of getting them without, by doing so, prejudicing the legitimate interests of other states' security. The

strategy of cooperation in the military realm—goals, areas, forms, conditions—necessarily derives from the Romanian Party's and state's unitary outlook on the creation of one's own defense capability.

Closely correlated with the aspect of the ultimate goals, another principle asserts each country's direct rresponsibility for its own defense and the organization, equipping, training, and control of the forces necessary to its security, as well as for their training and utilization in combat. The first consequence therefrom is that no other state—for any reason and, least of all, under the rubric of collaboration—is entitled to replace one's national authorities in any area of defense, or to take actions that run counter to the norms of international law by invoking the need to safeguard another country's interests. As a separate field of relations between independent, equal, and soveriegn states, military collaboration between socialist countries presupposes that the forms and ways in which it is realized should be set by common agreement between all concerned, without any pressure or interference, so that it may express the agreement of the collaborators' constitutional bodies. Romania's military collaboration with other socialist states is thereby founded on the firm ground of noninterference in domestic affairs—a doctrinal principle governing its whole foreign policy.

In view of the importance of military collaboration with the socialist states within the framework of Romania's foreign relations, and considering the particular consequences deriving from the engagement of its armed forces in a possible armed conflict caused by an imperialist aggression in Europe, socialist Romania's military doctrine sets forth the principle of the need to codify—in treaties and agreements—the goals, ways, means, and conditions of military collaboration. In its whole foreign policy, foreign military ties included, Romania attaches great significance to fulfilling the obligations it has assumed under bi- or multilateral international treaties.

The friendship, collaboration, and mutual assistance treaties Romania has concluded with other socialist countries contain provisions that stipulate mutual obligations on the plane of military relations. In various forms, these treaties state a pledge by the signatory states according to which, in the event one of them becomes the target of an armed attack from another state or group of states, other signatories would grant support to repel the aggression, resorting to a wide range of means, military assistance

included. As a general principle, whatever the situation in which Romanian troops carry out actions to support an allied state, they will take orders issued only by their own executive bodies, at the level of the Romanian supreme command. This fundamental principle illustrates a basic theme in the Romanian state-s present-day military collaboration. The alliances and the other military activities in which Romania takes part overrule any possibility of a show of force, inequality, or inequity among partners. A salient feature in this area is the fact that military assistance and collaboration are requested by the subject or subjects of armed aggression. This assistance cannot be imposed by other partners; the amount and kind of assistance are set by common agreement between the states concerned, without any interference that might violate national sovereignty or a state's right to independently decide on all the problems related to military collaboration.

Ways and Means of Romania's Military Collaboration with Other States

According to the nature of political relations and the general goals of international collaboration, Romania develops a complex system of ways and means of military cooperation as part of its foreign relations.

In the context of its political-military collaboration, a special case is that of its participation in the Warsaw Pact. In this connection, President Ceauşescu showed that "we are duty bound to work for the strengthening of collaboration with the armies of the Warsaw Pact socialist states and to carry out the respective common training activities so as to be always ready to fulfill the pledges assumed."[7] This fact is organically integrated into military doctrine, without prejudicing or narrowing the scope of applicability of general doctrinal principles, and without shunning the obligations assumed thereby. First of all, the treaty defines its aims as defense against an armed attack on any of its signatories. This reveals the strictly defensive character of the alliance and precludes the possibility that, were the signatories' obligations invoked, Romania should take part in aggressive military actions against another state. The military cooperation and collaboration between Romania and Warsaw Pact states are clearly defined in article 4 of the treaty, which reads: "In the case of an armed attack in Europe, coming from a state or group of states against one or several states

signatory to the treaty, each state signatory to the treaty will immediately and individually grant support to the state/states that were the subject of such an attack, in agreement with the other states signatories to the treaty and by all the means it deems necessary, including the use of the armed force, according to the right to individual or collective self-defense, in conformity with article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization."[8]

Another major aspect is that of the geographical area in which cooperation obligations are assumed. It covers only Europe. Thus, under treaty provisions, Romania is not involved in military events taking place outside that continent. The limitations our country takes into consideration (more particularly as regards the alliance's defensive character), which are in full agreement with the letter and the spirit of the treaty, are meant to provide the necessary balance to the provisions the signatories had assumed. Romania thereby pledges to promote understanding and cooperation with all countries, whatever their social systems, to refrain from the use and threat of force, and to solve international litigations only by peaceful means so as not to jeopardize, in any way, international peace and security.

The consequences of the fact that the treaty was concluded as a political-military alliance between sovereign and equal states that have assumed the obligation to gudie themselves in their mutual relations, according to the principles of mutual respect for national independence and sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs, are also given due consideration. Therefore, the activities entailed by the signing of the treaty neither can nor should prejudice those principles. The principal way in which the agreement on the attainment of common goals is by consultation on all the international problems that affect the common interests of the participating states. Existing governmental bodies and organs are not vested with the right to enforce binding decisions on the participating states; the measures regarding the fulfillment of treaty provisions must be worked out by consensus, and executive powers are conferred only as a result of having been sanctioned by the relevant constitutional bodies in each country. The land, air, and naval forces that each member state assigns to the joint armed forces are directly subordinate to their own national commands. Their equipment and training are in keeping with the decisions taken by their own governments, and their activity is carried out in accordance with the laws, regulations, and instructions in force in their own states.

In keeping with the general lines of Romania's foreign policy and with the Warsaw Pact provisions, Romanian military doctrine concentrates on the major fact of the need and possibility that the alliance should cease existence in the event of a corresponding dismantling of NATO, and the achievement of a viable system of collective security in Europe, sanctioned by a general treaty. In that event, stress will fall on the strengthening of the countries' own defense capabilities, the improvement of ties by military collaboration with all the socialist countries Romania already has treaties with, and cooperation with the armies of other states to provide the prerequisities for the attainment of their own security goals.

Although the ties with socialist countries have a highly important place in the context of military cooperation, they do not exclusively define it. Romanian military doctrine attaches considerable importance to collaboration with the armies of developing states, with countries that have a policy of independence and free development, and with states where, directly or indirectly, the army plays a major role in the process of social modernization, as well as with the armies of other states, regardless of their social systems. The resumption and expansion of contacts with the armies of European countries with which Romania also had military links in the past, and with states on other continents (including the United States) are significant in that respect. The premise in this case is that, as long as such relations do not violate the general principles of Romania's foreign policy, and are congruent with the lines of the national military doctrine, they can provide an additional way of mutual knowledge and a means for promoting the idea that the essential function of every army is to defend the independence of its own people.

With this broad horizon, Romania's military doctrine is open for international cooperation. In keeping with our state's outlook, according to which there is a give and take for every people within the framework of the circulation of material and spiritual assets, the institutions of the Romanian army take an active part in scientific and cultural exchanges with other armies.[9] They have working contacts on an exchange of experience and information basis with similar institutions in other countries. For instance, at the executive level, the Ministry of National Defense ensures the participation, within the framework of collaboration with the Warsaw Pact states, in the meetings of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces and of the Committee of Defense Ministers, as well as visits of friendship

to various countries, pursuing the development of collaboration between the Romanian army and the armies of the respective countries.

Relations are established between the socialist armies' general staffs and commands, which meant to contribute to improving cooperation with the various states' armies—a process furthered also during drills, exercises and other activities for raising the level of training of commands and units.

At command level, ship calls were mutually arranged with countries like the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France, and others. Visits of friendship, exchanges of experience, and technical consultations are also organized. In their turn, various scientific and cultural-artistic army institutions develop international collaboration in a wide range of ways. The Romanian military academy has made several delegation exchanges, pursuing an interchange of information relating to the instruction process with various countries. including the United States. The Military Publishing House, the *Apărarea patriei* newspaper, and the *Viața militară* magazine and the Central Military Museum have permanent contacts, in their own field of activity, with publishing houses, publications, and cultural establishments in countries throughout the world.

Romanian army institutions are members of relevant international organizations: e.g., the Romanian Military History Commission is affiliated with the International Military History Commission, and the Central Military Museum is a member of the International Association of Arms and Military History Museums. Romanian military specialists in the field of social sciences and technology are also members of various international bodies. After 1970, the Romanian Military History Commission was represented in historical science congresses (Moscow, San Francisco, Bucharest, Stuttgart), and played host to and sponsored the August 1980 International History Conference.

The army's film studio is a regular participant in international film festivals on military subjects. The "Doina" ensemble has become a genuine ambassador of Romanian art abroad. Cooperation has steadily grown in publishing, book and documentary material exchanges, study in archives and libraries, as well as exchanges of items belonging to museum collections.

In the realm of diplomatic ties, the military attachés contribute, in their turn, to developing relations between socialist Romania's army and the armies of the countries to which they are accredited. As part of their assignments, they arrange consultations, film galas, photograph exhibitions, etc., illustrating Romanian military doctrine and the efforts used by the army to prepare the defense of Romania's independence and sovereignty.

This review, brief as it is, of the general themes and doctrinal principles and of the concrete forms embodying the fundamental choices of the contents and goals of foreign relations on a military plane brings to the fore the constant preoccupation of Romania's military doctrine to establish a new way, able to guarantee both this country's own security aims and the lessening of the general level of insecurity in the international system. These could contribute to a new approach to the interconnection of national, regional, and global security, and confer on the army the role of an instrument of a policy for peace and understanding among peoples, able to guarantee the averting of a devastating military conflict.

NOTES

Notes to Chapter 1

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5. Major General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, *The Entire People's War For the Homeland's Defense with the Romanians* (Military Publishing House: Bucharest, 1980), 10-14.

6. Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Romania on the Way of Building up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society*, Meridiane Publishing House, Bucharest, 1979, p. 59.

7. D. Berciu, *Zorile istoriei în Carpati și la Dunăre* (Bucharest, 1966), 123-154; *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. I (Editura Militară: Bucharest, 1984), 24-26.

8. H. Daicoviciu, *Dacia de la Burebista la cucerirea romană* (Cluj, 1972), 127-149; *Istoria militară a poporului român*, 45-48.

9. Al. Vulpe, *Necropola hallstattiană de la Ferigile. Monografie archeologică* (Bucharest, 1967), 101-104; idem, *Geto-dacii ca unitate etno-istorică în lumea tracă*, in SCIVA, 31 (1980): 1, 5-11.

10. Concerning the expedition that enjoyed a huge participation (appreciated in later literary sources to 700,000 men on land along the western coast of the Black Sea and 600 ships), see: G. de Sanctis, *Il messagio figurato degli Sciti a Dario*, in vol. *In memoria lui Vasile Pîrvan* (Bucharest, 1934), 110-111; R. Henning, *Darius Feldzug in Skyttenland*, in *Terrae incognitae*, I (Leiden, 1936), 94-99; "Dariu i Scifii, Pričernomorija," in *Vestnik Drevniej Istoria*, 4 (1949): 15-28; P. Alexandrescu, *Retragerea lui Darius din expeditia scitică*, in *Studii și cercetări de istorie veche*, 7 (1956): 3-4, 319-342; *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. I, 54-60.

11. The development of the whole campaign is narrated by Herodotus *Istorii*, IV, 93, 94-96, who eulogized the exceptional moral-spiritual traits of the Getae. Works mentioning that Herodotus' appreciations, unique in its kind, would be confirmed by numerous later Greek and Roman sources; see in this respect P. Aurelian, *Geții și Dacii din Scythia Minor documentați în izvoarele scrise de la Sofocle la Strabo*, in "Pontica," 7 (1974): 9-26.

12. Major General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, *The Entire People's War for the Homeland's Defense with the Romanians*, 22-23.

13. Al. Vulpe, *Cercetări arheologice și interpretări istorice privind secolul VII-V î.e.n. în spațiul carpato-dunărean*, in "Memoriam Antiquitatis," 2 (1970): 115-213.

14. *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. I, 65-72.

15. The expedition is narrated by Arrianus, *Anabasis*, I, 1, after the diary of Ptolemaios.

16. Arrianus, I, 3, 5.

17. Ibidem, I, 4, 4.

18. Major General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, op. cit., 24.

19. C. Daicoviciu, *Țara lui Dromichaites*, in *Emlekkönyv Kélémen Lájos* (Cluj, 1957), 179-186.

20. From bibliography about Lysimachus, see W. Hünerwadel, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Königs Lysimachos von Thrakien* (Zürich, 1900); G. B. Possanti, *Il re Lisimaco di Tracia* (Torino-Roma, 1901).

21. *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. I, 72-78; The campaign is narrated by Diodor from Sicilia, *Biblioteca istorică*, XIX, 73, 1-2; XXI, 11-12, XXI, 12, 1; Pausanias, *Călătorie în Grecia*, I, 9, 5-7.

22. Pausanias, I, 9, 7.

23. Ibidem.

24. Major General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, op. cit., 25.

25. Diodorus Siculus, XXI, 12, 1.

26. Ibidem, 12, 3.

27. Ibidem.

28. Ref. the Geto-Dacian chieftains who continued to fight against the foreign invasions, see *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. 1, 80-91.

29. Strabo, VII, 3, 11.

30. The figure of the great Geto-Dacian king is evoked by V. Pîrvan, *Getica*, 77-83; R. Vulpe, *Getul Burebista, conducător al întregului neam geto-dac*, in Studii și Comunicări–Pitești, 1 (1968): 33-35; H. Daicoviciu, *Dacia de la Burebista la cucerirea romană*, 7-20; I. H. Crișan, *Burebista și epoca sa*, II, ed. (Bucharest, 1977); D. Berciu, *Burebista și tradiția statală*, in Revista de Istoria, 33 (1980): 6, 1027-1042.

31. Strabo, VII, 3, 13.

32. Information at Strabo, VII, 3, 11; M. Macrea, *Burebista și celții de la Dunărea de mijloc*, in Studii și cercetări de istorie veche, 7 (1956): 1-2, 23-38; Em. Condurachi, *Burebista și orașele pontice*, in Studii și cercetări de istorie veche, 4 (1953): 3-4, 515-524.

33. The doctrine of the entire people's war with the Geto-Dacians in the time of Burebista, at Major General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, op. cit., 31-35.

34. V. Mihailov, *Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae*, tom I (Sofia, 1956), nr. 13.

35. Ibidem.

36. Paul MacKendrick, *Pietrele dacilor vorbesc* (Bucharest, 1978), 9.

37. H. Daicoviciu, *Dacia de la Burebista la cucerires romană*, 104-109; idem, in *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. I, 130-140.

38. Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Romania on the Way of Building up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society*, vol. 14 (Meridian Publishing House: Bucharest, 1978), 318.

39. Tacitus, *Historiae*, III, 46.

40. Seutonius, *Domitianus*, VI, 1; Eutropius, VII, 23, 4; Iordanes, *Getica*, 76.

41. St. Gsell, *Essai sur le règne de l'empereur Domitien* (Paris, 1894), 135-137.

42. Dio Cassius, *Istoria romana*, LXVII, 6, 1.

43. Ilie Ceaușescu, op. cit., 40-42; *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. I, 144-151.

44. Suetonius, *Domitianus*, 6, 1; Iordanes, *Getica*, 77-78.

45. Dio Cassius, LXVIII, 7, 2-3.

46. I. Glodariu, *Sistemul defensiv al statului dac si întinderea provinciei Dacia*, in "Acta Musei Napocensis," 19, 1982.

47. About the emperor's personality, see R. Paribeni, *Optimus Princepts. Saggio sulla stroia e sui tempi dell'imperatore Traiano*, vol. I-II (Messina, 1926-1927); E. Cizek, *Epoca lui Traian* (Bucharest, 1980).

48. Dio Chrysostomos, *Discursuri*, XVI-XX.

49. Ref. the Daco-Roman wars in 101-102 and 105-106, see L. Rossi, *Trajan's Column and Dacian Wars* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1971); Major General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, op. cit., 43-48; N. Gostar, *L'armée romaine dans les guerres daces de Trajan 101-102, 105-106*, in Dacia NS, 23, (1979): 115-122; *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. I, 153-179.

50. Priscianus, VI.

51. This plan conceived and carried out by Decebalus is presented and analysed in detail in R. Vulpe, I. Barnea, *Din istoria Dobrogei*, vol. II (Bucharest, 1968), 84-93.

52. Ibidem, 11, 2-3.

53. Ibidem, 14, 1-3.

54. Ibidem, 8, 3.

55. This scene is showed in the column, scene CXLV and on the stele from Grammeni analyzed by M. Speidel, *The Captor of* Decebalus. A New Inscription of Philippi, in *Journal of Roman Studies*, 60, 1970, 142-153.

56. Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Romania on the Way of Building up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society*, vol. 14 (Meridian Publishing House: Bucharest, 1978), 298-299.

57. N. Macrea, *Viata in Dacia romană*, (Bucharest, 1969), 218.

58. Detailed appreciations on the consequences of the Daco-Roman wars on the Dacian people's situation under Roman rule at Major General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, *The Entire People's War for the Homeland's Defense with the Romanians*, 49-62; and *Transylvania, An Ancient Romanian Land*, (Bucharest, 1984), 14-16.

59. A distinct category of rebels against Roman occupation is mentioned in ancient sources under the name of *latrones* both in Dacia and in other provinces.

60. Lactantius, *De mortibus persecutorum*, 23.

61. Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Romania on the War of Building up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society*, vol. 22 (Meridian Publishing House, Bucharest, 1982), 7.

62. Karl Marx, *Capitalul*, vol. L, IInd edition (Bucharest, 1948), 232-233.

63. Mircea Mușat, Ion Ardeleanu, *De la statul geto-dac la statul român unitar* (Bucharest, 1983), 74.

64. N. Iorga, *Istoria românilor*, vol. II (Bucharest, 1937), 13.

65. General Ion I. Atanasiu, *Oastea română de-a lungul vreacurilor* (Bucharest, 1933), 42.

66. Nicolae Bălcescu, *Puterea armată și arta militară de la întemeierea Principatului Valahiei pînă acum*, in "Scrieri militare alese" (Bucharest, 1957): 70.

67. Ibidem, 72.

68. N. Iorga, *Chestiunea Dunării (Istorie a Europei răsăritene în legătură cu această chestie)* (Vălenii de Munte, 1913), 8.

69. Idem, *Elemente economice în cultura românească*, in vol. *Conferințe și prelegeri* (Bucharest, 1943), 53.

70. Simion Mehedinți, *Fruntaria României spre răsărit*, in *Opere complete*, vol. I/2 (Bucharest, 1943), 271.

71. A. D. Xenopol, *Istroia românilor din Dacia Traiană*, IInd edition (Bucharest, 1926), 142.

72. *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. I, 249.

73. St. Olteanu, *Etapele de formare a statelor feudale românești și structuri teritoriale politice românești în spatiul carpato-danubiano-pontic în secolele VIII-XI*, in "Revista de istorie," 30, nr. 2 (1977): 313-330 and 32, nr. 2, 1979, 285-307.

74. *Anonymi Bele regis notarii Geste Hungarorum*, Fasc. I, in *Fontes Historiae Daco-Romanorum* (Bucharest, 1934), 96 and foll; Simonis de Keza, *Chronicon Hungaricarum*, Fasc. IV, in *Fontes* . . . (Bucharest, 1935), 35; *Chronica Nestoris*, Fasc. VII, in *Fontes* . . . (Bucharest, 1935), 46-47.

75. *Anonymi Bele regis notarii, Gesta Hungarorum*, 74-75.

76. See *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. I, 261-273.

77. *Chronicon pictum Vindobonense*, Fasc. XI, in *Fontes Historiae Daco-Romanorum* (Bucharest, 1937), 19; *Chronica Nestoris*, 46-47.

78. *Anonymi Bele regis notarii. Gesta Hungarorum*, 95.

79. S. Szilágyi, *Endely ország Története*, vol. I (Pest, 1859).

80. Losonczy Istvan, *Hármas kis tükör* (Pozsony, 1783), 27.

81. S. Szilágyi, op. cit., 56.

82. András Huszti, *O és új dácia*, 1791, 8.

83. *Rogerii Carmen Miserabile*, in *Fontes Historiae Daco-Romanorum*, Fasc. V (Bucharest, 1935), 89-91.

84. DIR, C, sec. XIII, vol. II, p. 369.

85. *Chronicon Pictum Vindobonense*, 234.

86. Major General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, *The Entire People's War for the Homeland's Defense with the Romanians*, 77.

87. This southeastern part of Moldavian territory up to the Dniester banks was known in Middle Ages under the name of Bessarabia in the memory of the Wallachian dynasty of the Bessarabs who ruled over it.

88. Hurmuzaki, vol. I/1, p. 622.

89. N. Bălcescu, *Mersul revoluției în istoria românilor*, in op. cit., 195.

90. *Anonymi Bele notarii*, in op. cit., 41.

91. *Umanistul Nicolaus Olahus (Nicolae Românul) (1493-1568), Texte alese* (Bucharest, 1968), 116-117.

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2. Lieutenant Colonel V. Nădejde, *Istoria armatei române*, vol. I (Iași, 1930), 13.

3. N. Iorga, *Istoria armatei românești* (Bucharest, 1970), 25.

4. *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. II (Editura Militară; Bucharest, 1986), 483.

5. Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Romania on the War of Building up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society*, vol. 24 (Political Printing House, Bucharest, 1983), 52.

6. *Tratatele Tării Românești și Moldovei cu Imperiul otoman în secolele XIV-XVI: ficțiune politică și realitate istorică*, în vol. *Stat, societate, natiune, interpretări istorice* (Cluj-Napoca, 1982), 98.

7. I. Bogdan, *Documentele lui Ștefan cel Mare*, vol. II (Bucharest, 1913), 174-175.

8. N. Bălcescu, *Mersul revoluției în istoria românilor*, loc. cit, 195.

9. *Invățăturile lui Neagoe Basarab către fiul său Theodosie* (Editura Minerva; Bucharest), 1970, 278.

10. Ibidem, 385-386.

11. Ibidem, 387.

12. Ibidem, 388.

13. Ibidem, 386.

14. Ibidem, 388.

15. Ibidem, 389.

16. Ibidem, 388.

17. *Crestomatie turcă. Izvoare narative privind istoria Europei orientale și centrale (1263-1683)*, ed. M. Guboglu (Bucharest, 1978), 426-428; *Cronici turcești privind țările române*, vol. III (Bucharest, 1971), 529.

18. Major General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, *The Entire People's War for the Homeland's Defense with the Romanians* (Military Publishing House; Bucharest, 1980), 82.

19. *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. II, 505.

20. *Bătălie între romani și cartaginezi*, 216 î.e.n.

21. Quote from Emile Wintey, *L'art de la guerre*, vol. I, (Marabout Université, 1967), 103.

22. Liddell Hart, *Strategia. Acțiunile indirecte*, (Bucharest, 1973), 58.

23. *România și tradițiile luptei armate a întregului popor* (Bucharest, 1972), 8.

24. *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. II, 505-506.

25. Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Romania on the Way of Building up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society*, vol. 9 (Political Printing House, Bucharest, 1974).

26. Ștefan Pascu, *Dimitrie Cantemir în gîndirea și conștiința poporului român*, în "Analele de istorie," anul XIX, nr. 4/1973, 13.

27. Nicolae Iorga, *Sfaturi pe întunerec* (Bucharest, 1976), 77.

28. *Operele principelui Dimitrie Cantemir*, printed by Societatea Academică Română, tomul II (Bucharest, MDCCCLXXV), 36-37.

29. Professor Dr. Pompiliu Teodor, *Epoca luminilor şi lupta de eliberare socială şi naţională a românilor din Transylvania*, in File din istoria militară a poporului român, vol. 11 (Bucharest, 1983), 259.

30. Idem, 260.

31. *DRH, B*, vol. I, 18.

32. Apud Camil Mureşan, *Iancu de Hunedoara*, ed. a II-a (Bucharest, 1968) 54-58.

33. "Columna lui Traian," IV, 37-38 (Petru de Thomasis).

34. *Scriptores rerum Polonicarum*, t. II (Cracoviae, 1874), 27.

35. M. Cromer, *De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum* (Basiliae, 1568), 433î M. Stryjkowski, *Kronika Polska Litewska. Zmodzka i Wazy tkiej Rusi*, II (Warszawa, 1846), 302.

36. "Arhiva istorică a României," tom. I, 1st part (Bucharest, 1865), 10.

37. Ibidem, tom. I, second part, 168.

38. *Călători străini despre române*, vol. I (Bùcharest, 1968), 199.

39. Grigore Ureche, *Letopiseţul Ţării Moldovei*, ed. P.P. Panaitescu (Bucureşti, 1958), 110, 116, 144, 198, etc. From the time of Despot Vodă we have another [piece of] information according to which the "call" was made at first in the capital for "all the men to be under colors at the second call." *Călători străini*, II, 163.

40. *Cronici turceşti privind ţările române. Extrase*, vol. I, secolul XVI—mijlocul secolului al XVII-lea, edited by M. Guboglu and M. Mehmet (Bucharest, 1966), 36-37.

41. *DRH, D*, vol. I (1222-1456), 406.

42. See *Călători străini despre ţările române*, vol. I (Bucharest, 1968), 149, 199.

43. C. Esarcu, *O relaţiune contemporană inedită despre Ştefan cel Mare, 1476 din Biblioteca Marciană din Veneţia*, în "Columna lui Traian" (Bucharest, 1876), 378.

44. General Radu Rosetti, *Istoria artei militare a românilor pînă la mijlocul veacului al XVII-lea* (Bucharest, 1947), 78.

45. Şt. Pascu, *Voievodatul Transilvaniei*, vol. I (Cluj, 1972), 298.

46. Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria românilor prin călători*, vol. I, ed. II-a, 1928, 178.

47. Hurmuzaki, XII, 870.

48. *Cronicile slavo-române*, 17.

The word "band" is very old in Romanian, deriving from the Latin

coetus = "assembly, grouping." It was inherited from the period of setting up the Romanian people and designates a form of military power organization for the whole period.

49. *DRH, D*, vol. I, 294.

50. Ibidem, 296.

51. I. Bogdan, *Documentele lui Ţtefan cel Mare*, II, 338.

52. J. Dlugosz, *Historiae Poloniae*, II, col. 417.

53. Hurmuzaki, XV/1, p. 29.

54. *Fontes Historiae Daco-Romanae*, III, *Scriptores byzantini saec. XI-XIV* (Bucharest, 1975), 485.

55. A. Bonfini, *Rerum Hungaricarum Decades*, II (Leipzig, 1936), 28.

56. J. Dlugosz, *Historiae Poloniae*, I, col. 461-462; cf. "Romano-slavica," IV, (1960): 234.

57. M. Costin, *Opere*, ed. P.P. Panaitescu (Bucharest, 1958), 236.

58. N. Iorga, *Acte si fragmente*, vol. III, 43.

59. *Cronici turceşti*, I, p. 128, 328.

60. I. Bogdan, *Inscripţiile de la Cetatea Albă* (Bucharest, 1900), 17.

61. *Călători străini*, I, 138.

62. P. Abrudan, F. Sontag, *Sistemul de apărare al cetăţii Sibiului în secolele XV şi XVI–expresie a războiului popular*, în SMMIM (1974-1975): 129.

63. P. P. Panaitescu, *Contribuţii la istoria lui Ştefan cel Mare*, p. 4-6.

64. Martin Bielski, op. cit., în loc. cit., 166.

65. M. Constăchescu, *Documente moldoveneşti de la Bogdan voievod* (1504-1517) (Bucharest, 1940), 507.

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68. *Călători străini*, I, p. 418.

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70. Hurmuzaki, II/9, 304-307.

71. A. Bonfini, in *Călători străini*, I, 482-483.

72. See M. Cantacuzino, *Genealogia Cantacuzinilor*, ed. N. Iorga, (Bucharest, 1902); *Al. G. Stourdza, L'Europe Orientale et le rôle historique des Mavrocoardats* (Paris, 1913), 148.

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74. Lieutenant General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, *Transilvania, străvechi pământ românesc*, 57-59.

75. Dragalina, P., *Din istoria Banatului Severin* (Caransebeș, 1902).

76. *Istoria României*, vol. III (Bucharest, 1964), 461-464, 475-480, 599-602.

77. Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Romania on the Way of Building up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society*, vol. 9 (Political Printing House: Bucharest, 1977) 35.

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1. N. Bălcescu, *Opere*, vol. I, 1974, pp. 49-50.

2. Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Cuvîntare la adunarea solmnă organizată cu prilejul aniversării a 65 de ani de la făurirea Partidului Comunist Român, 8 mai 1986* (Editura Politică: Bucharest, 1986), 6.

3. Lieutenant General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, *Transylvania, An Ancient Romanian Land*, 57-58.

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7. *Documente privind istoria României. Răscoala din 1821. Documente interne*, vol. III (Bucharest, 1960), 149.

8. D. V. Barnovski, *Originile democrației române. "Cărvunarii," Constituția Moldovei de la 1822* (Jassy, 1922), 188.

9. Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria armatei românesti*, vol. II (Bucharest, 1919), 248.

10. Cornelia Bodea, *Lupta românilor pentru unitatea națională 1834-1849* (Bucharest, 1967), 219 and 222.

11. N. Bălcescu, *Scrieri militare alese* (Bucharest, 1957), 111-113.

12. In detail, see chapter 4, Major General Dr. Ilie Ceaușescu, *The Entire People's War for the Homeland's Defense with the Romanians.*

13. *Anul 1848 în Principatele Române. Acte şi documente*, tom. I (Bucharest, 1902), 494.

14. Ibidem, tom. III, 139.

15. George Barițiu, *Părți alese din istoria Transilvaniei*, vol. II (Sibiu, 1890), 222.

16. *Anul 1848 în Principatele Române. Acte şi documente*, tom. IV (Bucharest, 1903), 106.

17. Eftimie Murgu, *Scrieri* (Bucharest, 1969), 425.

18. Simion Bărnuțiu, *Românii şi ungurii* (Cluj, 1924), 31.

19. G. Sion, *Suvenire contimporane* (București, 1888), 322 and 367.

20. N. Bănescu and V. Mihăilescu, *Ioan Maiorescu* (Bucharest, 1912), 78.

21. Ion Papiu, alias Popovici, *O scurtă cuvîntare spre deslușirea tinerei constituții a României în înțelesul tuturor* (Bucharest, 1848), 8.

22. Silviu Dragomir, *Avram Iancu* (Bucharest, 1965), 210.

23. Nicolae Bălcescu, op. cit., 267.

24. *Anul 1848 în Principatele Române. Acte şi documente*, tom. I (Bucharest, 1902), 668-669.

25. Radu Pantazi, *C.A. Rosetti. Gînditorul-omul* (Bucharest, 1969), 62.

26. *Anul 1848 în Principatele Române. Acte şi documente*, tom. I (Bucharest, 1902), 670.

27. Paul Cornea, Mihai Zamfir, *Gîndirea românească în epoca paşoptistă* (Bucharest, 1968), 241-242.

28. N. Bănescu and V. Mihăilescu, op. cit., 236.

29. *Documente privind anul revoluționare 1848 în Țara Românească* (Bucharest, 1962), 17.

30. I. Ghica, *Amintiri din pribegia după 1848* (Bucharest, 1889), 20.

31. N. Bălcescu, *Opere*, vol. IV (Correspondence), edition G. Zane (Bucharest, 1964), 93.

32. Cornelia Bodea, op. cit., 142.

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2. "Secolul," year I, no. 35 or 9 May 1857.
3. "Revista Carpaților," year II of 15 March 1861.
4. "Românul," year IV, no. 280 of 6 October 1861.
5. Ion Ghica, *Scrieri*, vol. I (Bucharest, 1914), 285-286.
6. Ibidem, 286.
7. Ibidem, 287.
8. G. Adrian, *Mémoire sur l'organisation de la force armée des deux Principautés Roumains* (Bucharest, 1858), 9.
9. Captain George Anghelescu, *Organizarea sistemului militar al României*, in "România militară," year I, vol. I of January-February 1864, 54, 57, 58.
10. *Pagini din gîndirea militară românească, 1821-1916* (Bucharest, 1969), 51-52.
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2. Nicolae Bălcescu, *Opere*, vol. I (Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Române, 1953), 26-27.

International law incriminates aggression as an illegal act. The definition of aggression, unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly on 14 December 1974 (see Resolution 3 314/14.12.1974 in Resolutions of the Assembly at Its Twenty-Ninth Regular Session, 17.09.-18.12.1974), to the elaboration of which Romania made a notable contribution, represents an invaluable legal instrument for the clarification of acts of aggression.

The international law considers war in self-defense as legal; specific to it are moral and licit goals—the safeguarding of the states' right to existence, observance of sovereignty, and independence and territorial integrity. The aim of the right to self-defense represents the general aim of international law—safeguarding mankind's material and spiritual assets and recognition of all the peoples' right to freedom and peace.

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6. Law no. 14/1972 of National Defense Organization in the Socialist Republic of Romania, in *Apărarea națională a României socialiste.* Documente, 1965-1977 (Editura Militară: Bucharest, 1978) (to be further referred to as Law 14/1972).

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8. Nicolae Bălcescu, *Opere*, vol. I (Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Române: Bucharest, 1953), 27.

9. Cf. Documents on the activity of the Romanian Communist party in the army, 1921-1944 (Editura Militară: Bucharest, 1974), 15.

10. See *Nations Unies, Charte de Nations Unies et Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice*, article 51.

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3. Cf. collective, *Sistemul militar* (Editura Militară: Bucharest, 1973), 97.

4. Law no. 14/1972, title II, chapter IV, article 13.

5. Cf. collective, *Apărarea națională în concepția Partidului Comunist Român* (Editura Militară: Bucharest, 1982), 201.

6. Nicolae Ceaușescu, *România pe drumul construirii societății socialiste multilateral dezvoltate*, vol. 24 (Bucharest, 1983), 37.

7. Law no. 2/1978 of Civil Defense in the Socialist Republic of Romania, in *Bulteinul Oficial*, part I, no. 24/1978.

8. Law no. 14 of the National Defense Organization in the Socialist Republic of Romania, in *Buletinul Oficial*, no. 160/29, December 1972, title V, articles 127-144.

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4. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Romania (Bucharest 1980), 17.

5. Law no. 14/1972, title I, article 5.

6. Law no. 5/14.051969 on the Creation, Organization, and Operation of the Defense Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania (to be further referred to as Law no. 5/1969).

7. Law 14/1972, title II, chapter 14, articles 10-13.

8. See Law 14/1972, title I, chap. I, articles 6-7.

9. Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Romania, article 43.

10. See Law 14/1972, title II, chap. III, article 9.

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14. See Law 14/1972, title II, chap. 14, article 10.

15. See Law 14/1972, title III, chap. III, section I, articles 105, 106, 107.

16. See Law no. 14/1972, title III, chap. III, section III, article 119.

17. See Law no. 2/24 March 1978 on civil defense in the Socialist Republic of Romania and Law no. 14/1972, title III, chap. III, section II, articles 115-117.

18. See Law 2/24 March 1978.

19. See Law no. 14/1972, title II, chapter IV, articles 10-13.

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2. Cf. *Elemente de strategie militară* (Editura Militar]: Bucharest, 1975), 219.

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Notes to Chapter 15

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6. See *Apărarea națională în concepția Partidului Comunist Român* (Editura Militară: Bucharest, 1982), 240.

7. Nicolae Ceaușescu, *România pe drumul construirii societății socialiste multilateral dezvoltate*, vol. 19 (Editura Politică: Bucharest), 261-262.

8. *Organizația Tratatului de la Varșovia, 1955-1975* (Editura Politică: Bucharest, 1976), 17.

9. See Nicolae Ceaușescu, *România pe drumul desăvîrșirii construcției socialiste*, vol. 1 (Editura Politică: Bucharest), 52.

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